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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER 8: 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN FRANCE 
By some measures, the French economy has performed well 
during the last few decades. From 1967 to 1988, France's economy 
grew an average 3.3 percent a year, a rate higher than that for 
Germany ( 2. 8 percent) ; the U.S. ( 2. 6 percent) ; or the U.K. ( 2. 2 
percent); but lower than Japan (5.3 percent). Real GNP per person 
increased in France from $9,317 in 1967 to $15,853 (in constant 
1987 dollars), during the same time period. 
The performance of the French economy, in spite of these 
growth rates, has been mixed. The French economy has severe 
structural problems, centred on the production plant of French 
industry, specifically on the old technology employed in many of 
the French industrial establishments. As the result of the old 
capital stock used, there has been a noticeable decline in French 
industrial productivity (Balas sa, 1985). France's productivity 
growth rates, adjusted for infusions of new capital and henceforth 
for the use of advanced technologies, averaged 5.1 percent in the 
1951 to 1973 period; 3.2 percent in the 1973 to 1979 period; and 
2.4 percent in the 1979-1986 period. 
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French merchandise trade has had a negative balance in all 
except six years between 1960 and 1988. The last year France had 
a current account surplus in merchandise trade was 1986 and the 
surplus was a relatively insignificant $2.9 billion. In 1987, 
France's merchandise trade showed deficits of $3.1 billion and in 
1988 this deficit was estimated at $3.0 billion. France's share 
of the world's exports has remained essentially the same over the 
last twenty years. In 1967, France's share of world exports in 
value terms was 6.5 percent; 8 percent in 1979 and 6.7 percent in 
1988. By comparison, Germany's world market share increased from 
11 percent to 14 percent during the same time period; in the 
United Kingdom it declined from 9 percent in 1968 to about 6 
percent in 1987. Conversely, Japan's share increased from about 7 
percent in 1968 to 19 percent in 1987. 
France's mixed economic performance over the last two decades 
took place during a period when the French government's expend-
itures focused on economic improvement were increasing con-
siderably. France's government deficit in 1977 was FFr. 18.3 
billion; in 1987 it had increased to FFr 150 billion and in 1989 
it is estimated at FFr 100 billion. Much of these public 
expenditures were made to improve France's technological base, but 
with very modest results (Crafts, 1984; Chavaron, 1989). 
The advancement of science and technology in France in spite 
of large government expenditures has been at best moderate as 
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witnessed by most indicators of science and technology trends. 
French scientists have been responsible for some notable scienti-
fic discoveries since World War II, though these breakthroughs 
have not significantly advanced France's technological and 
industrial growth (O'Brien and Keyder, 1978). In fact the growth 
of advanced technology industry sectors in France has been very 
modest. 
Several uniquely French policy characteristics partly account 
for this modest performance. Detailed analyses of these ·are 
presented in the following sections, however, it is worthwhile 
identifying these at the outset. French science, technology, 
industry and economic policies are formulated and exercised at the 
highest echelons of the French government. Most of these policies 
are directed to large industrial establishments, owned or con-
trolled by the French government. Certainly, most of the 
fi~ancial assistance provided by the French government to indus-
try, is earmarked for government controlled enterprises. French 
firms not controlled by the government, a large proportion of 
which are small or medium sized, receive very limited assistance 
although all are affected by various policies and regulations 
promulgated by the French government, and tailored for the large 
industrial entities. The small or medium sized firms in France 
have very limited opportunities to contribute to industry 
policies before these are issued and the French government makes 
little or no attempt to build a consensus for the policies 
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promulgated (Gilpin, 1968; EEG, 1986). These policies are 
designed and implemented by a large cadre of high-level French 
bureaucrats or "functionnaires", the "Grands Corps" of the French 
government, employed in some eleven departments and agencies, so-
called "bureaus. " Most, if not all, of these functionnaires 
remain civil servants for all their professional lives. They have 
no opportunity to broaden their knowledge outside French govern-
ment offices and their industry experience is limited to the 
large, government controlled industrial enterprises. Essentially 
all are graduates from the three academically prestigious schools 
in France -- the "Grandes eccles," far removed from other French 
academic institutions, from business and from industry (O'Brien 
and Keyder, 1978). These French officials have limited interest 
in the smaller enterprises and have no interest in seeking infor-
mation, guidance or advice from the small or medium sized firms. 
These elite French civil servants are committed to "grandeur" 
types of policies enacted in numerous "grands programmes" -- large 
and expansive science and technology projects undertaken by 
government controlled firms but with specific objectives (OECD, 
1985). 
The principal overriding objective of all these projects has 
been to retain French control, if not ownership, of advanced 
technology industries in France, or to recapture the French 
domestic market for advanced technology goods (Zuscovitch, 1985). 
398 
One of the principal policies the French functionnaires have 
consistantly used to retain control of industry sectors has been 
·the nationalization of key industry sectors in France. As a 
result of this, most of the advanced technology firms in France 
are fully or partly owned, and certainly controlled by the French 
government. The design and execution of the grands programmes by 
the French civil service has also been tailored to retain French 
control of the industry sectors to which these projects have been 
applied (Gilpin, 1968). 
This desire of the French government to control advanced 
technology industries in France has resulted in a set of policies 
which in turn have had an adverse impact on the advancement of 
French science and technology. 
To begin with, French science and technology policies 
emphasize the supply or production side of advanced technology 
goods, with very limited attention paid to the demand for such 
products. For those industry sectors where the producers, i.e., 
the French government, could dictate the specifications of the 
products, the demand for such products and the diffusion of 
technology throughout the French economy has been very good. Such 
has been the case, for example, with French governmental policies 
to develop and apply digital communications for the French 
telephone and communications services owned and operated by the 
French government (Macioti, 1986; Farnour, 1983). 
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Demand for advanced technology products and the diffusion of 
technology for products which are based on market decisions by 
users -- in particular users that comprise the small size enter-
prises in France rather than French government edicts, has 
remained poor. For example, a large scale government project to 
diffuse computers specified by the French government and manu-
factured in France throughout the French economy was essentially a 
complete failure because the potential users of these systems, the 
French industrial and service establishments, preferred imported 
.. 
computer systems, such as an IBM system 360. Furthermore sales of 
French advanced technology products in world markets where demand 
rather than supply determines the sales potential have been weak. 
However, analyses of the content of these French exports, indicate 
that a significant portion of these are manufactured in France, 
but are products of foreign firms or multinational firms located 
in France. Furthermore, for some of these export products, 
certain modifications must be made in order to make these 
compatible with international standards and therefore eligible for 
export markets ("Economist", 10 December 1988). 
A number of the French government's technology and industry 
policies therefore have been designed to attract foreign firms to 
France in order to acquire foreign technologies. Indeed, among 
the many and varied industry policies the French government has 
introduced since the end of World War II to improve the industrial 
base in France, policies which offer significant benefits for 
400 
foreign firms to locate in France, have been continuous and 
visible (Friedman, 1983; Northcutt and Rogers, 1985). Typically, 
various types of agreements have been made to allow French civil 
servants to have certain control over these foreign firms with the 
conditions set forth by the French government in return for per-
mission to operate on French soil (Balassa, 1985). 
Government policies in France have also included both the 
protection and the promotion of key French native industrial 
sectors through a wide variety of mechanisms. These have 
included financial subsidies of many types, price controls, the 
encouragement of mergers to achieve economies of scale and 
therefore market power, export promotion and import restrictions. 
The ownership, complete or partial, of many, if not most, French 
industrial firms by the French government facilitates the 
implementation, but not necessarily the results of these French 
government policies (Dunning, 1977; Rendeiro, 1984). 
Not all of French industry is government owned. For example, 
the aircraft manufacturer, Aerospatiale, operates with essentially 
no government involvement in day-to-day operations, but most of 
the larger firms are controlled by the government. 
In conclusion, as in Japan, French government policies are 
centralized within an elite bureaucracy that has considerable 
autonomy in shaping science, technology and industrial policies. 
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Unlike Japan, the French industrial and government bureaucracy 
focus on the large government controlled enterprises. No attempt 
is made to undertake dialogues with industry executives of the 
smaller and medium sized firms, labour, the public or academia. 
8. 2 SCIENCE 1 RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY PERFORMANCE IN FRANCE 
The principal components of the French scientific, research 
and related activities pool in France are the French government 
laboratories and research institutions belonging to French 
national research establishments such as the National Centre for 
Scientific Research (CNRS), the French Space Agency (CNES), the 
Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and other national research 
institutions. 
These are large establishments with large staffs. For 
example, the CNRS employs 10,000 scientists and 15,000 other 
staff, while the CEA has 6,000 employees. All of the employees of 
these establishments are French civil servants, working exclu-
sively for national research institutes with no work experience in 
other research institutions of any kind. From time to time these 
scientific and technical functionnaires are joined by civil 
servants from grandes ecoles. In some French government funded 
projects, particularly those which focus on the research and 
development of industrial technologies (so-called "programmes 
mobilisateurs") scientists from other French universities (other 
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than grandes ecoles) may participate. Such occurrences are not 
common. 
The second important research and development performing 
group in France consists of universities and the three grandes 
ecoles. The three grandes ecoles dominate the management and 
administration of research and related activities. The French 
universities undertake the actual scientific and related research. 
There exists in France a wide gap between grandes ecoles and 
universities, as stated in a 1985 report by the OECD. 
Dualism in the French educational system is a core 
element that perpetuates the cleavage between research, 
education and industry. On one side universities, which 
conduct most of the research, carry low prestige in 
industrial circles and attract little attention; firms 
therefore often hesitate to recruit university graduates 
for the most promising careers. On the other, the 
engineering schools, and especially the "Grandes 
Ecoles," creates a caste with privileged access to key 
positions of industrial power in major firms. The caste 
can only serve as a career restraint, and a block on the 
ambitions of those educated elsewhere. It certainly 
hinders the integration of university researchers into 
industry. Despite timid attempts to remedy the 
situation, not only do the groups form two separate 
communities, but the inadequate research training for 
engineers in France means that those with the greatest 
ability in abstraction and analysis are not always tuned 
toward a research mentality and R&D strategies. 
The excessive separation between the public research 
institutes and the educational system further limits the 
flow of expertise from research to education, and in 
turn to industry. There is no role for research centres 
or individual researchers without teaching responsibil-
ities. However, a closed research system without sub-
stantial teaching functions cannot effectively transmit 
or diffuse the knowledge it creates. As experience in 
other countries demonstrates, students who pass into 
industry retain ties with research faculties which serve 
as channels of knowledge later. 
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The third components of the science and technology performing 
group in France are the research institutions operated by the 
regional organizations and local authorities. Until the late 
1970s these were of very limited importance in French scientific 
endeavours. In the last decade, however, research institutions or 
"technopoles" have been established by French regional and local 
authorities such as the Zone for Innovation and Scientific and 
Technological Realisations (ZIRST) at Meylan located in Grenoble. 
These have the potential to become important and, indeed, have to 
become more important in future technology activities. 
The fourth components of the French science and technology 
pool are the firms in the private industrial sector and 
nationalized companies. The nationalized companies participate 
and contribute to French science and technology activities by 
being invited to become members of the various grandes program-
mes. The firms in the private industrial sector undertake only 
modest research and development activities in France (Cuneo and 
Mairesse, .1983). As stated in an OBCD report" ••• the share of 
technical research funding borne by (such) firms is less than in 
the leading industrial countries. The same applies to the volume 
of research carried out by these same firms ••• " (OBCD, 1985). 
This structure of the French science and technology pool has 
remained unchanged since the end of World War II, in spite of 
404 
significant differences in the political philosophies of the 
various French governments since then. 
The following presents salient information on the four types 
of institutions which perform science and technology activities in 
France. 
8.2.1 Government Laboratories 
The most important French government scientific and research 
agencies with responsibilities for the conduct and support of 
research and technological development are listed in Table 8.1. 
Their relative importance can be seen by comparing their budgets 
(Table 8-2). The non-defence government agencies with the largest 
research programmes are the CEA and the CNRS. Of the three, the 
CNRS has the primary role in the performance of research and 
development activities. 
The CNRS, established in 1973, is the largest French govern-
ment supported research organization. The CNRS responsibilities 
were · defined by a government decree of 1982 in which it was 
required to: 
". • • evaluate and carry out, directly or indirectly, 
any research in the interest of science and of France's 
economic, social, and cultural progress; contribute to 
the application and valorization of the results of this 
research; develop scientific information, encouraging 
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TABLE 8.1 
Principal French Government Science Organizations, France 
National Centre for Scie~tific Research 
National Centre for Space Studies. 
Atomic Energy Commission 
National Agency for the Valorization of Research 
National Institute for Agricultural Research 
National Institute for Health & Medical Research 
Overseas Science and Technology Research Agency 
Tropical Agronomy Research Group 
French Agency for Rational Use of Energy 
Bureau of Geological and Mining Research 
French Research Institute for the Exploitation 
of the Sea 
Source: CNRS, Annual Report, 1987. 
CNRS 
CNES 
CEA 
ANVAR 
INRA 
INSERM 
ORSTOM 
GERDAT 
AFME 
BRGM 
IFREMER 
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TABLE 8.2 
Civilian Research and Technology Budget, France, 1985 
{in billions of FFr) 
Ministry of Research 
CNES 
CEA 
CNRS 
ANVAR 
INRA 
INFREMER 
INSERM 
Pasteur Institutes 
ORSTOM 
GERDAT 
AFME 
Research Project Funds* 
Ministry of Industr:y 
BRGM 
Other 
Post. Telephone and Telegraph 
Capital Equipment 
Electronics 
CNES 
Other 
other Ministries 
TOTAL 
(See PTT, below) 
2,198.1 
2,051.8 
910.3 
410.0 
435.4 
510.0 
134.0 
172.0 
115.0 
330.0 
89.6 
8,526.1 
83.3 
17.0 
100.0 
1,150.0 
1,898.9 
3,421.0 
337.0 
6,806.9 
4,984.7 
20,418.0 
* Support for International Research Centres and Programmes. 
Source: CNRS, Annual Report, 1987. 
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the use of the French language; contribute to training for 
and through research; and set national science policy in 
light of current and future trends in the national and 
international scientific situation." (EEC, 1985) 
The CNRS scientific programme is carried out by research 
units operated directly by the CNRS as well as in association with 
university laboratories, the grandes ecoles, and other government 
organizations. Its current staff of 25,000 includes 10,000 
researchers and 15,000 technical and administrative support 
staff. At the operating level, the CNRS·has a National Science 
Research Council, with 45 disciplinary panels. These panels have 
been responsible for recommendations on the programmes, funding, 
and personnel actions of every CNRS laboratory. In 1986, the CNRS 
had a total budget of 7.6 billion francs. The budget breakdown by 
programme and expenditure is shown in Table 8.3. 
The CNRS is organized into seven scientific departments, two 
national institutes (the National Institute for Astronomy and 
Geophysics and the National Institute of Nuclear Physics and 
Particle 
torates. 
share of 
Physics), and four (primarily administrative) dirac-
The seven scientific departments of the CNRS and their 
the CNRS budget are: 
Life Science 
Chemistry 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
Nuclear and Particle Physics 
Earth, Ocean, Atmospheric and 
Space Science 
Mathematics and Basic Physics 
Physical Sciences for Engineering 
25.5% 
15.6% 
13.9% 
12.3% 
11.6% 
11.4% 
8.3% 
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TABLE 8.3 
Budget of National Centre for Scientific Research 
{CNRS), France, 1986 
(in billions FFr) 
Programmes Financed 
Energy 
Biotechnology 
Electronics Services 
Third World 
Employment-Conditions 
French-Scientific Culture 
Material Industry 
Fundamental Research 
Final (Applied) Research 
Technology Development Programmes 
Indirect Resources 
TOTAL FUNDING 
Source: CNRS, 1987. 
1,288.8 
227.1 
400.9 
245.6 
296.2 
74.2 
9.4 
34.9 
3,888.0 
1,445.1 
1.011.3 
7,663.4 
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The remaining 1. 4 percent of the CNRS budget is allocated to 
interdisciplinary programmes. 
The CEA is the second largest research organization in 
France. Its basic function is to promote the use of nuclear 
energy in science, industry and defence. 
The CEA in 1986 had a total staff of about 2,000, of which 
about 60 percent consisted of professionals. In 1986, the total 
CEA total budget was 4.8 billion francs, of which 65 percent was 
allocated for programme and equipment authorizations. 
In addition to these agencies, French government funded 
scientific, research and technological activities in France are 
undertaken by several major national research facilities which are 
jointly operated by the CEA's Institute for Fundamental Research 
and the CNRS's National Institute of Nuclear Physics and Particle 
Physics. 
8.2.2 University and Grandes Bcoles Research Institutions 
University based science, technology and research activities 
are limited in France. An exception to this is the research 
undertaken by university science and engineering faculties at 
various laboratories operated by the French government. CNRS-
operated laboratories are the most important of this group and are 
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located on French university campuses. These provide opportun-
ities for French scientists to participate in the French govern-
ment sponsored and funded research. 
The principal CNRS laboratories are located at the Univer-
sities of Paris, Strasbourg, Grenoble, Lyon, Lille, Montpellier, 
Rennes, and Toulouse. In addition to these large CNRS labora-
tories, in 1987 the CNRS operated and funded some 1000 smaller 
research establishments, most of which are located near French 
universities. 
These French government funded CNRS research establishments 
in proximity to French universities provide the faculties of these 
universities with very important opportunities to engage in 
science, technology and research activities. 
A study by Zuscovitch (1985) evaluating the status of French 
science noted the following on this issue: 
Without these government institutions, univer-
sity research, the conditions of work in which 
have deteriorated steadily over the past 20 
years, would have been able neither to hold 
its own nor to maintain modern scientific 
teaching at a high level. These research 
institutions have enabled French scientists to 
make important discoveries on many fronts. 
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Some research and related activities in France are undertaken 
by the three grandes ecoles, the Ecole Polytechnique (science and 
engineering), the Ecole Normale Superieure (academic personnel), 
and the Ecole Nationale d 'Administration (government officials) • 
The emphasis in grandes ecoles, is however, not on research ~ 
~' but on management and administration and, of course, on public 
policy theory and practice. The student body in the grandes . 
ecoles are comprised entirely of French civil servants. 
8.2.3 Regional and Local Research Institutions 
Regional and local research institutions were not a factor in 
France prior to 1982. Legislation passed in that year, under 
President Mitterand, provided the basis for regional and local 
research institutions. The Policy and Planning Act for Research 
and Technological Development of July 15, 1982 provides provisions 
for regional science and technology policies defined as follows: 
"As part of regionalised planning and site location 
plans, the region shall define and develop regional 
technology poles and shall determine programmes of 
regional interest over several years ahead. 
The region shall be involved in formulating national 
research and technology policy and shall participate in 
implementing it. The region shall be particularly 
responsible for the dissemination and development of new 
technologies, training, scientific and technological 
information, for improving existing technologies, for 
decompartmentalising research and for integrating it 
within the economic social and cultural development of 
the region" (EEC, 1986). 
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These provisions for the development of scientific and technical 
resource bases in various regions of France are surprising in the 
light of a long standing and almost sacred French belief in the 
centralisation of government science and technology activities. 
This Act is, of course, the result of French political changes in 
1981. Furthermore, it represents only one of several science and 
technology regionalization initiatives undertaken during the 
1980's by the French government. A network of research, develop-
ment and technology advisers (the ARIST' s) established in 1982 
represents another French government attempt to decentralize 
science and technology activities in France. Other examples are 
the establishment in various regions of France, of Centres for 
Technology Transfer (CRITTs); and the establishment by.the French 
Ministry of Research and Technology of regional offices ( DRRI) 
which act as a liaison between the various regions and French 
government departments and agencies; and the implementation of 
"Contrats de Plan Etat-regions". 
The results of the French regional science and technology 
centres in terms of research and related activities undertaken, 
appear promising, but the history of these establishments is not 
sufficiently long to reach conclusions as to their impact on 
French science and technology activities. 
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8.2.4 Research Activities by French Industrial Firms 
. A distinction must be made between research activities 
undertaken by French industrial firms and those undertaken by 
private and nationalized firms. 
French private firms conduct limited research and development 
activities. Many of these are small establishments, described by 
many as "backwards" and with limited technical capacity (Chavaron, 
1989; Auquier, 1980; OECD, 1985). Nationalized firms in France 
participate in research and development activities via the grands 
programmes. French nationalized firms represent one of the 
principal components in most of the large scale research and 
development undertakings implemented by the French government. 
The importance of this effort has grown as the number of 
nationalized firms has increased in France. 
Six of the largest advanced technology firms in France were 
nationalized by the Mitterrand government shortly after the 
Socialists gained power in 1982 namely, Thomson, Rhone-
Poulenc, CII-Boneywell-Bull, Saint-Gobain, Compagnie General 
d'Electricite (CGE) and Pechiney-Ugine-Kihlmann (PUK). Other 
advanced technology industries in France, like telecommunications 
and the public utilities, have been nationalized for a long time. 
Further, a large number of advanced technology firms in France are 
semi-public -- that is, the French government has significant 
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shareholdings, and therefore has certain control over the 
management, including participation in research and development 
efforts (Kindleberger, 1964; Friedman, 1983). 
The National Agency for the Valorization of Research (ANVAR) 
is another French government office which provides private 
industry with low-interest loans, grants and tax incentives for 
scientific, research and development activities and for the 
adoption of advanced technologies. In 1981, about 1500 French 
firms received ANVAR assistance while by 1988, the number had 
increased to about 6000. 
French private firm expenditures for research and development 
increased by about 5.3 percent per annum during the 1970s; the 
increase from 1981 to 1988 was approximately 8 percent per annum. 
The French Industry Association or "Patronat" has fully 
supported the French government's management of research 
activities. A number of shortcomings concerning the French 
science research and development activities, as presented above, 
have been noted. 
Since the decision makers with regard to research and 
development activities in France are civil servants and not 
industry executives, the decisions 
considerations formulated by the 
are based on administrative 
French government. It is,. 
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however, the market analyses as formulated by industry executives 
which usually determine the choices, timing, allocation and 
selection of research and development activities. It has been 
alleged that without market analyses by industry, that is without 
the determination of entities willing and able to purchase 
advanced technology goods, the production of such goods would be a 
futile activity because the demand for such products may not 
exist. It has also been reported that the dichotomy of the French 
industrial sector comprising a few large and technologically 
advanced firms and many small and backwards enterprises, suggests 
that this may well not provide a domestic market of sufficient 
size to warrant the production of advanced technology products 
with attributes as specified by French civil servants (Balassa, 
1985; Hatzichronoglou, 1986). 
Finally, the paucity or absence of technological sophistica-
tion in the smaller French private sector firms is partly the 
result of the passive role allocated these firms by French science 
and technology policies. Unless policies are implemented by the 
French government which will allow these numerous but small 
enterprises in France to participate in technology activities, it 
is likely that France will continue to be plagued by the absence 
of a sufficiently large demand for advanced technology products. 
This in turn may retard the entire French science and technology 
advancement (Crafts, ·1984). 
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8.3 HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE ON FRENCH SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND INDUSTRY POLICIES 
Science and technology policies in France in the post World 
War II period have passed through a number of phases. Immediately 
after the end of World War II, the need for the recovery and 
redevelopment of the French industrial base resulted in formal 
government policies coordinated with the Marshall Plan ( 0' Brien 
and Keyder, 1978). These French government policies were almost 
exclusively focused on the need to rebuild French industrial 
facilities and the infrastructure with very limited concern 
devoted to scientific and technology issues. 
In 1952, however, the French government initiated the first 
post-World War II policies exclusively concerned with scientific 
and technical issues. These policies called for significant 
government subsidies to improve the research activities of the 
French science and technology establishment. In 1956, additional 
science and technology policies were instituted by the French 
government, again via subsidies, to promote the use of advanced 
technologies in French industrial plants and to replace advanced 
technology imports with native production (Crafts, 1984). 
In 1958, the French government established the Interdepart-
mental Scientific and Technical Research Committee (CIRST), 
assisted by the Scientific and Technical Research Advisory 
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Committee (CCRST), set up under Decree No. 58-1144. A joint 
Secretariat, the General Scientific and Research Agency (DGRST), 
which acts as a review and executive unit for science and 
technology activities, was established for these two bodies. A 
post for a Minister responsible for monitoring scientific research 
and related activities was also established at French cabinet 
level (Crafts, 1984). 
In the 1960's, under the Gaullist government, considerable 
additional emphasis was placed on scientific and technological 
activities in France. A strategy of "national champions"--
targeted sectors intended to bring prestige as well as trade 
competitiveness to French industry, was established in 1962 -- a 
policy similar to the Japanese "target" industries concept 
(Cameron, 1970). During this period the most comprehensive of the 
grands programmes, the Plan Calcul, was initiated to provide 
significant government support to the French microelectronics and 
computer industries. 
The Plan Calcul was initiated as the result of an agreement 
between the French government and the French computer firm 
Companie Internationale pour 1' Informatique (CII). The massive 
and coordinated effort by the Gaullist government to launch the 
Plan Calcul was largely a political reaction to several events 
which had reinforced the widespread perception by the French 
government of u.s. dominance of European microelectronic and 
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computer industries. Among these events, prominent were the 
acquisition of the French computer firm Machines Bull by the u.s. 
firm General Electric in 1964, and the refusal by the u.s. 
government to make advanced U.S. computer technology available to 
the French Atomic Energy Commission in 1966. These and related 
events provided the Gaullist government with the rationale for the 
establishment of native microelectronic and computer sectors in 
France. The Plan Calcul not only called for the establishment of 
a viable French microelectronic and computer industry, but also 
envisioned competition with u.s. computer firms in the world's 
markets (Arcangeli, et al., 1983). 
The Plan Calcul required very extensive cooperation within 
the French· government, among the Ministry of Industrial and 
Scientific Development, the Ministry of Defence, the Delegation 
for Information Science and others. It required the cooperation 
and coordination of various French industrial firms, and French 
government agencies. It demanded major advances in microelec-
tronic technologies by the French scientific establishment or the 
purchase of these technologies from abroad, principally the U.S. 
The Plan Calcul was coordinated by an ad hoc body within the 
office of the Prime Minister and received significant French 
government funding (Arcangeli, et al., 1983). 
The Gaullist government launched a number of other sectoral 
plans during the mid-1960's including the Computer Plan, the Space 
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Plan, the Components Plan, the Construction Plan, and others. In 
the late 1960's, the Gaullists established two new major policies 
to direct French science and technology and therefore to provide 
assistance to the French economy. The first of these was the 
creation of ANVAR in 1967 with the objective of commercializing 
scientific research. ANVAR was followed in 1969 by an enactment 
of formal procedures directed by the French government to convert 
the results of scientific and R&D activities into applied 
technology. 
None of these activities was successful. The Plan Calcul's 
failure (it was terminated in 1975) in particular represented a 
significant but typical failure of Gaullist government science and 
technology policies (Dosi, 1981). 
There are several reasons for the Plan's failure, all of 
which point to several key weaknesses of French science and 
technology policies. The principal problems centred on the poor 
coordination between the Plan Calcul and French macroeconomic 
policies 1 or to be more specific 1 the inability of the French 
government to sell the microelectronic and computer products 
resulting from Plan Calcul in the French domestic markets. 
Potential French users of these products consisting of medium and 
small French firms were either unable or unwilling to purchase the 
microelectronic components and the computer systems of Plan 
Calcul. Another reason for the failure of Plan Calcul was the 
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unwillingness of the French government to obtain critical 
technology from the U.S. after it was clear that the French 
scientific establishment could not achieve the required technical 
advancement (Friedman, 1983; Ellis, 1978). 
The failure of Plan Calcul was a considerable setback for 
Gaullist science and technology policies. This was especially so, 
because the French government used in Plan Calcul most of the 
policy instruments at its disposal as well as almost unlimited 
funding. The instruments used included outright grants by the 
French government for research, development and engineering; loans 
and credit on preferential terms to the firms participating in the 
Plan; the prohibition of imports of competitive microelectronic 
and computer products; promises of government purchases for 
computing equipment and a host of other policy instruments. The 
French government also assigned to the Plan Calcul it's best civil 
servants (Ellis, 1978). 
As a result of the poor performance of the Plan Calcul, the 
French government established in the mid-19 70s two new agencies 
with a mandate to advance French science and technology: Dele-
gates for Industrial Relations (DIR) in 1972, and Regional 
Agencies for Scientific and Technical Information (ARIST) in 1974. 
These two agencies performed reasonably well, but were not able to 
bring French science and technology to a level where French 
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advanced technology products were able to compete in world markets 
with Japan or the U.S. 
In the area of computers, the French government ceased 
advocating a "pure" French computer product and in 1976, with the 
blessing of the French government, CII, the principal French firm 
in Plan Calcul, merged with the U.S. firm of Honeywell-Bull. This 
merger marked the end of a "pure" French mainframe computer 
industry sector. However, the French government continued to 
"guide" this new French/U.S. computer enterprise throughout the 
1970's and 1980's by providing financial assistance and policy 
guidance (Geryhadze, 1983). 
In the late 1970's and the initial years of the 1980's, the 
French government continued to assert its role in the advancement 
of French science and technology via a number of initiatives. 
a) Establishment within the Ministry of Industry 
of an Innovation and Technology Agency (DIT); 
b) Expansion of ANVAR responsibilities in 
assisting industries innovation. 
c) 
d) 
Publication of "State of Technology" initial 
report 1979 (under the title of "Premiers 
Elements Pour un Programme National 
d' Innovation" ) of what was to become Le 
Rapport sur l'Etat de la Technique (Report on 
the state of technical development) , issued 
annually. 
Creation of a new agency INODEV to provide 
medium-term funding for industrial innovation. 
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All of these policies originated at the Ministry level of the 
French government, using procedures which have become known as the 
"French model". 
The OECD ( 1985) description of the "French model" is as 
follows: 
When confronted with problems deemed of national 
importance, the French state, whatever the political 
complexion of the government, tends to respond in very 
similar ways. The problems giving rise to a particular 
policy may differ, but state projects to address them 
have often looked remarkably alike. · According to the 
French model, the government mobilizes substantial 
resources financial, institutional and manpower--
and directs them to accomplish a predefined task. The 
reasons for this response are not difficult to find, it 
being the response of elite technocrats operating from 
within a centralized bureaucracy, able to draw on a 
state-dominated financial system. It is a classic top-
down approach. 
One unique aspect of the French model, not shared with other 
countries but well established in France, is the requirement that 
advanced technologies and products used by the French are either 
government developed, or government owned and operated. The OECD 
(1985) report states the following on this: 
and 
Assuring that the most advanced technology is under 
national control, that it is produced by a French-owned 
company, has been a prime objective -- perhaps even the 
central one -- of French policy for industrial technol-
ogy. This has often proved incompatible with two other 
objectives: ensuring the widespread diffusion of 
advanced technology applications, and protecting the 
competitive position of the producing company. 
From the 'Plan Calcul' to current component strategies, 
the priority has been to guarantee a national supplier, 
albeit often a weak one. Little distinction was made 
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between needs of advanced science and military applica-
tions, the need for national production capacity and 
actual commercial production and development (OECD, 
1985) • 
This requirement, of course, contradicts the worldwide trend 
of multinational corporations, cooperative ventures among nations, 
cross-licensing, off-shore facilities and other developments which 
have "internationalized" advanced technology sectors. 
The top-down policies used by French ·governments also assume 
that technology-push, rather than market-pull will diffuse tech-
nology throughout the economy or that after an advanced technology 
is made available in France it will percolate throughout the 
numerous sectors of the French economy. None of the French 
science and technology policies of the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's 
has addressed market demand issues. Specifically these policies 
did not consider the economic and management environment in the 
French industry sectors particularly in the smaller French firms 
(Macioti, 1986) • The French government's science and technology 
policies assumed that attainment of technological goals would 
diffuse into industrial innovation. In this regard they were 
wrong. Conversely, the Japanese who emphasized diffusion of 
technologies rather than technological goals have been very 
successful. 
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8.4 PRESENT FRENCH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
The current phase of French science and technology policies 
began in 1981 with Mitterrand as President. As before, the French 
government adjusted, reorganized, and replaced the government 
departments and agencies responsible for science and technology 
policies. Article 1 of Decree No. 81-723 of 28th July 1981 
established the Ministry of Research and Technology ( MRT) and 
stated that: "The Minister of Research and Technology is 
empowered to propose and, in conjunction with the other Ministries 
concerned, to implement government policy in the field of research 
and technology." 
In September 1982, the Ministry of Industry was merged with 
the MRT to form the Ministry of Research and Industry (MRI). The 
life span of the MRI was brief and in 1984 when Laurent Fabius was 
appointed Prime Minister of France, a new Ministry of Research 
and Technology was formed and is still in existence today. 
The initial structure and responsibilities of the new MRT are 
essentially identical to those of the old: "The Minister of 
Research and Technology shall propose and implement the govern-
ment's policy in the field of research and technology. • and 
he may be delegated by the Prime Minister to chair the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Technical Research." 
In 1985, the structure of the Ministry was somewhat reorganized by 
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Decrees No. 85-808 and 85-805, but retained its mission and 
objectives. 
In the present structure of the French government the 
agencies answerable directly to the Minister of the new MRT are: 
a) the Scientific and Technical Mission; b) the Research and 
Technology Directorate (DGRT); and c) the Information, Communica-
tion and Scientific and Technical Culture Commission ("DIXIT"). 
The MRT, however, interacts with a series of other directorates in 
the French government, including the Regional Development and the 
Industrial and Technological Environment Directorate ( DGDREIT) , 
the International Affairs Agency ( DAI), the Industrial Strategy 
and Statistics Research Department (SESSI), the Forward Planning 
and Assessment Centre (CPE), and the General Administration 
Directorate (DAG). 
Furthermore, the Minister of the MRT is assisted by a 
Programmes Committee and the Research and Technology Council 
(CSRT) which was established in November 1982, and replaced the 
former "Committee of Wise Men" (CCRST) and the Innovation Mission. 
The CSRT is comprised of representatives of the French scientific 
and technical community of industry and research, and of the 
French social and cultural communities and the regions. 
Several other French government departments play certain 
policy roles in science and industry activities, including the 
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Ministry of Education, the Ministry of National Defence, the 
Ministry of· Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. 
The French Parliament approves the science and technology 
budget as recommended by the President. Approval of the budget 
however is not a pro forma activity and the approval process 
includes analyses of the goals and objectives of the budget. For 
this purpose in 1983, Parliament established a "Scientific and 
Technological Options Assessment Board" to conduct an annual 
investigation and analysis of the science, technology and industry 
activities for which public monies are requested. 
The current French government apparatus for science, 
technology and industry policies remains exceedingly complex with 
an excessive number of separate departments and agencies involved 
in policy making activities. The implementation of science, 
technology, or industry policies in France requires considerable 
and tLme consuming coordination, hindered by the fact that each of 
French departments and agencies has its own science and technology 
agenda, often with conflicting demands (Mitterrand, 1982). 
There are other features of the French policy making 
apparatus which create problems in the execution of science and 
technology policies in France. One of these is the exclusion of 
labour, academia and interest groups from participation in the 
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policy making process and no attempt is made to reach a consensus 
among these components of the French population. As noted above, 
CSRT membership includes some representatives from the scientific 
community with 20 out of 40 members appointed by scientific 
research organizations and industry, but in practice these members 
are for the most part civil servants and their influence is 
minimal. Labour and public interest groups have no representation 
in the French policy making process (Friedman, 1983). 
Another feature which negatively impacts on government policy 
making in France is the narrow view held by many French government 
officials, which emphasizes the interests of their department, 
agency or geographic region over national interests. Several key 
French technology and industry policies can be traced directly to 
this emphasis on self-interest. For example the extensive trade 
barriers which protected certain French industry sectors can be 
traced directly to the certain local interests in France which 
protect certain geographic areas (~, steelmaking regions) 
against competition (Northcott and Rogers, 1985). The non-tariff 
barriers to international trade can also be readily traced to 
regional or industrial interests in France, as these are directed, 
not by regional or industry representatives, but by French civil 
servants whose jobs are related to the affairs of the regions or 
industries (Dunning, 1977). 
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Regional and self-interest considerations have also been the 
principal reason for the extensive French industrial policies 
which protect and promote declining industry sectors. The 
comprehensive French government policies enacted at regular 
intervals throughout the last three decades which have supported 
steelmaking and shipbuilding sectors in France are examples of 
this. 
The legal and administrative basis for post-1981 science and 
technology policies in France is the Policy and Planning Act which 
became law on 15 July 1982. It has two parts: 
The first part increases the French science, technology and 
research effort from 1. 8 to 2. 5 percent of the GNP, and catego-
rizes in some detail French science and technology activities for 
funding purposes. 
In place of the traditional "interdepartmental block grant," 
the new "non-defence research and technological development 
budget" ( BCRD) identifies four kinds of science and technology 
activities: 
a) Fundamental research; 
b) Applied and goal-oriented research; 
c) Technological development programmes; 
d) Multi-year· resource mobilizing programmes 
which involve a), b) and c). 
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The Act prescribes government policies for each of these four 
activities. 
The second part of the Act sets out the five major French 
science and technology policy thrusts: 
a) Development and improvement of French national 
research programme by: 
i Creating assessment bodies; 
ii Promoting a "research innovative and 
creative spirit"; 
iii Strengthening fundamental research; and 
iv Increasing scientific and technical 
co-operation, especially in Europe. 
b) Involvement of French regional resources in 
the national research effort. 
c) Adoption of provisions contributing to the 
solution of a number of administrative, 
personnel and related problems in French 
government research programmes. 
d) Adoption of provisions to encourage and 
facilitate training for and through research. 
e) Development of guidelines to allow the 
adoption of regulations concerning the various 
categories of research personnel recognized as 
"contributing to the national interest." 
The provisions and specifications of the Policy and Planning 
a&t provided the legal and administrative basis for France's 
Ninth Plan for economic development. 
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Two additional French laws, both enacted in 1983, provided 
further guidelines for the most recent French science and 
technology policies. 
The National Plan Law of 13 July 1983, listed ten "Major 
Actions," of importance including Major action No. 4 ("the 
scientific, technical and industrial imperative") which formulated 
broad objectives for scientific, research and development 
activities. 
The National Plan Law of 24 December 1983, defined twelve 
priority programmes (PPEs), for science and technology activities 
in France. This Plan Law also prescribed the purpose and scope of 
contracts between the French government and the French regions and 
between the French government and public enterprises. 
Of these twelve PPEs, seven included research and development 
as components. The third PPE on "promoting research and innova-
tion" was exclusively concerned with research and development with 
the purpose of introducing advanced technologies and innovation 
into French industry, and itemized four objectives of the French 
research and development effort: 
a) Increase the research and development effort and promote 
the use of new technologies in enterprises, particularly 
in small and medium enterprises (SMEs); 
b) Develop staff training in new technologies; 
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c) Undertake major efforts at promoting scientific and 
technical culture and information; 
d) Provide the regions and local authorities with more 
responsibility. 
The "new" element in these recent French policies to advance 
science and technology is the emphasis for the first time on 
French regions as active participants in French science and 
technology activities. However, as reported by several scholars, 
the driving force behind the inclusion of the regions in French 
science and technology policies was based ·on political considera-
tions and not on the obvious need to de-centralize science and 
technology policies in France. 
In order to implement these recent science and technology. 
policies, the French government has established complex funding 
arrangements by which public monies are provided to the French 
science and technology establishment. 
This system is indeed complex and bureaucratic. The 
principal decisions for the funding of science and technology 
activities in France are made by the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance (Ministere de l'Economie et de Finances) and by the 
Treasury {Direction du Tresor). 
More often than not there are sharp policy disagreements 
between these two French Ministries, because each has its own 
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funding plans, priori ties, and schedules. Furthermore, both of 
these Ministries in executing the funding must coordinate their 
funding functions with four other French government agencies: 
(a) The Fonds de Developement Economique et Social (FOES) , 
(the Fund for Economic and Social Development). Created in 1955, 
the FOES receives budgetary appropriations from the Treasury, and 
provides low-interest loans to industry. 
(b) The Comite Interministeriel pour l'Amenagement des 
Structures Industrielles (CIASI) (Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Industrial Structural Adjustment). Created in 1974 and chaired by 
the Ministry of Economics, the CIASI is responsible for providing 
funding to industrial firms which merit the government's concern 
on policy grounds but are financially weak. Subsidies for such 
firms are provided from the Fonds d' Intervention pour 1 'Amenage·-
ment du Territoire (FIAT), (Fund for Assistance in Territorial 
Management) • 
(c) The Fonds Special d'Adaptation Industrielle (FSAI), 
(Special Fund for Industrial Adjustment). Created in 1978, the 
FSAI has the responsibility of assisting French industry in 
international competition. It also provides financial support to 
French industrial firms located in regions of France where there 
is unemployment. 
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(d) The Institut de Developement Industriel (IDI), (the 
Institute for Industrial Development). The IDI's objective is to 
increase the capital equity of middle-sized French firms. The IDI 
buys shares, lends funds and plays the role of "partner" with some 
leading firms in their specialized markets. 
Recent government policies for science and technology also 
include a host of regulations concerning financial assistance for 
advanced technology exports and foreign investment in France. 
8.4.1 Financial Assistance for Exports 
The French government policies for financial assistance for 
advanced technology product exports are complex, with more than 
sixteen types of specific programmes in force in 1989. Export 
assistance programmes which are currently utilized to a consider-
able extent by French firms, include financial assistance for 
investment in production facilities linked to exports, and 
special loan procedures for exports. 
Financial assistance for export-linked investment in France 
includes, government loans to finance investments designed to 
promote exports; increased shares of a firm's capital held by the 
Comite Interministerial de Developpement Investment et de Soutien 
d'Emploi, (CIDISE) (Interministerial Development Committee for 
Investment and Support of Employment); and subsidies for 
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investments made to manufacture products to meet the requirements 
of foreign markets. 
The Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur (BFCE), (the 
French Bank for Foreign Trade) created in 1946, provides loans to 
facilitate· exports of French products, with recent emphasis on 
advanced technology products. It also provides technical assist-
ance to French exporters. Several types of loans are offered by 
the BFCE: pre-financing loans, the refinancing of loans to enable 
French exporters to offer short-term credits, and mid-term and 
long-term loans, allocated by the Banque de France through the 
BFCE and Compagnie Francaise d' Assurance pour le Commerce 
Exterierur (COFACE) (the French Insurance Company for Foreign 
Trade). 
8.4.2 Regulations of Foreign Investment 
The recent French government policies on foreign investment 
have continued to emphasize the acquisition of foreign technology, 
and the close regulation of foreign investment in France. Joint 
ventures with French partners, particularly those involving 
advanced technologies or research and development activities are 
encouraged by the French government. 
In the case of joint ventures ~n industry sectors which the 
French government considers important for strategic or political 
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reasons, they are permitted providing control remains in French 
hands. In order to assure this, the French government "appoints" 
to the French "side" of a joint venture one or several French 
civil servants to oversee the administration and management of the 
joint venture. To limit the foreign control of French firms while 
assuring access to foreign technology, the French government 
either restructures foreign firms operating in France or arranges 
the so-called "French solution", in which French shareholders or 
the French government purchases sufficient shares of a firm 
operating in France to control its management. 
In spite of these restrictive policies, a large number of 
foreign entities have begun operations on French soil. There are 
two reasons why France is attractive to foreign enterprises 
despite the French government's policies. The fact that France 
constitutes a significant market for advanced technology products, 
especially those products which are encouraged by the French 
government to be developed within the numerous grands programmes, 
is one reason (Macioti, 1986). 
Another reason is the access from France to the markets of 
the European Community. French government policies to encourage 
exports add significantly· to the attractiveness of France as a 
base for sales to the nations of the European Community (EEC, 
1986; Dunning, 1977). 
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8. 5 GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES IN FRANCE 
The French government's policies in support of advanced 
technology sectors closely reflect its general involvement in 
French industrial sectors. The French government, has attempted 
to encourage advanced technology sectors in France by planning and 
implementing ambitious development programmes, providing funding, 
arranging mergers of firms, managing exports and imports, setting 
prices, standards and undertaking a host of other policies. 
8.5.1 Microelectronics Sector 
Two firms dominated the French microelectronic sector, during 
the early post-World War II period, Machine Bull and CII. In the 
1960s and 1970s, French government policies for the micro-
electronic industry in France were focused on these two native 
establishments. The first of the grands programmes the Plan 
Calcul was directed at the French microelectronic sector. During 
the period 1966 to 1976, the French government allocated $350 
million to these two firms in an attempt to develop a native 
French microelectronic industry. The French government also 
established in 1969 an independent research institute (IRIA) 
devoted to the advancement of the French microelectronics sector. 
As described in the previous section, these policies were 
failures. Machine Bull was purchased in 1967 by the u.s. firm 
General Electric with the approval of the French government, and 
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three years later the Machine Bull enterprise was sold to 
Honeywell, another U.S. firm, which established the Honeywell~ 
Bull Corporation in France. After it had become obvious that Plan 
Calcul was not a success, the French government attempted to 
arrange a series of joint ventures for CII with several other 
European firms in order to form a basis for a joint European 
computer industry (UNIDATA) managed by the French government. The 
French government did not succeed in this effort and in 197 5, 
forced a merger between CII and Honeywell-Bull. The new French 
microelectronic company, CII-HB (with a majority shareholding by 
the French government), was established at an estimated cost of 
$700 million to the French government. 
During the same period, the French government attempted to 
advance French manufacturers of other type microelectronic 
equipment via another of the grands programmes. The 'Plan Peri-
informatique', implemented by the French government in 1967, 
encouraged the reorganization of the French microelectronic 
industry around two 'poles,' each a part of the two other major 
French microelectronics manufacturers, CGE and Thomson-CSF. In 
order to facilitate "Plan Peri-informatique', the French govern-
ment forced the sale of two foreign-owned microelectronic compo-
nent manufacturing subsidiaries operating in France, ITT and 
Ericsson-France to Thomson-CSF. These other French policies did 
not result in the expected improvement, and in 1978, in order to 
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advance the microelectronic industry, the French government 
undertook the following actions: 
a) Creation of a new research centre-CNET, 
specializing in the development of new 
microelectronic products. 
b) Extension of financial support to enable 
Thomson-CSF and the CEA to develop a Very High 
Scale Integration programme. 
These French government actions were complemented starting in 
1978 by a concentrated programme of education and research in 
microelectronics technology and applications by universities, 
polytechnics, the CNRS, etc. The expected results of these 
actions did not materialize (Arcangeli, et al., 1983). 
In 1979, the French government established another four 
industrial consortia for the development and manufacture of 
microelectronic products. 
a) Thomson-CSF/SESCOSEM which focused on the development of 
integrated circuits. 
b) RTC (the French subsidiary of the Philips group) which 
concentrated on high speed bipolar ICs. 
c) EFCIS, (an establishment owned jointly by Thomson-CSF 
and CEA) which was to manufacture custom NMOS, SOS and CMOS 
products. 
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d) Saint-Gobain Pont/National Semiconductor which focused 
on the development of integrated circuits, with the French 
government providing some $443 million in funding. 
The stated objectives of these four industrial consortia were 
indeed ambitious. With these policies the French government 
attempted no less than the development of French technology to the 
level of parity with, or superiority to, the U.S. in microelec-
tronics. 
In spite of these ambitious policies the French native micro-
electronics industry sector remained weak. The expected technol-
ogical advances did not take place, French exports of microelec-
tronic products were essentially nil and U.S. exports of micro-
electronic products to France increased significantly. 
In 1982 France's new Socialist government nationalized the 
French microelectronics industry and took over the principal 
French microelectronics firms -- Bull, Thomson-CSF, and Compagnie 
Genera1e des Constructions Teleponiques. Nationalization of these 
firms was immediately followed by a series of very large French 
government grants to the nationalized microelectronics sector. 
During the 1982 to 1988 period, the French government provided 
grants to the native microelectronics industry estimated at $14 
billion. 
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The new socialist government also established another new 
centre for microelectronic research in France. The Filiere 
Electronique was initiated in the spring of 1982 as a five year 
effort with public and private investments over the 1982 to 1988 
period of $32 billion. The stated goals of Filiere Electronique 
in 1982 were to: 
a) increase the production of microelectronic 
products by 3 to 9 percent per annum; 
b) create a surplus trade balance in micro-
electronic products; and 
c) generate 80,000 new jobs per year (SAI, 1985). 
The table below provides a summary of proposed funding for the 
1982 to 1986 period. 
Total Government 
Funding (FF billions) 
1982 
4.0 
1983 
6.7 
1984 
7.6 
1985 
8.0 
Source: Ministere de 1' Industrie el de la Recherche, 
"La Politique Industrielle de la Filiere 
Electronique," November 1983. 
1986 
9.2 
Most of the support was obtained from the Ministry of 
Defence, followed by the Telecommunications and Industry 
Ministries. The role of the Ministry of Defence was cardinal in 
the selection, direction and coordination of the Filiere activ-
ities. Table 8.4 provides an overview of the industry structure 
which emerged at the end of 1983, after the French government's 
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TABLE 8.4 
Government Directed Company Specialization 
of the French Microelectronics 
Industry, 1983 
Field 
Components 
Consumer Electronics 
Professional Electronics 
Telecommunications 
Computers 
Office Equipment 
Source: SHC, 1985. 
Leacier 
Thomson 
Matra-Harris 
Thomson 
Thomson 
CGE (CIT-Alcatel) 
Bull 
Bull 
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nationalization policies of the microelectronics sector had been 
implemented. 
The research emphasis _at Filiere Electroniques prescribed by 
the French government was concentrated on six projects: 
a) large scientific and industrial computers 
b) computer-aided design, engineering, and production 
c) computer-aided design for VLSI 
d) display 
e) computer-assisted instruction 
f) computer-aided translation. 
Filiere Electronique was also directed to link French government 
research centres with French microelectronics industry sectors. 
Under the Mitterand policies regarding the microelectronics 
sector in France, Thomson and Matra-Harris were the firms 
designated to provide the core thrust to the French native micro-
electronic industry. International cooperation in microelec-
tronics was the responsibility of Filiere. This structure of the 
French microelectronic industry established in 1983 remains 
essentially in force in 1989. 
During the 1982 to 1988 period, the French government also 
negotiated a number of cooperative technology agreements between 
nationalized French microelectronics enterprises and foreign 
firms. In 1984, an agreement was concluded to share technology 
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between Bull and Convergent Technologies and Ridge Computers, both 
from California USA. Compagnie Generale d 'Electricite in 1985 
concluded an agreement for joint production with the u.s. firm· 
Intel. In 1985, Thomson acquired Mostek, a major microelectronics 
firm in the U.S. In 1985, Thomson also arranged for technology 
exchanges with the Japanese Oki Electronic and Motorola in the 
U.S., and in 1987 Thomson merged its microelectronics operations 
with the state-controlled Italian microelectronic firm S.G.S. 
These changes resulted in only marginal improvements in the 
French performance in the microelectronics world market and in 
1987, France accounted for less than one percent of the world's 
microelectronic product output. 
8.5.2 French Policies to Advance the Machine Tools Industry 
The history of the French machine too_l industry also indi-
cates significant French government involvement in this sector of 
the French economy. The indigenous machine tool industry in 
France has always operated under the shadow of the excellence of 
its German neighbour, although the French government has long been 
determined to create a strong domestic machine tool sector. The 
machine tool sector ranked as a high priority sector in the French 
industrial policies of the 1950s with preferential allocations of 
steel and skilled manpower at a time when both were in very short 
supply. In the 1960s, the French machine tool industry improved 
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in terms of output and technological advancement as a result of 
French automobile manufacturers' involvement with Renault and 
Peugeot providing assistance to French machine tool makers in the· 
1960's. The French machine tool industry, however, could not 
compete with the technological advances made in Germany and the 
U.S. and went into a decline in the early 1970's, remaining · 
marginal throughout the 1970's (Rendeiro, 1984). 
The socialist government under Mitterand in 1981 established 
a comprehensive national machine tool plan which in effect created 
two large nationalized groups of firms or 'pole de developement.' 
Both involved extensive horizontal mergers among the existing 
French machine tool makers. 
The Machine Francaises Lourdes ( MFL) group became France's 
producer of heavy-duty machine tools, concentrating on the whole 
on the traditional, one-off heavy-duty machine tools. 
The other major 'pole de developement' for the industry was 
Interlautomatisme, encompassing Hure (specialized milling 
machinery), Graffenstraden (horizontal machining and flexible 
manufacturing systems) and H. Ernault Somua (lathes). 
In late 1981, the French Council of Ministers adopted a 
three-year restructuring and development plan for the French 
machine tool industry. The major goals of the plan were to (a) 
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foster concentration of the French machine tool industry on the 
needs of advanced technology sectors; (b) regroup and refinance 
machine tool firms in order to create larger, more specialized and 
more competitive companies; and (c) reduce the growing dependence 
of French manufacturing on foreign imports of numerically 
controlled machine tools (EEC, 1986; ITC, 1986). 
The specific objectives of the plan's implementation 
programme were to (a) double total French machine tool production 
by 1985 and in so doing, quadruple production of numerically 
controlled machine tools; (b) increase 5-fold R&D expenditures; 
and (c) reduce by one-half the foreign share of the French market, 
(i.e., to a range of 30 to 35 percent) and double French machine 
tool exports to industrialized countries. The programme under-
taken by the French government, under the sponsorship of the 
Ministry of Industry, provided for direct financial assistance for 
machine tool manufacturing consolidation and development, support 
for manufacturing research and development, and increased public 
procurement (EEC, 1986). 
The level of government funding allocated at the end of 1985 
for the implementation of the plan's 3-year programme was approxi-
mately $682 million which was to be matched by funding of about 
$4 61 million from French companies in the machine tool industry 
and from private-sector sources. Under this programme, French 
machine tool purchasers (users) could receive financial aid for 
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the acquisition of automated machine tools and, subsequently, 
government-backed loans at preferential interest rates for the 
purchase of additional machines. 
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NSA) characterizes the 
French government policies in the machine tool sector in this 
period as follows: 
The French government formally classifies companies into 
industrial categories. The approximately 250 companies 
classified as machine tool builders· have levied upon 
them a special tax earmarked for technical research at 
an R&D institute in Paris, Comite European de Coopera-
tion des Industries de la Machine Outil (CERMO). With a 
full-time staff of approximately 30, CERMO conducts 
research in manufacturing engineering in areas of 
particular relevance to machine tools. Located within a 
technical school, CERMO is also a training center and 
offers an engineering degree. Apart from its role in 
research and training, the French government is also 
active in promoting the diffusion of new machine tool 
technology. In 1980 it distributed about $4.3 million 
to small French companies to aid them in the purchase of 
NC machine tools. In 1981 the French government 
announced a major aid plan for the machine tool in-
dustry, involving more than $400 million in direct 
grants over a 3-year period, and a restructuring of the 
industry around major product categories. In 1986 an-
other grant of $600 million was announced (NAS, 1986). 
The French Ninth Plan for industrial development called for a 
priority effort aimed at the modernization of French industry and 
provided additional assistance to French machine tool makers. The 
Plan stated that to remain competitive and improve their market 
shares, French enterprises must embark on a decisive technological 
phase requiring the installation of automated manufacturing facil-
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ities such as numerically controlled machines, robots, industrial 
data processing and automated materials handling machinery. In 
order to accomplish these goals, the French government allocated 
for research about $400 million in 1984 and a total of $2.4 
billion over the five year life of the Ninth Plan. 
French government policies for the development of industrial 
robots began in 1981, when the First Plan, known as "Filiere 
Robitique," was established by the French Government. The objec-
tives of this Plan were increased research and development effort 
in robotics, automation, mechanics, electronics, hydraulics and 
software, as well as the diffusion of automation technologies. 
The 1981 budget for the Plan was over $46 million, and similar 
plans have been established every year since 1982 at an average 
annual budget of $55 million. 
To increase· the level of automation in industrial sectors, 
the French government in 1982 began to encourage foreign robot 
producers to invest in French firms. The Robotics Mission of the 
French Ministry of Research and Technology had budgeted $350 
million during the 1983 to 1987 period to create an Inter-Agency 
Robotics Committee. The objectives of this Committee consisted of 
funding the research and development of robotics, training 
robotics specialists, and extending low-cost financing to 
potential robot users. 
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Over $1.6 billion was initially earmarked for fu,nding robot-
related projects in France during the 1982-87 period. However, by 
mid-1983, economic difficulties forced the French goveril:Jllent to 
reduce its planned yearly funding, and the actual funding for 
robot-related projects over the 1982 to 1987 period was about 
$400 million. Table 8.5 summarizes the key research areas in 
robotics undertaken as part of government policies in this sector. 
As a result of these French government policies, the French 
machine tool sector increased its production by some 15 percent in 
the late 1970's. However, French machine tool makers could not 
compete with the very substantial technological advancements made 
in the machine tool industry by the Japanese nor could it compete 
with the Japanese in terms of prices. 
Furthermore, the German machine tool industry, historically a 
very strong international competitor, increased its exports to 
France in the 1980's. As a result of this competition the French 
machine tool sector the in mid-1980's had to reduce its sales in 
France, and significantly curtail its already marginal presence in 
the world's markets for machine tools. 
8.5.3 French Government Policies in the Advanced Materials Sector 
The French government has undertaken very marginal attempts 
to establish an advanced materials industry in France. Allegedly, 
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TABLE 8.5 
Robotics Research in France by Institution and 
Focused Area of Research, 1988 
INSTITUTION 
Universitites 
Technical University 
of Compiegne 
University of Lilla 
FOCUSED AREA OF RESEARCH 
Real time vision processing, 
geometric data-base design, 
systems integration 
Basic research issues 
Government In-House Laboratories 
LIMSI 
INRI A 
LAAS 
IMAG 
CGA 
LAM 
DERA 
National Robotics Lab. 
Industry Laboratories 
Manipulation of assembly, visual 
inspection, work cell integration 
Perception: Laser illumination 
for assembly & inspection, 3-D 
vision, obstacle avoidance 
Sensors and sensor data proces-
sing, systems integration: 
control for assembly, perception, 
planning ARA Project, mobile robot 
Robot programming tools {developed 
language LM) automatic assembly, 
expert manufacturing planning, 
vision: gray scale & 3-D using laser 
Inspection of nuclear facilities 
Modelling and control of manipula-
tors, simple vision, coordination 
of multiple robots 
Control systems; flexible automation 
and robots for space systems 
Various applied research issues 
Renault Industrial robot research vision for 
inspection, controllers, process 
planning 
MATRA Fast vision module; Assembly robots 
Source: SHC, 1985 
450 
the French Ministry of Defence has funded research on advanced 
materials from several nationalized industries and the CNRS, but 
the details of this funding are not available. None of the French 
chemical, automotive, or machinery firms is engaged in the 
research and development of advanced materials. 
8.6 CONCLUSIONS 
French government policies to encou~age the advanced tech-
nology sector development in France have resulted, at best, in · 
marginal technological and market improvements. France certainly 
has lost its competitiveness in world-wide markets for advanced 
technology products. A number of reasons may be suggested for 
this failure. 
The dual state of the French economy, consisting of a rela-
tively small number of technologically very advanced firms 
controlled by the French government and a very large number of 
firms which can be accurately described as backward is one of the 
reasons for this failure. The French emphasis on the supply side 
(or the producer) of advanced technology products comprised, for 
the most part, of large government-controlled firms at the 
expense of the demand side consisting of numerous small and medium 
sized entities is another. The very low rate of diffusion of 
advanced technology products within French industrial sectors, 
particularly among the smaller enterprises, and the French 
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government's unwillingness to correct this is another reason for 
the poor performance of French advanced technology sectors. 
The traditional French solutions to the problems facing the 
French economy, grand~ programmes undertaken by government 
controlled firms, may not have been the most appropriate to 
improve advanced technology sectors in France. Other reasons for 
the French failure is the unwillingness of the French government 
to explicitly consider the needs of the smaller and medium sized 
firms, to seek policy consensus with these firms, and to 
appreciate the awesome international competition in advanced 
technology sectors from the u.s. Japan and some other nations. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY 
POLICIES IN GERMANY 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The German economy has performed well in the postwar period, 
with some notable achievements in science, technology and 
industrial advancement. In 1988, Germany's GNP was estimated at 
$691 billion, an increase of over 40 percent in the last two 
decades. Germany's trade balance in 1988 was a positive $130 
billion, as compared to $80 billion in 1975. Germany's exports of 
all manufactured products have gradually increased throughout the 
entire post-World War II period. In 1955, Germany's exports of 
manufactured products represented 14.6 percent of total world 
exports; by 1987 this percentage had increased to 18.3 percent. 
In 1955, Germany exported 17.6 percent of total advanced 
technology product exports in the world; by 1987 this percentage 
had increased to 24.3 percent. 
Germany has relied on a macroeconomic policy emphasizing 
price stability and most important, export-led growth. The role 
of government policies in promoting science and technology has 
been very limited. For the most part, science and technology 
activities and industrial growth and development in Germany, have 
been left to market forces. Some debate about the need for 
science and technology policies to promote advanced technology 
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industries, the so-called "Strukterpolitik", was initiated in 
Germany in the mid-1980's principally by members of German 
academia (Gremmen and Vallenbergh, 1986). The sharp reduction of 
German machine tool exports, an industry where Germany has been 
historically dominant, prompted this debate. Free market forces 
prevailed with the support of industry groups such as the 
Federation of Germany Industry (BDI); explicit government inter-
vention in the German market economy was rejected. The German 
government continues to direct the country's economic growth with 
broad macroeconomic policies, and some support for German science, 
research and development activities (Daly, et al., 1985). 
9.2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING IN GERMANY 
Four German institutions, the Council of Economic Advisors, 
the Ministries of Finance and Economics, and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, plan and execute German macroeconomic policies in 
close cooperation with German industry and labour unions. The 
four principal German policy making institutions cooperate closely 
with the Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) which guides 
science and technology activities in research institutions, 
universities and industrial firms and with Ministry of Economics, 
the principal German agency for industrial development. 
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Established in 1972, the BMFT has developed a variety of pro-
grammes to assist Germany's science, technology and research and 
development activities as well as industrial sectors. The BMFT 
provides most of the funding for the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, a 
nonprofit society that conducts a very significant portion of 
applied research and development in Germany and provides support 
to such major German research organizations as the VDI Technology 
Centre. The Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (Society) comprises 28 
individual research institutes, each with its own facilities, 
.. 
personnel, and research programme. The institutes are organized 
on a disciplinary basis and each institute has an independent 
board of directors with strong industry and academia representa-
tion. The BMFT also provides significant support to various 
German trade associations. 
The German Ministry of Economics, the principal German 
government agency for industrial development, supports some eighty 
German industrial research associations, organized across 
disciplines to cover the range of technologies important to a 
particular industry sector. 
Science, technology, and research and development activities 
supported by the Ministry of Economics and the BMFT, place con-
siderable emphasis on the development of industry products which 
are designed for export markets. The emphasis on exports is 
however not dictated by German government policies, but results 
455 
from the historical export market orientation of German industry 
and labour (Kriele, 1978). 
The involvement of labour in the management of German indus-
trial firms is strong. Labour union representation in the BMFT 
and Ministry of Economics is substantial and labour participation 
on the supervisory boards of German corporations is required by 
law. 
The involvement and concern of German labour unions about the 
development of German industry, export potential and international 
competitiveness is a unique characteristic among industrialized 
nations. Equally unique is the labour union representation in the 
management functions of German industrial firms (Bulmer, 1983). 
9. 3 SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES IN GERMANY 
The organization 
technology and industry 
and support of scientific, research, 
activities in Germany is diverse and 
complex. Germany's science and technology activities are 
undertaken at both the German federal and state (Laender) levels, 
with policy advice provided by numerous German science advisory 
bodies. 
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The current German research and technology activities are 
guided by the four principles promulgated by the German government 
(BMFT) in 1983: 
a) Need for freedom of academic research; 
b) Restraint by the government in interfering 
with research carried out by industry; 
c) Reaffirmation of technological progress as 
necessary to international competitiveness, 
economic growth and full employment; 
d) Recognition of performance as a stimulant to 
productivity in R&D. 
The resources for science and technology activities in 
Germany which strictly adhere to these four principles consist of 
higher education institutions, German government laboratories, and 
industry. 
9.3.1 Higher Education Institutions 
The universities in Germany represent a significant force in 
scientific, research and development activities. Essentially all 
universities are state institutions, but are by law independent 
bodies that are free from most German government regulations. 
There are four types of higher educational establishments in 
Germany; comprehensive universities, technical colleges, colleges 
of education, and polytechnics. The latter two provide three-year 
courses of study while the comprehensive universities and 
technical colleges provide four- to five-year baccalaureates as 
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well as advanced study programmes. In 1987, there were sixty-
three comprehensive universities and technical colleges in 
Germany. These performed essentially all of the research and 
development activities of the German higher education institu-
tiona. Research activities in German colleges of education and 
polytechnics are of minor importance. 
The German Laender, or state governments, provide the 
principal funding for all German comprehensive universities and 
.. 
technical colleges. In 1987, about 83 percent of total research 
and development expenditures in the universities was financed by 
the Laender. Another 15 percent was financed by the German 
government, and less than 2 percent by industry (Table 9.1). 
9.3.2 German Government Research Establishments 
Research establishments administrated by the German federal 
and Laender governments undertake most of the applied research and 
development activities in Germany. These establishments also 
accounted for about 26 percent of basic research activity in 
Germany in 1987. The research organizations comprise three broad 
categories: a) research institutes subordinate to the Max Planck 
Society, the Fraunhofer Society and other independent coordinating 
organizations which receive all or substantial portions of their 
support from the German federal and state governments; b) German 
national laboratories supported largely by the Ministry for 
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TABLE 9.1 
Breakdown of University Expenditures on 
Research and Development, by Source: 
Germany, 1987 
Percent 
Government 98.5 
Federal 15.4 
Laender and Local 83.1 
Industry 1.5 
Other Sources 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, 
Bundesbericht Forschung, 1988 
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Research and Technology; and c) individual research establishments 
subordinate to the various German Federal and Laender Ministries. 
9.3.2.1 Research Institutions Subordinate to Independent 
Coordinating Organizations 
Organizations included within this category are the research 
institutes of the Max Planck Society, the Fraunhofer Society, and 
a number of German academies of science. The most important of 
these organizatiorns are the institutes within the Max Planck 
Society (Table 9.2). 
The Max Planck Society for the Promotion of the Sciences, 
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften -- (MPG) 
is the largest and most prestigious of all German research 
establishments. Established in 1948 as the successor to the pre-
war Kaiser Wilhelm Society, the MPG undertakes scientific and 
research activities which cannot be undertaken in the German 
universities, such as large interdisciplinary research projects or 
research requiring specialist equipment or facilities. Table 9-3 
provides information on the distribution of activities by field of 
research at the Max Planck Society. 
There are a total of 68 research centres managed by the Max 
Planck Society. Most of these are located near major German 
comprehensive universities or technical colleges in order to share 
scientific personnel with the academic institutions. These 
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TABLE 9.2 
List of Institutes of the Max Planck Society, Germany 
MPI for Aeronomy 
MPI for Astronomy 
MPI for Chemistry 
MPI for Biophysical Chemistry 
MPI for Ferro-Research 
MPI for Solid State Research 
Fritz-Haber Institute for Physical Chemistry 
Gmelin Institute for Inorganic Chemistry 
MPI for Nuclear Physics 
MPI for Coal Research 
MPI for Mathematics 
MPI for Metal Research 
MPI for Meteorology 
MPI for Physics and Astrophysics 
MPI for Plasmaphysics 
MPI for Polymer Research 
MPI for Quantum Optics 
MPI for Radio-Astronomy 
MPI for Radiation Chemistry 
MPI for Fluid Dynamics Research 
MPI for Biochemistry 
MPI for Biology 
MPI for Biophysics 
MPI for Experimental Endocrinology 
MPI for Nutritional Physiology 
MPI for Medical Research 
MPI for Neurological Research 
MPI for Physiological and Clinical Research 
Friedrich Miescher Laboratory for Biological Research 
MPI for Molecular Genetics 
MPI for Brain Research 
MPI for Immune Biology 
Clinical Research Groups of the University Clinics of Goettingen 
Clinical Research Group for Blood Clots and Thrombosis 
Clinical Research Group for Reproductive Medicine 
MPI for Biological Cybernetics 
MPI for Limnology 
Research Laboratory Matthaei 
MPI for Experimental Medicine 
MPI for Psychiatry 
MPI for Psycho-Linquistics , 
Research Laboratory for Psychopathology 
MPI for Systems Physiology 
MPI for Behavioural Physiology 
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TABLE 9 • 2 (Continued) 
MPI for Virus Research 
MPI for Cell Biology 
MPI for Plant Breeding Research 
Bibliotheka Hertziana (of Italian Art, Rome, Italy) 
MPI for Educational Research 
MPI for Psychological Research 
MPI for History 
MPI for Patent Law 
MPI for Foreign and International Private Law 
MPI for International Law 
MPI for European History of Law 
MPI for Social Law 
MPI for Social Sciences (is being disbanded) 
MPI for Criminal Law 
Source: Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, 
Bundesbericht Forschung 1988. 
462 
TABLE 9.3 
Allocation of Research Funding 
Within the Max Planck Society, 
By Field of Research, 1987 Budget 
Field of Research 
Astronomy & Astrophysics 
Chemistry 
Physics I 
Physics II 
Mathematics (Informatics) 
Meteorology, Aeronomy and 
Space Research 
Biomedical Research with 
Primates and Humans 
Psychology and the Biological 
Aspects of Behavioural Research 
(Plant) Breeding Research 
and Ecology 
Law 
History 
Social Sciences 
TOTAL 
Source: Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, 
Bundesbericht Forschung 1988. 
Percent 
7.6 
12.2 
10.0 
i5.3 
1.7 
6.9 
13.7 
3.3 
2.3 
2.6 
1.4 
2.4 
100.0 
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centres vary in size from a few scientists to the larger 
institutes with scientific and technical personnel in excess of 
one thousand. 
In 1987, the number of scientific and technical personnel 
working at various Max Planck Society institutes was estimated at 
10,000. An additional 2,400 scientists worked at MPG institutes 
as visiting scholars from other German research organizations and 
from other countries. 
The Fraunhofer Society for the Promotion of Applied Research-
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Angewandten Forschung 
-- (FhG) is a German research society which focuses explicitly on 
applied research. The FhG was founded in 194 9 to pursue " ••• 
research and development in the fields of the natural sciences and 
engineering on behalf of industry and government" (Geimer, 1978). 
In 1987 the FhG comprised 30 separate institutes which carried out 
contract research in the following areas: production technology, 
materials sciences; process engineering, energy technology, 
construction engineering, microelectronics, sensor technology; 
information technology, production automation, and environmental 
technology. These FhG institutes are located near comprehensive 
universities as in the case of MPG institutes, and the technical 
and research staffs at FhG institutes have appointments also at 
the universities. 
In addition to 
Academies of Sciences 
activities but their 
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the MPG and the FhG, so-called German 
also undertake research and development 
principal role is the dissemination of 
scientific and technical information. These organizations are 
characterized by their triple roles as scholarly societies, 
agencies for long-term research projects, and publishers of the 
results of research undertaken in all industrialized nations for 
the benefit of the German science and technology establishment 
(Prais, 1981). 
9.3.2.2 German Government's National Laboratories 
There are a total of thirteen German national laboratories 
supported primarily by the German Ministry of Research and 
Technology. The research effort conducted in these laboratories 
consists of scientific and applied research activities that 
require special, dedicated and costly apparatus, equipment, and 
facilities. The National Laboratories are established and funded 
by the German federal government. However National Laboratories 
are legally independent institutions organized as private associ-
ations, under German laws of "registered association," "limited 
liability company," or "foundation". German government authority 
over National Laboratories exists only in the form of very general 
regulations. Researc.h objectives, are established by each 
National Laboratory. The thirteen German National Laboratories in 
1987 employed over 6,000 scientists, technicians, and engineers. 
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All of the National Laboratories are linked together under an 
Association of National 'Research Centres (AGF), which coordinates 
their scientific as well as management activities and represents 
their interests at the federal government level. 
9.3.2.3 Research Establishments Subordinate to the German Federal 
and Laender Ministries 
Individual research institutes and other facilities directly 
subordinate to the German federal and Laender ministries, repre-
sent another component of Germany's science and technology 
resource pool. There are three types of organizations: a) re-
search facilities or institutes directly subordinate to the German 
Government's federal ministries; b) research facilities or insti-
tutions directly subordinate to the Laender; and c) institutes or 
facilities on the so-called "Blaue Liste" that are jointly 
financed by the German federal authorities and either single 
Laender or all of the Laender. 
In 1987, there were a total of forty-one research institutes 
subordinate to the German Federal government ministries, referred 
to as "federal government research establishments. " Most of the 
research performed in these establishments is in direct support of 
their ministry's mission. In 1987, these research establishments 
employed a total of 14,500 personnel. 
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The Laender operate their own research institutes similar to 
those of the German federal government, and in 1987, there were SO 
such institutes financed by the individual states in which they 
were located. These institutes undertake both basic and applied 
research serving the requirements of an individual German state or 
a particular region of Germany. 
There are 46 joint German federal-state research institutes-
which comprise the so-called "Blaue Liste." Established in 1975 
under an agreement between the German federal and Laender govern-
ments known as the "Skeleton Agreement on Research Promotion", 
these institutes undertake principally applied research and 
development. In 1987 the total scientific and technical staff in 
these institutes was about 1,400. 
9.3.3 Research Facilities Operated by German IndustkY 
Most of German industry's research and development is under-
taken by individual German industrial firms, with cooperative 
research ventures between German firms being limited. The break-
down of German industry's funding for research and development by 
industry sector is shown in Table 9.4. 
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TABLE 9.4 
German Industry-Financed R&D Expenditures, Germany, 1987 
Sector of Industry 
ENERGY AND WATER SUPPLY, MINING 
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 
Mining 
Total 
MANUFACTURING 
Chemical Industry, etc., 
Processing of Mineral Oil 
Chemical Industry 
Manufacture of Plastic and 
Rubber Products 
Construction Material, 
Ceramics and Glass 
Production of Metals and 
Manufacturing of Metal Products 
Iron-Producing Industry 
Steel, Machine and Auto 
Production, etc. 
Machine Construction 
Manufacture of Autos and Spare Parts 
Aeronautics and Aerospace Vehicle 
Manufacture 
Electrotechnology, Precision 
Mechanics, Optics, etc. 
Electrotechnology 
Precision Mechanics and Optics 
Timber, Paper, and Printing Industry 
Percent R&D Financed 
by Inciust:r:y 
81.1 
40.6 
50.7 
95.2 
98.0 
96.9 
94.7 
76.2 
66.3 
82.6 
92.8 
96.1 
27.6 
86.3 
86.6 
91.8 
96.8 
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TABLE 9 • 4 (Continued) 
Leather, Textile and Garment 
Manufacture 
Food Industry 
Total 
ALL OTHER SECTORS OF INDUSTRY 
TOTAL 
85.1 
96.8 
87.3 
61.1 
85.2 
Source: Adapted from Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, 
Bundesbericht Forschung 1988. 
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The proportion of German industry's financed research and 
development activities is increasing. In 1970 German industry 
funded 53 percent of total German research and development 
activities and by 1987 this proportion had increased to 65 
percent. Industry supported research activities are organized in 
a total of seventy-nine associations along areas or disciplines 
of research. 
All industry funded research and development activities in 
Germany are represented by the Confederation of Industrial 
Research Association (AIF), comprised of the seventy-nine 
professional member associations. 
~.3.4 Conclusions 
The German science, technology, research and development 
establishment has formed close working relationships among the 
various research organizations in Germany as well as among the 
German federal and Laender governments' departments and agencies 
(Deich, 1979). 
The numerous institutions of the MPG and the FhG serve as 
conduits of scientific information to other research establish-
ments in Germany. Essentially all German communities have an 
active science association, often sponsored by the local 
industrial establishment. These associations have regular 
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meetings, presentations and lectures by members of the German 
science establishment, academia, and German government officials. 
Information concerning recent developments in science and 
technology is therefore rapidly disseminated in Germany (Gehrels, 
1983). 
German research and development personnel are also well 
trained in their respective science and technical areas. The 
initial formal training in German academic institutions is 
supplemented by periodic scientific and technical courses provided 
in many localities in Germany. The formal training requirements 
in Germany exceed those of most other industrial nations. Even 
the support personnel such as factory foremen receive formal 
instructions. The term "skilled" in Germany (Fahman) is used only 
after completion of formal training period, whereas in many other 
industrial nations, the terms is applied to individuals with long 
.work experience. These characteristics allow for the rapid 
diffusion of advanced technologies throughout German industry, and 
create domestic demand for advanced technology products and 
services (Gremmen and Vallenbergh, 1986). 
The innovative characteristics of German industry can be 
readily seen from the number of U.S. patents granted to German 
scientists. In 1987 the U.S. Patent Office granted German 
scientists a total of 6,900 patents; the corresponding number for 
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French scientists was 2,100 and for British scientists it was 
2,500. 
9. 4 FUNDING PATTERN FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN GERMANY 
Expenditures for research and development in Germany, by 
source of funds for the 1978 to 1986 period, are shown in Table 
9. 5. In 1986, German federal and Laender government sources 
accounted for 42.3 percent of the total, German industry accounted 
for 56.2 percent, and less than 2 percent came from other sources 
such as private foundations and foreign sources. Of the total 
German government funding, about 60 percent came from federal 
sources and 40 percent from the Laender governments. 
Of the total German federal government research and 
development funding, the BMFT accounts for about 57 percent, 
followed by the Ministry of Defence, (16 percent), the Ministry of 
the Economy ( 9 percent) , and the Ministry for Education and 
Science (BMBW) (8 percent). The other German federal ministries 
account for the remaining 10 percent. 
The BMFT represents the most important German federal 
government source of financial support for research in Germany. 
In addition to financing its own research, the BMFT also provides 
support to the MPG, the FhG, the National Laboratories, and the 
German Research Society (DFG). The BMFT budget for 1986 is shown 
Year 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
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TABLE 9.5 
Gross Expenditure for Research and Development, 
by Source: Germany, 1978-1986 
(Million DM) 
Total Government Defence Space Industry other 
31,620 13,770 1,756 566 16,870 980 
39,040 17,070 1,704 .. 633 21,050 920 
44,570 19,400 1,695 696 24,470 700 
46,780 19,780 1,858 762 26,300 700 
50,800 19,900 1,900 800 27,400 800 
Source: Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, 
Bundesbericht Forschung 1987. 
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in Table 9.6. Of the BMFT's total budget, about half is allocated 
to project support, another 36 percent to support for research 
institutions, 10 percent to international organizations and 
programmes, and the remaining 4 percent to indirect research 
support and administration. 
The BMBW plays a significant role at the federal level in the 
provision of financial support for research, primarily to the 
German universities. The BMBW provides most of the German federal 
Government's contribution to the funding of the DFG. 
The DFG is a non-governmental organization, even though its 
funds are received almost entirely from the German federal and 
Laender governments, with about 59 percent of funds provided by 
the German federal government (primarily through the BMBW), and 40 
percent from the Laender. Its principal function is to provide 
funding for research in the German Comprehensive Universities. 
Several German private foundations are also important as 
funding agents for science activities in Germany. Significant 
among these is the Donors Association for the Promotion of Science 
and Humanities, supported by German industry for the promotion of 
science related research and teaching. The Donors Association is 
supported by approximately 5, 000 German industrial enterprises, 
and has a budget of about forty million DM a year. 
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TABLE 9.6 
German Federal Ministry for Research 
and Technology: Budget, 1986 
Areas of Special Rmphasis 
Basic Research and Programmes Oriented 
Toward Basic Research 
Max Planck Society 
Miscellaneous R&D in Natural Sciences 
Space Research and Technology 
Marine R&D 
Polar Research 
Humanities and Social Science 
Orientation Programmes 
Research on Ecological Impacts 
Climatic Research 
Technological Assessment, 
Research Planning 
Promotion of R&D in Important Areas 
of Government Forward Planning 
Environmental Technologies, 
Water Research 
Fossil and Renewable Energy Sources: 
Rational Energy Utilization 
Nuclear Energy 
Health R&D 
Humanization of Labour 
.... 
<Million DM) 
2,385.1 
407.8 
867.8 
816.6 
164.2 
64.5 
64.3 
91.7 
66.9 
28.8 
4.9 
2,955.4 
157.2 
678.5 
1,638.7 
318.6 
184.8 
(Percent) 
32.9 
5.6 
12.9 
11.2 
2.3 
8.9 
8.5 
1.3 
8.9 
8.3 
8.1 
48.7 
2.2 
9.2 
22.6 
4.6 
1.4 
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TABLE 9.6 (Continued) 
Promotion of R&D in Key Technologies 
Information Technologies 
Materials Research 
Biotechnology 
Physical Technologies, Chemical 
Processing Technologies 
Aviation R&D 
Improvement of Basis for Industrial 
R&D and Promotion of Innovation 
Fraunhofer Society 
Improvement of Technology Transfer 
Support for the Establishment of 
Technology-Oriented Enterprises; 
Risk Capital 
Special Information Systems 
Promotion of R&D and Innovation in 
Public Administration 
Ground Transport and Traffic 
Geosciences and Raw Materials R&D 
Safety R&D (as far as not contained in 
special programme areas) 
Other (Stipends, Exchanges) 
Administration 
TOTAL 
1,160.6 
671.8 
83.5 
125.2 
189.8 
171.9 
338.3 
114.9 
58.5 
68.8 
96.9 
280.5 
186.8 
24.8 
9.7 
45.2 
51.1 
7,268.8 
Source: Federal Ministry for Research and Technology 
Fact Sheet, 1988. 
16.8 
9.1 
1.2 
1.7 
1.5 
2.4 
4.5 
1.6 
8.8 
9.8 
1.3 
3.9 
2.6 
1.2 
8.1 
8.6 
8.7 
100.0 
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The other large German private foundation funding research is 
the Volkswagenwerk Foundation, which provides research grants to 
German non-profit institutions engaged in research and higher 
education. 
9. 5 GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES IN GERMANY 
Neither the German federal government nor the Laender have 
enacted science, technology or industry policies which impact on 
free market operations in Germany (Hager and Taylor, 1982). 
The German federal and Laender governments have funded some 
research and development for advanced technology sectors as well 
as supported educational activities and training. Very modest 
procurement policies have also been enacted by the German federal 
government. 
9. 5 .1 SUP!)Ort to the German Microelectronics Sector 
The German microelectronics industry, with Siemens A.G. as 
the principal firm, has maintained a modest stake in the world's 
microelectronic markets for several decades with very limited 
assistance from the German government. In 1988, the German 
microelectronic sector had world-wide sales of $780 million and a · 
1.8 percent share of world markets. In 1964, Germany's share of 
the world wide microelectronics market was 1. 4 percent. In the 
-
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1960's and 1970's, Germany maintained its modest market share by 
undertaking in-house research and development activities. In the 
mid-1980's, Germany's microelectronic industry turned to foreign 
technologies to maintain its microelectronic production at home as 
well as to continue to export some microelectronic products. 
Federal government assistance to its native microelectronic 
industry was limited throughout this period (Northcott and Rogers, 
1985) • In 1985 Siemens A.G. purchased advanced microelectronic 
technology from the Japanese Toshiba Corporation and in 1987, 
.. 
Siemens joined forces with the N.V. Philips Corporation from the 
Netherlands to develop next generation microelectronic devices, 
i.e. DRAMS, one of the most widely-used microelectronic 
components. 
The initial attempt by the government to assist the German 
microelectronics industry was in 1967 through training programme 
support. In 1971, the German federal government established a 
very modest public procurement policy giving preference to German 
microelectronic products (El-Agraa, 1985). 
Between 1974 and 1978 the BMFT operated a programme of 
support for the German electronic components industry with 
research and development funding of about $30 million per year. 
In 1979 this support was terminated. 
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Also in 1978, the BMFT provided funding for research focused 
on integrated circuits to be used in television and radio sets by 
German manufacturers. This programme also included support for 
the development of new microelectronics manufacturing.technologies 
(Drais, 1981). 
Clearly German government support for its native microelec-
tronics industry has been modest (Neuman, 1981; Aquino, 1983). 
9.5.2 German Policies in the Machine Tools Sector 
Governmental support to the German machine tool sector has 
also been modest and mostly indirect (Hutton, et al., 1977). The 
government has provided some funding for German institutions 
engaged in research and development programmes directly focused on 
production, i.e., process technology, automated manufacturing, and 
flexible manufacturing systems. For example, the German govern-
ment has, during the past several decades provided support to the 
machine tool industry via its annual funding of several research 
establishments. The Technical Research Institute at Aachen, 
considered by many to be the best machine tool laboratory in the 
world, was the principal recipient of funds for research from 
German federal and Laender governments (Daly and Jones, 1980). 
The German machine tool industry has also benefited indirectly 
from governmental tax incentives and other aid programmes 
available to all German industries to advance production 
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technologies. Examples include programmes aimed at bringing 
efficiency to small and medium size firms, promoting "knowledge-
intensive" businesses, stimulating research and development, and 
assisting export-oriented industries ( ITC, 1984). Beginning in 
1979, many small and medium size German firms, including machine 
tool companies, were able to receive grants from the Federal 
Ministry of Economics for personnel improvement in the form of 
contributions to wages and salaries of research and development 
personnel (Gehrels, 1983). 
Two other sources of indirect financial assistance to the 
German machine tool industry have been available over the last 
several decades: 
a) Since 1978, firms with sales of up to $75 
million, have been eligible to receive 
payments from the BMFT for outside contracted 
research. 
b) Since 1982, the BMFT has entered into agree-
ments with private companies to support their 
programmes for applications of micro-
electronics. This support takes the form of 
subsidies which can amount to 40 percent of 
R&D personnel and contract costs, and 20 
percent of investments (ITC, 1984). 
German machine tool manufacturers, and other industries may 
also receive export financing assistance from their participation 
in the German government's "special-function banks," which 
provide aid to foreign countries. Such assistance takes the form 
of so-called "Humes guarantees" for exports of products which, in 
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turn, allow exporters to receive preferential financing rates from 
either special-function banks or private sector banks (ITC, 1984). 
In the case of industrial robots in the period 1974-1979, the 
German government funded industrial robot research and development 
programmes to the level of about $13 million, allocated to German 
industrial firms engaged in robot production in the form of grants 
(Baranson, 1983; ITC, 1984; Massen, 1983). 
Since 1980, the "Fertigungstechnik" programme established by 
the BMFT, with a total budget of $100 million from 1980 to 1988, 
has indirectly benefitted the German machine tool and robotics 
industry, by assisting small and medium sized German firms through 
grants and preferential loans to finance research and development 
activities (ITC, 1984). 
In 
billion 
1984, the government approved 
to stimulate the development 
funding of about $1.1 
of advanced-technology 
industries in Germany which included German machine tool makers 
and in 1985, the government established support programmes of some 
$200 million for the use of computer-aided design and manufac-
turing, software and robotics in German industry sectors. 
As can be seen from the above, the German government has 
provided only marginal support to the German machine tool sector. 
Most of the German government policies which have profited German 
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machine tool makers have been indirect in that these policies have 
been designed to benefit the entire German industrial sector (Daly 
and Jones, 1980). 
9.5.3 Government Policies in the Advanced Materials Sector in 
GeOMny 
Research in advanced ceramics in Germany has been funded at a 
total level of nearly $50 million over the past 15 years. This 
research, which dates from 1974, was initially sponsored by the 
BMFT in support of programmes dealing ·With advanced ceramic 
components for vehicular gas turbines (Hutton, et al., 1977). 
Almost half of the funding was provided by industry. The initial 
programme ended in 1983, and a new programme called "Car for the 
year 2000" was begun in 1984. 
1No other explicit policies have been enacted by the German 
federal or Laender governments to facilitate research, development 
or engineering of advanced materials (Kocka, 1980). Several 
comprehensive universities and technical colleges have initiated 
work with advanced ceramics, and some of the funding for this 
research effort· originates from the German federal government 
departments and agencies (Balmer, 1983). Such funding, however is 
provided for advanced research without specifying advanced 
materials as the research focus. Similarly, several German 
chemical firms, including I.G. Farben A.G., have undertaken 
research and development work on advanced ceramics as well as 
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polymers. Here again, there has been no funding or other kind of 
support for these efforts from the German federal and Laender 
governments. 
9.6 CONCLUSIONS 
German federal and Laender governments have enacted only a 
few policies to assist German advanced technology industries. The-
limited assistance provided to these industry sectors has resulted 
from the macroeconomic policies of the German federal government 
designed and implemented to assist all German industrial sectors, 
without targeting particular sectors or technologies (Rubenstein, 
1977; Franzmeyer, 1979; Lederman, et al., 1986). 
There are no formal German government and industry coordi-
nating mechanisms or offices for science and technology activ-
ities. The German autonomous science and technology associations 
such as the MPG and the OFG are very successful in coordinating 
science and technology efforts among all German establishments 
engaged in such activities. 
The German government support and funding of research and 
development efforts may be marginally classified as policies 
designed to assist specific industry sectors. In terms of public 
expenditure theory, such government assistance however may be 
readily accepted and considered as normative policy. It can be 
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readily prescribed as a public welfare activity effort in order to 
avoid socially undesirable duplication of research activities and 
to promote socially acceptable advancement in science. It can be 
stated with some certainty that German government policies with 
regard to German industry in general, and German export sectors in 
particular, have been designed and implemented in accord with free 
market principles at home and in world markets (El-Agraa, 1985). 
The German government's policy of not interferring with free 
market mechanisms has been applied with some consistency during 
periods of prosperity as well as economic decline. For example, 
during the 1978 to 1987 period, the German machine tool industry, 
clearly one of the most important German export sectors, lost 
about 40 percent of its world-wide sales of machine tools to 
Japanese manufacturers. In spite of these very large losses, and 
in spite of the fact that Japanese machine tool makers did not 
conduct their export sales according to accepted "rules, " the 
German government chose not to tamper with free market forces on 
behalf of their machine tool industry (Daly, et al., 1985). 
In the light of the above, the obvious question is how well 
has German industry performed, especially in comparison to 
nations which have attempted to advance their industry sectors by 
various policies which interfere with market forces? 
The German microelectronics industry has had a minor presence 
in world-wide microelectronics sales. Germany, however, has 
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maintained its share of the world market over time. In 1964, 
Germany's microelectronic production represented about 1.4 percent 
of the world's total; by 1975 Germany's share had increased to 1.6 
percent, and by 1987 it had further increased to 1. 7 percent. 
Clearly not a spectacular performance, but one which cannot be 
categorized as a failure. 
Perhaps more important the German government has expended 
essentially no public monies in direct support of its microelec-
tronic industry sector. By comparison, France, with its native 
microelectronic sector in complete disarray in 1988, has expended 
approximately $1.5 to $2.5 billion on the French microelectronic 
industry over the last three decades. 
In the machine tool sector, Germany's experience is somewhat 
different. As in the case of microelectronics, the German govern-
ment has provided only very marginal support to German machine 
tool makers. German machine tool exports were very large until 
the late 1970's. In the post-World War II period, German machine 
tools constituted, at various times, between one-third and more 
than one-half of the total world-wide sales of machine tools 
(Peacock, 1980). Starting in the late 1970's, the Japanese 
machine tool industry began to penetrate international sales of 
machine tools, almost exclusively at Germany's expense, and 
captured about 40 percent of Germany's machine tool exports as 
well as increasing sales of Japanese machine tools in Germany. 
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A study of the voluminous technical, economic and inter-
national trade literature suggests that the Japanese success was 
not based solely on the technological superiority of their machine 
tools. 
The cardinal reason for the Japanese success in increasing 
their machine tool exports and the German failure to prevent the 
Japanese from capturing their export sales, apparently lies in the 
superior Japanese export marketing organization and skills. To be 
more specific, the Japanese were able to offer far superior terms 
of sale than those offered by German machine tool export sales. 
The superior Japanese terms of sales included superior engineering 
and related consultation services, after-the-sale performance 
guarantees, replacement services, assistance in installation, 
training and initial after-the-sale supervision and, perhaps most 
important, much more attractive sales terms to the buyer. The 
latter included a host of Japanese innovations such as lease-back 
guarantees, lease of machine tools in place of outright purchase, 
payments scheduled in concert with utilization rates, delayed pay-
back loans for purchases and others. One can assume, perhaps with 
some justification, that these superior after-the-sale incentives 
and advantages offered by the Japanese for sales of their machine 
tools represents a manifestation of still another set of indus-
trial policies on the part of the Japanese government. 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
486 
CHAPTER 10: 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Over the last several decades, the economy of the UK has 
shown a modest secular growth pattern. In 1988, the GNP of the 
U.K. increased by 4. 4 percent as compared with a 3. 4 percent 
increase for both Germany and France and a 5. 7 percent increase 
for both the U.S. and Japan. 
The International Monetary Fund estimates for 1989 indicate 
that the GNP of the U.K. will increase by 3.3 percent as compared 
to a 2.8 percent increase in France and a 2.4 percent increase in 
Germany. In terms of international trade, however, the position 
of. the U.K. is less favourable. In 1988, the current account 
balance for the U.K. was a negative $26 billion, and this 
negative balance is projected to increase to $30 billion in 1989. 
The Current Account balances for France for these two years are 
also negative, but much smaller -- $4 billion in 1988 and $2 
billion in 1989. Conversely, Germany's current account balance in 
1988 was positive and relatively large 
essentially an identical estimate for 1989. 
$49 billion with 
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The trade balance for the U.K. in advanced technology 
products has deteriorated over the last decade or so, and is a 
contributing factor to the overall decline in the balance of trade 
for the U.K. 
This has not always been the case. On the contrary, the 
U.K. in the past has been in the forefront among industrial 
nations in scientific activities and technological achievements 
(Aldcroft and Richardson, 1970). 
The Royal Observatory at Greenwich was established as early 
as 1675, the Geological Survey in 1832 (one of the first in the 
world) and the Laboratory of the Government Chemist in 1843. By 
the early part of the 19th century, Parliament was accustomed to 
appropriating not insignificant public monies to support initially 
natural science but gradually other scientific enterprises 
(Matthews, et al., 1982). 
Parliamentary recognition of the importance of research led 
to the creation of a Department of Science and Art in 1853, and 
the genesis of the Agricultural Research Council in the U.K. dates 
from 1909. The adoption of the National Insurance Act of 1911 
provided that one penny per insured person was to be allocated to 
medical research (Daly, et al., 1983). 
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The U.K.'s scientific and technological inventions in the 
18th and 19th centuries were adopted as a measure for scientific 
achievements world-wide. Equally important, U.K. scientific 
achievements were matched by technological advances and industrial 
innovations including steam powered transportation systems, 
textile machinery, aviation, food processing and others (Crafts 
and Thomas, 1986). These achievements continued throughout this 
century, with the development of the radar, during World War II, 
as an indicator of the quality of scientific and technological 
activities in the U.K. The U.K. can also claim numerous 
achievements in the post World War II decades up to the present 
time (Gibbons, 1984). 
It has, however, been stated by many that during the last 
several decades, the application of scientific and technological 
advances in the U.K. has been modest (Mcintosh, 1986). As stated 
by the Economist (January 14, 1989): 
Britain lacks less for good inventions than for good 
technology. The electronic device foreseen by Mr. Brian 
Josephson while studing at Cambridge University won him a 
Nobel prize in 1973. But the lightning-fast Josephson 
junction (used to make computers go faster) is being 
perfected in Japan. The CT scanner invented by EMI' s Mr. 
Geoffrey Bousfield, which won him a Nobel prize in 1979, is 
now making American medical-equipment firms rich. 
If anything, Britain's experience shows that the curiosity, 
frivolity and fumbling so cherished by British boffins are 
the best ingredients for creative success -- but just about 
the worst for turning ideas into profit-earning products. 
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Indeed some of the science indicators point clearly to a decline 
in the U.K.'s ability to apply scientific knowledge. For example, 
in 1960, over twenty percent of all patents granted by the U.S. 
Patent Office were granted to U.K. scientists. In 1983 this 
proportion had declined to 8 percent, and in 1986 to less than 6 
percent (Hochstrasser, 1986). The British government has 
attempted to design and enact relatively comprehensive policies to 
correct these declines and to improve the performance of advanced 
technology industries in the U.K.(1) The results of these 
policies have been modest (Martin, et al., ·1984). 
10.2 SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY PERFORMANCE 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the U.K., scientific, research and development and 
technology related activities are performed by four types of 
establishments: a) universities; b) British government owned and 
managed laboratories and research institutions; c) private 
industry; and d) independent nonprofit organizations. 
A report from the OECD (1986) provides an approximate 
measure of the distribution of scientific and research activities 
by these four types of establishments in terms of total 
expenditures: 
Universities 
Government {in-house) 
Private industry 
Private nonprofit 
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60% 
24 
14 
2 
100% 
Government funding 1 however 1 is cardinal in the U.K. with 
approximately 4 8 percent of all research and development in the 
U.K. funded by the British government. 
10.2.1 Universities 
Some of the principal performers of basic research and a 
significant portion of applied research in the U.K. are the 
universities. 
Since 1966 1 higher education in the U.K. has consisted of 
universities and polytechnics. U.K. polytechnics were established 
in 1966 in order to provide technical and applied education. 
There are at present 29 polytechnics in the U.K. The cardinal 
characteristic of these polytechnics is that these are principally 
teaching institutions. Polytechnics were established primarily in 
response to the needs of the communities or regions in which they 
are located. The curricula of the polytechnics emphasize science 
and engineering applications 1 but these are generally broadly 
based. Polytechnics have over time become involved in some 
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research and development activities, particularly applied research 
serving the needs of local industry sectors. 
Universities in the U.K. are autonomous institutions but a 
significant proportion of their funding is provided by the 
government. Some universities receive modest additional funding, 
from their own endowments, local authorities (mainly for student 
stipends), industry, and other private sources. 
British government support for universities is derived from 
two sources: the University Funding Council (UFC), which provides 
support to the universities primarily in the form of annual block 
grants from public monies, the internal disposition of which is 
determined by the recipient university; and from the five Research 
Councils (Science and Engineering, Medicine, Natural Environment, 
Agriculture and Food, and Economic and Social Science) , which 
provide competitively awarded research grants from public monies 
to university scientists as well as some fellowships and 
scholarships. 
The combination of support to the universities for scientific 
research and development and related activities from these two 
sources (UFC block grants and the five Research Councils) 
comprises what is known as the U.K.'s "dual-support system" for 
academic science, research and development and related activities. 
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The university system in the U.K. has performed well in 
various scientific, research and development endeavours.· 
However, the system, on the admission of the U.K.'s own authori-
ties, may be handicapped in its science and related activities by 
a shortage of experienced research personnel and scientists in 
some of the British universities in some disciplines of science. 
The Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) in 1987 
recommended in the light of this possible shortage, a so-called 
RTX classification scheme of the U.K. universities. Under this 
classification, universities rated Type R are those with substan-
tial research activity and capability across all fields; Type X 
are those with substantial research capability in particular 
fields, and Type T are those universities which are capable of 
pursuing the research and scholarship necessary to support 
teaching, but not able to undertake advanced research. 
This attempt by the ABRC met with significant opposition on 
the part of the universities (Phillips, 1988). The merits of such 
a classification system is of secondary importance here. It is 
important to note however, that in the light of the above, 
scientific and related activities by the universities in the U.K. 
may be handicapped because of the absence of "economies of scale" 
in some U.K. academic institutions. 
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In response to the need for more applied research, the 
Engineering Research Council has established various British 
universities Interdisciplinary Research Centres -- research units 
with a strong emphasis on applied research and development 
activities. The activities of these Centres have been subjected 
to some criticism by university scientists who are engaged in 
basic research activities. For example, a Committee consisting of 
chemists engaged in research at various U.K. universities 
responded in the following way to a request by the UFC in 1987 to 
provide analyses of these Centres as well as on the RTX 
classification; according to Science (Jan. 3, 1988): 
The chemistry committee also rejects the notion of 
teaching-only departments. But it warns against a 
tendency to put excessive emphasis on applied (or even 
strategic) research in universities. The committee 
expresses particular concern about the Science and 
Engineering Research Council's (and the British 
government's) current enthusiasm for university-based 
Interdisciplinary Research Centres. It says that these 
have been cutting directly into the budget for 
fundamental research and that as a result research in 
core chemistry is in serious danger since support has 
been reduced to an unacceptable level by the movement of 
existing funds into new areas. 
The critical issue which needs to be highlighted is that here 
again the issue of "economies of scale" in scientific activities 
is raised. 
A more widely accepted policy to increase applied research in 
universities and to encourage university-industry cooperation in 
research, is the establishment of science parks. About 20 science 
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parks, generally located near universities and in proximity to 
advanced technology firms, have been established or are planned in 
the U.K. (Lowe, 1985). 
10.2.2 Government Laboratories 
The principal performers of scientific activities and 
research and development within the government sector in the U.K. 
are the various research establishments and units subordinate to 
the British government's Five Research Councils: the Agricul-
tural and Food Research Council (AFRC), the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC), the Medical Research Council (MRC), the 
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), and the Science and 
Engineering Research Council (SERC). In addition to providing 
support for research conducted in U.K. universities, each of the 
Councils also conducts research within its own establishments. 
Each of the Five Research Councils is an autonomous body 
established by Royal Charter. They are financed primarily through 
the Science Budget of the Department of Education and Science, 
although the five Councils may also receive funding from other 
British government departments and agencies to undertake contract 
research. 
The SERC, the principal British government agency for science 
and technology, was established in 1965 as the successor to the 
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previous Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. The 
primary responsibility of the SERC is to promote scientific and 
research activities in all areas of basic and applied science and 
engineering in the U.K., other than the specialized areas covered 
by the AFRC, MRC and NERC. During the 1965 to early 1970's 
period, the SERC concentrated on funding research in areas such as 
nuclear physics, astronomy, 
the mid-1970's the SERC's 
and basic chemical sciences. Since 
funding has also been extended to 
applied research, development and engineering projects. 
The SERC operates four major research establishments, estab-
lished as specialized research centres and operating facilities 
that are beyond the resources of academic institutions. These 
establishments include the Daresbury Laboratory (engaged in 
nuclear structure research), the Royal Greenwich Observatory, the 
Royal Observatory, Edinburgh, and the Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory (engaged in particle physics, laser-produced plasmas 
and space research). 
The NERC was established in 1965 to conduct research in 
the physical and biological sciences that relate to the natural 
environment and resources. It has nine component institutes 
engaged in research related to atmospheric, terrestrial and marine 
environments. 
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The MRC was established in 1920 to promote research in all 
areas of health and disease. It operates three major research 
establishments and some fifty smaller research units associated 
with medical schools and hospitals. 
The AFRC was established in 1931 to promote the advancement 
of scientific knowledge relevant to agriculture, horticulture and 
food and the application of this knowledge to related industries. 
The AFRC has eight research institutes ·under its direct control 
and is also responsible for 15 independent state-aided agricul-
tural research institutes. 
The ESRC encourages and supports research in the social 
sciences, particularly research that might assist with the formu-
lation of public policy. 
10.2.3 Industry 
Scientific, research, development and engineering activities 
undertaken by industry in the U.K. include such activities as are 
conducted by private companies, public corporations, and a number 
of industrial research associations. The latter are usually found 
in sectors of the economy dominated by smaller enterprises. 
A breakdown of expenditures for research and development per-
formed by industry in 1975, 1978 and 1981 is shown in Table 10.1. 
497 
TABLE 10.1 
Expenditures on R&D Performed by Industry 
by Broad Product Group:1 the United Kingd~ 
1975, 1978 and 1981 
(L Killion) 
1975 1978 1981 
All product groups 1,340.1 2,324.3 3,792.5 
All products of manu-
facturing 1,293.4 2,243.3 
Chemical & allied 
products 245.4 424.7 
Mechnica1 engineering 103.4 181.1 
Electronics 279.0 649.6 
Other electrical 
engineering 73.0 100.8 
Motor vehicles 88.3 129.7 
Aerospace 291.5 424.6 
Other manufactured 
products 212.8 332.6 
1 Includes capital as well as current expenditures. 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, as cited in 
"Industry Carried Out R&D Worth L 3. 8 bn in 
1981," British Business, 9 December 1983, 
p. 751. 
3,549.0 
654.7 
276.0 
1,153.3 
120.8 
180.4 
762.9 
401.0 
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Of the total research and development performed by industry in 
1981, nearly 94 percent was related to products of manufacturing. 
By far the largest concentration of this research was in electron-
ics. Electronics and aerospace accounted for more than one-half 
of industry research and development in 1981. Chemical and allied 
products were ranked third in terms of research and development, 
followed by the mechanical engineering sector and motor vehicles. 
The significant research and development activities in 
electronics by U.K. firms have been criticized because of the 
heavy reliance by U.K. electronics and aerospace firms on defence 
procurement (Maxwell Stamp Assoc., 1969; Gummett, 1980). In 1986, 
for example, more than one-half of the total production of 
U.K. electronics firms was allocated to defence-related products. 
Out of the top ten European defence electronic companies in 1987, 
five were from the U.K. (GEC ranked first; Plessey fourth, British 
Aerospace fifth, Ferranti seventh, and Racal tenth). 
It has been argued that such a heavy concentration on 
defence-related products by U.K. electronic firms, may leave these 
firms with a limited ability to pursue civilian electronics 
markets. Indeed, these concerns and criticisms of the electronics 
sector have been put forth by industry experts and academic and 
government officials in the U.K. and elsewhere (Hochstrasser, 
1986; Chandler, 1980; Caves, 1974). The absence of major innova-
tions in the microelectronics industry (except for !NMOS' out-
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standing success with microprocessors) during the last two 
decades provides some credence to these charges. It must be 
noted, however, that since 1985, U.K. electronic firms, notably 
GEC and Plessey, have deliberately attempted to reduce their 
reliance on defence contracts (Palmer, 1987). 
It is too early to tell whether or not these changes in 
market orientation will bring about advances in non-defence 
microelectronic products. The other alleged problem area which 
may have a direct impact on industrial research and development 
activities in the U.K. is the continuous attempts by British firms 
to reorganize their activities by mergers, acquisitions, partial 
sell-offs of departments and related activities (Sharp, et al., 
1987) • 
In 1985, for example, GEC attempted to take over Plessey only 
to be prohibited from doing so by the Monopolies and Merger 
Commission of the British government. In 1988, again GEC 
attempted to absorb Plessey, this time with the assistance of the 
German firm Siemens. In early 1989, GEC faced dismemberment from 
a consortium financed by Barclays Bank, as well as from the 
combination of General Electric Corporation from the U.S. and 
British Airways. Other possible participants in such takeover 
activities during the last several years have been Phillips 
(Holland); CGE (France); GEC (UK); Thomson (France) and others. 
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Such activities are not new to industry in the U.K., rather a 
large number of complete or partial takeovers, rationalizations, 
purchases, etc. have taken place in the past (Prais, 1976). For 
example, GEC has a 5 percent interest in France's Matra; Plessey 
owns 49 percent of Italy's Electtronica; British Aerospace bought 
Rover in 1984; Rolls-Royce in 1989 purchased for $520 million the 
Northern Engineering Industries (NEI); the British Smith 
Industries in 1987 purchased its rival the Lear Siegler Corpora-
tion of the u.s. and so on. Not all of these corporate mergers, 
takeovers and acquisitions result in net losses to the U.K.'s 
economy. On the contrary, some of these provide Euro-
competition to the U.S. and Japan, while others result in improved 
competitiveness in world markets. 
There are, however, a number of knowledgeable authorities who 
claim that the sheer magnitude and frequency of these activities 
reduce planning ability and the execution of appropriate research 
and development programmes by the enterprises involved (Hughes and 
Kumar, 1981; Kumar, 1984; Hochstrasser, 1986). 
10.2.4 Private Nonprofit Institutions 
Private non-profit institutions involved in the performance 
of research, development and engineering activities account for 
only a minor portion (about 2 percent) of the overall research and 
development effort in the U.K. 
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10.3 GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND ASSISTANCE FOR SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The government of the U.K. utilizes several government 
departments and agencies as a funding source for scientific, 
research and development activities in the U.K. The principal 
agencies involved are the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and the Five 
Research Councils, in particular the SERC. 
In very broad terms, the British government's funding for 
science and research and development activities increased up to 
the early 1960's and declined from then until the mid-1980's when 
the government begun to increase public monies for science and 
related activities as part of a deliberate policy to enhance the 
status of science and technology in the U.K. 
Between 1959 and 1963, funding for research activities by the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research increased by 
about 320 percent. In the mid-1960's, the funding began to 
decline. In 1971 the rate of annual increase in funding had 
declined to 4 percent. Gibbons (1974) reported on this as 
follows: 
Because of the increasing pressure on government 
resources of other more directly appealing or social 
claims, we are now probably past the point of maximum 
growth rate of resources for science. 
This creates difficulties which are .increased by 
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'sophistication' (a term used to express the fact that 
it becomes more expensive to make equivalent advances to 
knowledge) and by the growth of 'big science' (where the 
threshold of expenditure needed to achieve any worth-
while result tends to rise continually, as the fields of 
nuclear physics and radio-astronomy illustrate). 
This growth of expense of what might be considered the 
same 'amount' of good science can partially be offset, 
for example, by increasing international collaboration 
and by selectivity in the support of science. 
The consequence of an increasing need for selectivity in 
support of science and for an increasing amount of 
international science at a time of decreasing popular 
approval of science will be that Research Councils will 
have to become increasingly well-informed about national 
needs and objectives, so that they may try to deploy 
scarce resources in the most appropriate direction, and 
be seen to be doing so. 
Though this is a task of considerable complexity, it is 
also one of immense importance and we regard it as 
imperative that those responsible for determining 
scientific priorities should be fully informed of, and 
should pay due regard to, government policy and national 
needs. 
Throughout the 1970s and mid-1980s, the funding for science and 
technology by the British government remained relatively constant 
in current money terms, which means it declined somewhat in real 
terms. Since 1985 the British government's funding of science and 
related activities has increased at a modest but steady rate 
(Phillips, 1988). 
Another British government agency for the advancement of 
British science and technology in industry is the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI). Since 1980, DTI direct support for 
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science and technology has increased significantly. In 1980, the 
DTI provided for science and technology activities $227 million or 
about 6 percent of its budget. By 1985, DTI funding for science 
and technology activities, had increased to $654 million and is 
projected to increase to about $800 million in 1989. DTI 
assistance to British science and technology activities may be 
grouped in the following categories: 
a) funding of the four British Industrial Research Establish-
ments (IRE's); the National Physical ·Laboratory (NPL); the 
National Engineering Laboratory (NEL); the Warren Sperry Labora-
tory (responsible for environmental sciences); and the Laboratory 
of the Government Chemist; 
b) funding assistance to private firms for selected research 
and development projects; 
c) measures designed to promote technological collaboration 
among British firms; and 
d) activities designed to promote the application of 
advanced technologies in the U.K. 
The funding of selected research and development projects by 
private firms is of special interest because this funding repre-
sents essentially sectorial or target industry support by the 
British government. Barber and White (1987) describe this funding 
as follows: 
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Support for Innovation (SFI): This is a comprehensive 
facility available to all sectors, offering selective 
financial support to firms undertaking R&D projects. 
The main form of assistance is grant aid of up to 25% of 
eligible costs for development projects and up to SO% 
for research projects. 
The Microelectronics Industry Support Programme (MISP): 
This scheme (started in 1983) provides for total grant 
assistance of L120m over seven years for R&D and/or 
capital projects which contribute significantly to the 
improvement of the competitiveness, strength and 
independence of the UK microelectronics industry. An 
earlier MISP scheme which provided total assistance of 
LSSm closed in 1983. 
The Fibre Optics and Optoelectronics Scheme (FOS): This 
scheme is similar to MISP but directed at the UK fibre 
optics and optoelectronics industriei. It was launched 
in 1981 with a total budget of L25m which has since been 
increased to about L55m. Software Products Scheme 
( SPS) : This scheme provides support in the form of 
grants of up to 25% of eligible project costs for the 
development and marketing of software products (pack-
ages) • The current level of expenditure under this 
scheme is of the order of L6-7m per annum. 
The budget of the SERC represents another British government 
funding source for research activities. As noted previously, the 
SERC promotes research in all areas of science and engineering 
with the exception of the more specialized areas covered by the 
AFRC, MRC and NERC. Research performed in-house in the SERC' s 
subsidiary research establishments accounts for about 35 percent 
of its total research and development expenditures. A number of 
joint research projects have been undertaken in collaboration with 
government departments and nationalized industries. In addition, 
the SERC has been utilizing a variety of methods for encouraging 
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university and industry collaboration in research on engineering 
and applied problems of national importance. 
The activities of the SERC are carried out by four subordi-
nate Boards -- Engineering; Astronomy, Space and Radio; Nuclear 
Physics; and Science. The Science Board accounts for about 2 8 
percent of the SERC' s total R&D expenditures; the Engineering 
Board, about 25 percent; the Nuclear Physics Board about 23 
percent; and the Astronomy Space and Radio Board about 18 percent. 
The remaining 7 percent of the SERC's expenditures goes to central 
administrative support. The SERC relies on the advice of the four 
subordinate Boards as well as close to 70 committees, sub-commit-
tees and panels (each typically with 10 or 12 members) in alloca-
ting its budget support. 
The Engineering i8oard conducts and supports research in all 
areas of engineering and technology. The distribution of its 1986 
research and development expenditures by subject area was as 
follows: 
Information Technology 21.0% 
Materials 12.5 
Machines and Power 12.2 
Engineering Processes 9.7 
Marine Technology 9.5 
Environment 6.6 
Teaching Company 5.7 
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Biotechnology 3.8 
Polymer Engineering 3.4 
Energy 1.6 
Support for Establishments 
and Other Domestic Facilities 12.6 
The Astronomy, Space and Radio Board of the SERC covers 
astronomy and solar system studies, and provides access for UK 
astronomers to a wide range of facilities, both domestically and 
internationally. The breakdown of the Boards' 1986 expenditures 
by principal subject area was as follows: 
Astronomy 
Solar Systems 
International Contributions 
Support for Establishments and 
Other Domestic Facilities 
17.5% 
6.9 
26.7 
50.2 
The SERC's Nuclear Physics Board supports fundamental 
research in particle physics, which is carried out wholly in 
international facilities, and in nuclear physics using both UK and 
overseas facilities. The distribution of its R&D expenditures by 
broad subject area in 1986 was as follows: 
Particle Physics 
Nuclear Structure 
International Contributions 
Support for Establishments and 
Other Domestic Facilities 
8.8% 
3.7 
56.8 
30.8 
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The Science Board of the SERC supports basic research in the 
'core' sciences -- biology, chemistry, physics and mathematics--
which provide the foundation for the activities of the other 
science-based research councils and the UK's science-based 
industries. The breakdown of its 1986 expenditures by broad 
subject area was as follows: 
Chemistry 
Biological Science 
Physics 
Mathematics 
Other Research 
International Contributions 
Support for Establishments 
and Other Domestic Facilities 
21.1% 
20.2 
10.7 
3.8 
3.8 
9.5 
31.0 
The SERC and the four other Research Councils account for 
about eighteen percent of the total amount spent by the British 
government on research and development in the U.K. In 1988, the 
British Department of Education and Science proposed to increase 
its support to the five Research Councils from $1.24 billion in 
1988 to $1.44 billion in 1989, an increase of sixteen percent. 
The allocation of this funding among the five Research Councils, 
will be based on the advice provided by the ABRC. 
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10.4 RECENT SCIENCE POLICIES IH THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the early 1960's, British science research and development 
activities began a downward slide, partly brought about by reduced 
spending. 
By 1971, the annual real growth rate of science research and 
development expenditures in the U.K. had fallen from 15 to 18 
percent in the mid-1960's to about 4 percent, with further 
reductions in prospect. In the mid-1960s, the U.K. had the 
second highest research and development budget among OECD member 
countries. By the mid-1970's, the U.K. ranked fourth among OECD 
members in research and development activities. 
It has been reported that this decline in funds was due to a 
lack of direction in the U.K. 's science and technology policies., 
and some argue that the British government in the 1970s had 
essentially no centralized science and technology policy but 
rather a series of individual departmental policies ( Dalyell, 
1983; Gummett, 1980). Science and research policies in the U.K. 
in the 1970's were not formulated by a central body but rather by 
a series of committees at various levels, such as the ABRC, the 
Advisory Committee on Applied R&D, and the Defence Scientific 
Advisory council. 
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Indeed a number of scholarly papers on the status of U.K. 
science and technology in the 1970's suggest a drift in policies 
and merger accomplishments in science and technology related 
activities (Mcintosh, 1986; Peacock, 1980; Danic, 1980). The 
science and technology policies were reversed by the British 
government under Prime Minister Thatcher in the 1980's. 
In 1983 the British government announced plans to improve 
significantly science and technology policy coordination between 
various government agencies and to strengthen the role of the 
Chief Scientist in the Central Policy Review Staff. 
More important, a number of entities of the British govern-
ment and of the U.K.'s science and technology establishment began 
critical reviews of the science, technology, research and 
development, and advanced industry status and activities in the 
U.K. A number of public documents resulted from this effort. 
In early 1987, the House of Lords _published critical report 
on the U.K.'s science effort. The report proposed that a Minister 
of Science with cabinet rank be appointed. In July 1987, the 
government replied with a White Paper in which significant changes 
in science policy were outlined. 
One of the key provisions was the recommendation for a 
"collective Ministerial consideration under the Prime Minister's 
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leadership of science and technology priorities," which resulted 
in the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on science and tech-
nology chaired by the Prime Minister. 
According to Phillips (1988) the Committee has four principal 
responsibilities: 
a) considering important ad · hoc · issues for 
instance, present questions about the UK's 
involvement in space research and in CERN; 
b) considering major policy developments on 
science -- perhaps, for example, the Govern-
ment's response to the ABRC's Strategy Advice; 
c) overseeing reviews of particular parts of 
Government-funded R&D in ·relation to general 
policy considerations. The relationship 
between Government-funded and industry-funded 
research might be one such concern; 
d) undertaking an annual review of science 
funding priorities as a major input to the 
Public Expenditure Survey process, beginning 
in 1988. 
The ABRC, in a report published simultaneously with the White 
Paper, also expressed its own concern at 11 • • • a lack of purpose-. 
ful direction, nationally, in the redeployment of the university 
research effort, both between and within institutions. 11 One of 
the principal recommendations of the ABRC was the creation of a 
number of interdisciplinary, university-based research centres, 
focused on "strategic" science. In August 1987, the SERC 
announced seven science and technology areas for which such 
centres will be established. The Centre for Exploitation of 
Science and Technology in the autumn of 1987 began efforts to 
511 
identify other areas of science and technology which would be 
suitable for commercial exploration.< 2 > 
In late 1987 the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (after her 
third successive general election victory and partly in response to 
the concerns expressed) significantly modified the existing science 
and technology policy-making apparatus. She made administrative 
changes by placing the emphasis on applied research and by 
soliciting industry's views of appropriate science and technology 
policies. 
In place of the Advisory Committee on Applied Research and 
Development (ACARD), which during the last decade had functioned as 
the principal science and technology advisory body to the Prime 
Minister, a new organization -- the Advisory Committee on Science 
and Technology (ACOST} was formed, with the responsibility of 
reporting to the Prime Minister through the Cabinet office. 
Another new organization, the Centre for the Exploitation of 
Science and Technology was also established with the mandate to 
work closely with ACOST. The Centre was mandated to provide U.K. 
industry, government and the academic community with advice on the 
most commercially promising areas of science, that is, applied as 
opposed to basic research. This focus on applied research 
presented the members of the two new British Government agencies 
with an opportunity to emphasize industry research priorities for 
research and development. Essentially all ACOST members were 
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research managers and chief executives within the private sector, 
and the Centre was funded by private sector-industry subscrip-
tion. Thus, the British private sector become an important factor 
in the principal science and technology policy making activities 
in the U.K. in 1987. 
The need to reemphasize applied research and development in 
the U.K. was not limited to the opinions held by industry. On the 
contrary, the need to concentrate on applied research had been 
expressed by other interested parties in the U.K. For example, an 
ABRC report published in 1987 which focused on the criteria for 
the selection of research and development activities in the U.K. 
emphasized such applied research components as exploitability (the 
potential for profitable industrial and commercial use); applica-
bility (the potential for uses leading to social and environmental 
benefits); and the significance of research for education and 
training (Phillips, 1988). Sir David Phillips summarizes this as 
follows: "The implication • is that judgments of potential 
utility should play a greater part in determining the relative 
level of effort to be devoted to different fields of basic 
research." (Phillips, 1988). 
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10.5 THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR ADVANCED 
'l'ECBHOLOGIES 
10.5.1 The Microelectronics Sector in the United Kingdom 
Most governmental policies directed at the U.K. microelec-
tronic industry have consisted of a series of government grants to 
the native microelectronic sector. 
In 1968, the British Ministry of Technology made the first 
grant by providing International Computers Ltd (ICL) with 
financial support of about $12 million per year for the period 
from 1968 to 1976. The British government also allocated about 
$12 million in this period for applied research in the microelec-
tronic industry to be undertaken through the Advanced Computer 
Technology Project (ACTP). An additional $8 million per annum was 
provided by the British government to seven English microelec-
tronics firms to stimulate software development. For the British 
microelectronic components industry, the Department of Industry 
provided funding of $4 million per annum from 1973 until 1977 with 
additional support from the Defence Ministry of about $5 million 
per year. 
In 1978, the BDI announced the availability of a further $140 
million of funding over a three year period to integrated circuit 
manufacturers operating in the U.K. Almost simultaneously, 
another U.K. government agency, the National Enterprise Board 
(NEB), announced an investment of $100 million in an attempt to 
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establish a new world-class semiconductor manufacturer called 
Inmos (Mackintosh, 1979). 
The NEB has been the principal source of government funding 
to the microelectronics industry over the last several decades. 
The SIA reported (1985) on these NEB activities as follows: 
The National Enterprise Board agreed to put up $115 
million to establish Inmos. Inmos is supposed to 
establish a UK capability to design and produce state-
of-the-art memory circuits (i.e., the 64K ·MOS RAM). 
The Department of Industry is involved with several 
major endeavors: MAP, the Microprocessor Applications 
Project; the National Computing Centre "Awareness 
Program"; the Microelectronic Support Scheme; and MISP, 
the Microelectronic Industry Support Programme. MAP is 
to help both electronics and non-electronics firms to 
quickly incorporate microprocessors into their 
manufactured products so that they will become more 
competitive in world markets. This $30 million program 
is getting another $80 million infusion. Some discus-
sions have placed a total expenditure at $230 million. 
The Awareness Program holds organized seminars in an 
effort to locate and train 50, 000 decision makers for 
microprocessors at a cost of $20 million. The Micro-
electronic Support Scheme expired by the end of 1979. 
The accumulated cost was $150 million. MISP is the most 
important of the DOI electronic endeavors. It is 
intended to deal with high volume production to 
manufacture standard products such as microprocessors, 
LSI memories, etc.; sponsorship of companies to produce 
custom parts will also cover related test equipment 
required for manufacture; and development of the local 
semiconductor industry infrastructure. MISP does not 
limit its funding to British-only companies but has and 
will continue to fund foreign multinationals wanting to 
locate in the UK. MISP has an estimated $140 million 
available (SIA, 1985). 
During the same period, in order to increase the use and 
application of microelectronic products in the economy, the DTI 
established the Microelectronics Application Project , (MAP) to 
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encourage industries in the U.K. to use microelectronic devices 
both in products and in production facilities. MAP consisted of 
several components including a programme which provided seed money 
to companies with plans to incorporate microelectronics in their 
products for the first time. From 1978 to 1985, the British 
Government's expenditures for MAP programmes was estimated at 
about $160 million. In 1985, MAP programmes were reduced in scope 
and expenditures, and spending by MAP between 1985 and 1988 has 
been estimated at about $50 million. 
In order to achieve effective research and development 
activities, economic size of production facilities and marketing 
efforts by the British microelectronics sector, it was the policy 
of the British government during the 1960's and 1970's to support 
mergers or consolidations in the U.K. microelectronics sector. 
Several such consolidations did take place in the 1960's and 
1970's (deCarmoy, 1978). 
The British government has also attempted to provide policy 
guidance to the native microelectronic sector by establishing in 
the 1970's a series of British government councils with a broad 
mandate to formulate and execute government policies for industry 
sectors including microelectronics.(3) 
These attempts by the British government to assist the micro-
electronics sector in the 1960's and 1970's were only partially 
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successful (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974; Daly et al., 1985). Four 
U~K. companies, Plessey, Ferranti, Marconi, and the General 
Electric Company ( GEC) comprised the bulk of the native micro-
electronic industry in the U.K., prior to the sale of Marconi to 
Ferranti (Cabinet Office, 1978). Total annual sales of these four 
companies in the late 1970's was estimated to be $50 million, only 
about 6 percent of the annual sales of the microelectronic in-
dustry's leader in the U.K., the U.S. firm of Texas Instruments. 
During the 1980's the British government has attempted another 
approach, that of funding large scale projects, more specifically, 
establishing and funding the Alvey Programme in 1983 -- a large 
scale project similar to the French grands programmes. 
The Alvey Programme for Advanced Information Technology, 
named after John Alvey, the chairman of the British government 
commission which recommended it, was viewed as the U.K.'s 
response to the French national programmes or to Japan's Fifth 
Generation Computer Project. The Alvey programme represented a 
British government-industry joint venture focused ~n key research 
objectives in several areas of the microelectronics industry. The 
programme was intended to extend scientific and technical knowl-
edge rather than advance the frontiers of microelectronics 
technology ( OTA, 1984; Palmer, 1987-). 
The initial funding for the Alvey Programme approximated $350 
million, of which about $320 million was provided by the British 
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government; $64 million by the British Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
and $176 million by the DTI. The progranune was administered 
through the DTI in collaboration with the MOD and the SERC. 
Mechanisms for channelling funds to the Alvey Programme partici-
pants reflects this cooperation. The SERC managed the partici-
pation of the British academic institutions, the MOD supervised 
defence-related activities and the DTI supervised private sector 
participants. 
The programme was designed to operate as a native U.K. 
research effort with technical information shared among the 
participating partners. The principal objective was to provide 
the results of the progranune essentially exclusively to the U.K.'s 
entities • 
• • • participation by non-U.K. multinationals should be 
permitted only when they are able to contribute a parti-
cular asset to the programme, where the results of their 
involvement will be available to benefit U.K. industry 
as a whole, and where the relevant technical information 
will not leak from the U.K. Full exploitation by U.K. 
industry should be encouraged and at an early a stage as 
possible (OTA, 1986). 
In 1987, four years after the initiation of the Alvey 
programme, there were nine technical areas of concentration in the 
programme. The categories of technical interest and approximate 
allocation of funding are presented in Table 10.2. 
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TABLE 10.2 
Components of the Alvey Programme, 1987 
.Areas of 
Research Concentration 
Information Knowledge-Based 
Systems (IKBS) 
Very Large Scale Integration 
(VLSI) 
VLSI Architecture 
CAD for VLSI 
Software Engineering 
Man-Machine Interface (MMI) 
Large Scale Demonstrators 
Infrastructure and 
Communications 
Comtemplated: Declarative 
Architectures and Systems 
Number of 
Projects 
36 
36 
7 
8 
28 
8 
4 
2 
__ o
129 
Approximate 
Allocation 
of funding 
10 ' 
26 ' 
3 
' 
9 
' 
17 
' 
14 
' 
9 
' 
6 
' 
0 ' 
Source: Alvey Programme, Press Release, U.K. Embassy, 
Washington, D.C., 1988. 
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The formation of consortia composed of companies, university 
teams, and research establishments was a requirement for partici-
pation in the programme. The average consortium consisted of four 
or more partners, two or three companies, and one or two 
universities. Table 10.3 identifies the overall distribution of 
participation in the Alvey Programme. 
A review of individual Alvey projects and participants shows 
that of the 53 private firms which participated, 16 were involved 
in more than one research project, with the British firm GEC 
represented more than any other with participation in 28 separate 
projects. Within the academic sector, 31 of the 40 universities 
were participating in more than one project, with Cambridge 
University participating in 16 projects. Table 10.4 presents the 
36 individual technology projects comprising the major thrust of 
the Alvey Programme in 1984. 
The ultimate results of the Alvey Programme and an assessment 
of its impact on the British microelectronics industry must wait 
for the completion of this large project in the early 1990's. 
There are indications, however, that this programme has already 
resulted in significant improvements in the British micro-
electronic sector, especially in terms of advanced technology 
diffusion (OTA, 1986; Pickering and Sheldon, 1984). 
PARTICIPANTS 
Companies 
Universities 
Polytechnics 
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TABLE 10.3 
Participants by Type in the 
Alvey Programme, 1987 
Research Establishments 
TOTAL 
NPMBER 
53 
40 
6 
__ s 
106 
Source: Alvey Programme, Press Release, United Kingdom Embassy, 
Washington, D.C., 1988. 
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TABLE 10.4 
Technology Components of the 
Alvey Programme, 1984 
Enchanced rate RIE 
Dry etching for VLSI 
Plasma processing technology 
Gas phase investigation 
3rd generation RIE system 
Ion surface interactions 
Implant and diffusion 
Impurity and defects 
Analytical techniques 
Electron tunnelling 
Two dimensional model 
Model evaluation 
Interactive model 
2 and 3D device model 
Direct wire study 
E-beam resists 
Microlithography 
Variable shaped E-beam 
Chrome mark etching 
Critical mask measurement 
SEM falure analysis 
Reliability of VLSI 
CMOS-SOS 
Bulk CMOS process 
UHS bipolar 
CDI bipolar process 
Bulk CMOS 
Multilevel metal 
Dynamic recoil mixing 
Si MBE for device fabricatiorn 
MBE for silicon VLSI 
Silicon on insulator 
Source: Alvey Directorate, DTI Press Release, 1985. 
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The present status and the future of the microelectronic 
sector in the U.K. as of 1989 is not clear. 
On the one hand there exists considerable pessimism in some 
quarters about the future of microelectronics in the u. K. In a 
recent report for the National Economic Development Council, 
McKinsey and Co., a management consulting firm, reported the near 
fatal status of microelectronics in the U.K. Recent reports by 
the OECD anticipated a trade deficit in electronics for Western 
Europe of $30 billion by 1992, of which a large portion will be 
carried by the U.K. ( OECD, 1986) • A distinguished industry 
expert, describing attempts to direct large scale projects such as 
the Alvey Programme, stated in 1984 that "the UK's major difficul-
ties arise from the pervasive lack of incentives in its system of 
mission-oriented R&D," and describing the overall performance of 
such large scale projects: "On balance the UK effort has prob-
ably been the least successful. • " (Ergad, 1984). 
These views are not shared by industry in the U.K. Sir John 
Clarke, the chairman of Plessey, called McKinsey's criticisms "a 
monstrous travesty of the facts." In the autumn of 1988 the 
Economist, stated the following: "Executives in other companies 
are talking about opportunities rather than retreat. Elsewhere, 
stockmarket analysts, long critical of the European electronics 
sector, are beginning to recommend it to investors. Such optimism 
523 
is not only new, but, looking at electronics sector by sector, 
appears reasonably well founded." (Ecomonist, August 6, 1988). 
10.5.2 Governmental Assistance to the Machine Tool Sector 
in the United Kingdom 
The U.K. machine tool industry has experienced a significant 
decline. The U.K. domestic machine tool firms have declined in 
number (partly as a result of the government's policies to 
rationalize this sector of the economy), production statistics 
show a sharp downturn, while the imports of machine tools into the 
U.K. have rapidly increased (Ministry of Technology, 1961; Pavic, 
1980) • 
A brief summary of the past British government programmes for 
the machine tool industry provides a point of departure for a 
review of recent governmental policies regarding the U.K. machine 
tool industry in the 1980's. 
In the inter-war period it was a protected industry, and 
only those types of machine tools not produced in this 
country were admitted free of duty. More recent 
examples of government support included a 'pre-
production order scheme' in the 1960s designed to 
overcome user-conservatism; under this scheme, 
technologically-advanced machines of an experimental 
(and therefore expensive) nature were bought by the 
government and then lent free to industrial users for an 
extensive 'trial period.' A further scheme, which 
lasted until 1970, was intended to encourage the 
purchase of numerically-controlled machine tools; the 
government guaranteed to repurchase any unwanted machine 
tools and to pay the manufacturer for any reconditioning 
or reselling costs. A more recent scheme, under the 
Industry Act of 1972, provided a 25 percent subsidy to 
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the costs of developing and launching of new machine 
tools, and 15-20 percent grants for projects to 
modernize and expand capacity; about L30 million had 
been authorized on this basis by the end of 1978. Other 
finance has been provided to build machine tools for 
stock. Over the period 1966-78 it may be estimated that 
the gross sum spent by the British government on the 
machine tool industry by one scheme or another • • • was 
about LlOO million (Sanders, 1978). 
The failure of U.K. machine tool manufacturers to adjust to 
fluctuations in demand for machines tools, the principal charac-
teristic of the machine tool sector worldwide, the subsequent 
build-up of delivery backlogs and the technological advances. of 
foreign (Japanese, German, U.S.) machine tools are the major 
reasons for the significant rise in machine tool imports into the 
U.K. in the 1980's (Heim, 1984). 
The British government has over time undertaken a series of 
policies to support indirectly the native machine tool industry in 
Britain via a number of support mechanisms including financial aid 
for investment, restructuring, modernization, assistance for 
research and innovation, technical advice, information and export 
credit services (Sanders, 1978). None of these policies has been 
directed explicitly at the machine tool sector. Since 1975, when 
the British government provided $54 million in aid specifically to 
the u. K. machine tool industry to foster production improvement 
and higher technology content in its products, the British 
government has not implemented any programme solely aimed at 
supporting machine tool producers. The U.K. machine tools 
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industry since 1975 has received only indirect assistance from the 
British government's overall industrial support programmes. 
Several of these may have benefitted U.K. machine tool makers and 
robotics manufacturers (Sanders, 1978; Pavitt, 1980). 
For example, the government programme to support innovation 
and promote the development and application of numerical control 
(NC) machines and flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), have been 
of assistance to the domestic machine tool industry.(4) In fact, 
several U.K. machine. tool manufacturers have participated in a 
number of FMS projects funded for the most part by the British 
government. Some of these have been relatively large. As of 
1987, the DOI had committed over $60 million for the development 
and installation of FMS by U.K. industrial firms, and $50 million 
has been allocated to high-risk FMS projects under the U.K. 
Science and Technology Act (DOD, 1987). 
The DTI support programme for information technology 
represents an indirect British government programme relevant to 
machine tool technology, but one which the machine tool sector in 
the U.K. has used to advance the technology base of U.K. machine 
tools. During the 1976 to 1987 period the DTI allocated over $300 
million annually for the above programme in its budget (DOD, 
1987). 
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Another British government programme that indirectly benefits 
the machine tool industry in the U.K. is the "Small Engineering 
Firms Investment Scheme" which assists British firms in the 
purchase of technologically advanced machinery and equipment. 
Approximately $150 million per annum was provided to British firms 
under this programme between 1983 and 1987 (ITC, 1986). 
The Thatcher government since 1981 has given priority status 
to programmes aimed at increasing the efficiency of the U.K.'s 
manufacturing industries and, hence, promoting machine tool and 
robotics development, application, and production. Financial 
assistance has been provided for both machine tool and robot 
producers and users, mainly under the Robot Support Programme, a 
subset of the Support for Innovation Scheme ( SFI) launched in 
1982 by the DTI (ITC, 1986). 
Within the SFI scheme, government assistance to promote the 
development and diffusion of robots was provided under the Robot 
Support Programme (RSP). The RSP provided three principal areas 
of government assistance: 
a) Companies are eligible to receive free initial 
advice through the Ministry of Industry con-
cerning the application of robotics to their 
production or processing operations. In the 
affirmative, companies can employ independent 
consultants to carry out technical and eco-
nomic appraisal, and feasibility studies for 
which the government will provide up to 15 
man-days of consultancy time at 50 percent of 
normal cost. 
527 
b) Companies developing new industrial robots and 
peripheral equipment can receive up to 25 
percent of eligible costs in government 
financial assistance. Eligible costs include 
costs incurred from the initial design stage 
to the point of actual commercial production. 
c) Companies are also eligible to receive 
financial assistance for the installation of 
robots, i.e., up to 33 percent of the costs of 
new processes that feature robots as primary 
constituents. These costs include capital 
cost and development time cost to get the 
robot installation working efficiently ( ITC, 
1986). 
In a concerted effort to increase the productivity of its 
industries, the British Government has also instituted several 
programmes of support and incentives to promote directly the 
development and use of the most advanced machine tools--
industrial robots. The Science Research Council provided $59 
million in 1982 for industrial robot "awareness and demonstration" 
in the U.K. Under the Product and Process Development Schemes, 
British government grants were given for up to 50 percent of the 
cost of robot design and development to British firms, and up to 
25 percent of the cost of projects involving design and develop-
ment by U.K. manufacturers of new industrial robots and associated 
equipment (ITC, 1986). 
There are other forms of government assistance that have 
directly or indirectly benefitted the British robotics industry. 
As a means of providing investment incentives for all British 
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companies, including robot producers and users, the British 
government has granted tax relief for capital expenditures on 
plants and machinery (deCarmoy, 1978). The tax allowance against 
corporate taxation applies to 100 percent of the cost of equipment 
and machinery purchased or used in the U.K. and up to 10 percent 
of the cost for equipment leased to overseas entities (ITC, 1983; 
ITC I 1986). 
The unique feature of machine tool and robotics research and 
development in the U.K. is that it is driven to a large extent by 
engineering and application thrusts, rather than by the scientific 
issues as in the u.s. and Japan. This is due primarily to the 
nature of government funding programmes which are directed towards 
a push for immediate modernization of the U.K. 's industry (Daly, 
et al., 1985). 
Three British universities are especially active in the 
research of advanced machine 
Edinburgh, Warwick and Oxford. 
University of Edinburgh has 
tools and robotics application: 
The research effort at the 
concentrated on studying the 
kinematics and geometry of industrial assembly operations, as well 
as the development of robot language. At Warwick University the 
research effort has concentrated on mobile robot application. The 
research at Oxford university is also application-oriented and 
focused on automating factory processes such as arc welding. 
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The British government is funding most of the research 
efforts at these three universities. 
10.5.3 The United Kingdom Government's Policies for the 
Development of Advanced Materials 
The U.K. government, prior to 1970, supported the advanced 
ceramics industry with significant funding. A number of research 
and development projects in advanced ceramics were undertaken in 
universities, and in industry. Most of this effort ceased in the 
mid-1970's. 
There are some research and development efforts currently 
being undertaken by British Aerospace in polymers and advanced 
composites. Most of this effort is funded by the MOD and 
information on these activities is not available. 
10.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The industry policies of the British government have, for 
the most part, been consistent with the "accepted" norm of the 
free market system. The British government has adopted policies 
for the benefit of the industrial sector as a whole, rather than 
implemented specific sectoral policies. The principal policies by 
have been those of assistance to research and development 
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activities, education (including education of industrial managers 
in the adoption of advanced technologies) and training. 
The one area where British government policies have been 
somewhat unique is in the encouragement of mergers for some 
British firms. The fundamental reason for this policy of 
encouraging rationalization in some sectors is the relatively 
limited domestic market for some U.K. industrial products. Prior 
·to World War II the very extensive U.K. "interests" in colonies 
assured U.K. firms of a large overseas market for most of the 
products manufactured. Geopolitical changes after World War II 
closed many, if not most, of these offshore markets to U.K. firms. 
The very rapid growth of the Japanese export markets further 
reduced the declining export potential for U.K. goods. 
Unlike the Japanese government, which essentially closed its 
domestic markets to foreign goods until such time as the Japanese 
manufacturers had achieved economies of scale in their production, 
British government policies have allowed for essentially unre-
stricted imports. This in turn has reduced domestic markets for 
some U.K. products. The fact that some of the imported products 
embodied advanced technologies reduced both domestic and overseas 
markets for U.K. firms even further. 
Under such conditions, U.K. policies to combine the many 
small firms in certain sectors of the economy (i.e., motor 
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vehicle manufacturers, machine tool markets, electronics) into 
fewer and larger enterprises, have been reasonable and necessary. 
These rationalization schemes, however, did not bring about a 
revitalization of the U.K. industrial sectors because U.K. 
products had not kept pace with the technological advancement 
embodied in products offered by foreign competitors. 
Scientific activities and advancement in the U.K. have 
resulted in a large number of important ·scientific discoveries. 
The universities in the U.K., research institutes and even 
private sector entities have executed outstanding work in the 
basic sciences. In the past, the applied research effort in the 
U.K., unfortunately, has not been emphasized. Consequently, the 
most recent policies of the government have placed priority on 
applied research and development. 
Support for this statement is not difficult to find. Wit-
ness, for example, the recent ABRC plea and the emphasis placed 
on the need to apply scientific findings to the development of 
marketable products (emphasis added), to the necessity to select 
scientific activities which are "strategic", i.e., lead to 
industrial innovations. The British government's "White Paper" of 
1987 which expressed the need to establish "collective Ministerial 
consideration under the Prime Minister's leadership of science and 
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technology priori ties" (emphasis added) points out also the need 
for applied research in the U.K. 
The historic lack of emphasis on applied research or indus-
trial innovation by the U.K. scientific conununity has not only 
reduced the growth of advanced technology sectors in the u. K. ·, but 
has also retarded the adaptation of advanced technologies by 
manufacturing firms in the U.K. in their production processes. 
For example, the very advanced microprocessor developed by 
the U.K. firm Inmos, the so-called "transputer", has had a very 
limited market in the U.K. because many industrial enterprises did 
not possess process machinery sufficiently advanced to utilize 
this micro~lectronic device. Also as reported by Daly, Hitchens 
and Wagner ( 1985), the results of Census of Production in the 
post-World War II period indicate that the U.K.'s industrial 
output has been about one-half of that in Germany and below that 
in most other E.C. nations. The authors attribute this poor U.K. 
performance, at least partly, to the older vintage technology used 
in U.K. manufacturing establishments. 
The outcome of this past emphasis has been the older tech-
nology content of U.K. products as compared to the products of 
other nations. This, in turn, has further limited markets to 
U.K. goods, both domestic and international. 
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Unlike the French or Japanese governments, the British 
government has not (except for the Alvey Programme) used the 
vehicle of very large, very focused, government funded projects to 
improve the technology adaptation in the industrial sector or 
projects. In the light of France's very poor experience with such 
projects, the British government's decision may be correct. 
Industrial firms in the U.K., with the apparent approval of the 
British government, have selected another path to increase their 
market share for their projects, that of merging, purchasing or 
otherwise acquiring those foreign firms which possess both the 
desired advanced technologies and the access to markets in the 
U.K. and abroad. Often such strategies have proved highly 
effective. In addition, such transactions by U.K. firms have 
enabled them to reduce their dependency on a single market such as 
defence-related products. However experience in the U.S. of such 
transactions shows that these reduce (perhaps only tempor~rily) a 
firm's ability to plan and execute the required research and 
development activities. 
There exist a number of factors which may impact on the 
future of British advanced technology industries in the U.K. The 
recent science and technology policies of the Thatcher government 
have attempted to address most of these. Others are either based 
on historical trends and therefore not amenable to immediate 
adjustment by any government policy or lie in the future. The 
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establishment of the European Common Market in 1992 is certainly 
one of the latter. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10 
1) An aspect of U.K. society that has important implications 
for the conduct of research is the relatively low degree 
of job mobility. With deep psychological and economic 
roots, the tradition of "staying put" cuts across all of 
U.K. society, and for that matter, most European societies 
as well. For the labour force as a whole, it is estimated 
that about 10 percent of Europeans change jobs as often as 
once a year as contrasted with the 30. percent in the U.S. 
who did so in 1981. Among UK "professionals" in all 
fields, job changes are relatively rare. Whether in 
academia, government or the private sector, their 
employment is effectively tenured; this situation has been 
reinforced by such factors as non-portable pension schemes 
and housing problems. It should also be noted that 
mobility among university students is very limited. Once 
embarked on a particular curriculum they cannot, in prac-
tice, readily change either curriculum or educational 
institution without starting again from the beginning. 
The great exception to the above points, emigration. 
2) The u.s. Department of Defense has selected the Centre for 
Exploitation of Science and Technology as a potential 
recipient of research and development funds for defence-
related activities. 
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3) British government policies with regard to the micro-
electronic sector received considerable encouragement from 
u.s. microelectronic firms operating in the U.K. 
4) Some U.K. machine tool firms have received funding for 
advanced machine tool purchases from the u.s. Department 
of Defense in order to facilitate manufacture of defence-
related equipment produced jointly with U.S. firms. 
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CHAPTER 11: 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
IN TBB UNITED STATES 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since 1982 the economy of the u.s. has experienced a period 
of exceptional growth and expansion, with increasing production of 
goods and services, increasing wages and salaries and increasing 
GNP, which for 1988 was estimated at $3750 billion (in constant 
1982 dollars). 
The u.s. economy does have a number of problems, however. In 
particular, over the last decade the U.S. has lost significant 
segments of its comparative advantage in a number of industry 
sectors, especially advanced technology sectors (Kennedy, 1987). 
A brief restatement of the data on changes in the U.S. export 
shares from 1955 to 1987 will provide ample evidence for this. In 
1955 exports of all manufactured products represented about 26 
percent of the total world export shares; by 1988, the U.S. share 
had declined to less than 13 percent. In advanced technology 
product exports, the U.S.' share in 1955 was about 36 percent of 
the world total; by 1988 this share had declined to less than 18 
percent. Statistics for U.S. international trade since 1972 show 
negative trade balances for automobiles, consumer electronics, 
steel, and textiles. Since 1980 the U.S. has had rapidly growing 
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negative trade balances in microelectronics, machine tools, 
metalworking machinery, computers, and electrical machinery. 
Indeed the current account trade balance for the U.S. has shown an 
almost continuous decline since 1980, estimated to reach about 
$150 billion by 1990. 
This rapidly worsening trade deficit results from a number of 
factors, some of which are exceptionally difficult to correct by 
private sector or government policies. The most difficult of 
these pertain to the industry practice~ performed by private 
sector firms in the U.S. {Landau and Rosenberg, 1986). 
These are discussed in comprehensive detail in a 1989 study 
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology entitled Made in 
America: Regaining the Production Edge (Gertouzos, et al., 1989). 
This massive research effort by one of the premier academi9 
institutions in the U.S. reports the following on U.S. industry 
practices: 
The industry studies revealed two types of outdated 
strategies that are impeding industrial progress today: 
an overemphasis on mass production of standard commodity 
goods and an economic and technological parochialism. 
Both are holdovers from the unique economic environment 
that prevailed after World War II. For decades after 
the war U.S. industry was able to flourish by mass-
producing undifferentiated goods principally for its own 
markets, which were large, unified and familiar. 
Because firms in most other countries had to rebuild in 
economies devastated by the war, they could mount no 
significant competition and were largely ignored by U.S. 
industry. 
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Not only did U.S. producers sell their wares primarily 
to the domestic market, they also drew their technical 
expertise almost exclusively from U.S. factories and 
laboratories. Such technological parochialism blinded 
Americans to the growing strength of scientific and 
technological innovation abroad and hence to the 
possibility of adapting foreign discoveries. In the 
1950's and 1960's for example, American steel producers 
lagged behind Japanese and European steelmakers in 
adopting such new process technologies as the basic 
oxygen furnace; later they were again slow to adopt 
continuous casters and such quality-enhancing 
technologies as vacuum degassing and oxygen injection. 
The critical error in many of these cases was the 
failure to recognize the worth of someone else's 
innovation. 
One should not conclude that the state of ·industry in the U.S. or 
of the advanced products industry is declining rapidly. It is 
not, and some industry sectors in the U.S. have shown exceptional 
growth (Landau, 1988). It would also be unreasonable to conclude 
that the policy makers in the U.S. do not recognize the extreme 
importance of scientific, research and development activities 
which are the basis for industrial growth and advance. The 
benefits of scientific activity are fully recognized by the U.S. 
government (Mansfield, 1988; Baumal, 1989). 
"Not only is basic research an essential investment in the 
nation's long-term welfare, but it is largely a federal respon-
sibility because its benefits are so broadly distributed. Quite 
simply, basic research is a vital underpinning for our national 
well-being" (Keyworth, 1984). This statement by George A. 
Keyworth, II, the Science Advisor to President Reagan made in 
1984, summarizes the U.S. federal government's rationale for 
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enacting policies, admittedly limited in scope, for the advance-
ment of science and technology in the U.S. A review of other u.s. 
government policy statements, budget documents, testimonies of 
federal government officials and other statements indicates some 
intervention by the U. S. government in areas generally considered 
to be the responsibility of the private sector. U.S. government 
interventions have, however, been limited and those which have 
taken place have been defended on several grounds. 
The first of these is cultural in origin and assumes that 
scientific knowledge is an intrinsic public good, which benefits 
society in general and the U.S. population in particular. The 
u.s. government therefore has an obligation to advance scientific 
knowledge (Bailey and Chakrabarti, 1985). 
The second is that research and related activities promote 
national and economic security and economic growth in. the U.S. It 
is assumed by public servants in the U.S. that advances in 
technology result in improvements to the U.S. national defence 
posture and in the improvement of U.S. competitiveness in the 
world's markets. Increased U.S. competitiveness relative to other 
nations improves the economic well-being of the U.S. population. 
Underlying this assumption is the belief held by the u.s. govern-
ment and supported by economic theories that private industry in 
the United States (as well as elsewhere) will under invest in 
scientific research and related activities because of the high-
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risk, non-captivability. of returns on such investments. The U.s. 
government therefore has the responsibility of correcting under-
investment and of either funding scientific research activities or 
encouraging funding by the private sector via appropriate public 
policies (Boretsky, 1982; Tirman, 1984; Clark and Malalone, 1988). 
· In practice, such . policies are presented in the form of tax 
incentives and the reduction of disincentives to research, rather 
than direct government funding, except for a relatively large 
number of scientific and research activities directly. related to 
national se6urity. 
The third justification for governmen~ intervention is 
socio-political and emphasises the highly desirable effects of 
sciences and related activities on public health, safety, environ-
mental quality, availability of resources and other areas 
(Habakkuk, 1962). These three guiding principles are well 
summarized by the President's Science Advisor: " strong 
support for basic research permits U.S. scientists and engineers 
to challenge intellectual frontiers in the most important fields 
of science and technology. That provides the new knowledge th~ 
drives our .economic growth, improves our quality of life, and 
·underlies our national defense" (Keyworth, 1984).{1) 
In contrast to other industrialized nations such as Japan, 
Germany or the U.K., U.S. science policy is very fragmented and 
decentralized among complementary and competing interests. This 
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results in science and technology policies enacted by the u.s. 
government that may be described as pluralistic or chaotic, 
depending on the point of view of the observer. 
Many observers agree, however, that deficiencies in the u.s. 
national science policies indeed exist and that these derive from 
the absence of a single science policymaking body in the u.S. 
(Golden, 1988). In most other nations, a mechanism to prioritize, 
guide and administer science policy exists in some form or 
another. Although the Office of the Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP), headed by the President's Science Advisor and located in 
the Executive Office of the President, is charged with providing 
advice to the President and, to some degree, direction on science 
policy, its functions are limited in theory and, at times, non-
existent in practice. 
This fragmentation of the science policy structure in the 
u.s. does not result in a comprehensive science policy enactment 
and the appropriate allocation of public monies for scientific and 
related activities or for basic as opposed to applied research. 
The "mission agencies" which receive most of the public monies for 
science and technology activities demand funding for projects 
which are applied and have immediate practical applications. The 
funding of basic research activities is not often undertaken by 
these "mission agencies." The activities which may be classified 
as basic science in the U.S. are designated for the academic 
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institutions. However, because u.s. institutions of higher 
learning also undertake contract research for u.s. mission 
agencies, basic research activities may again be postponed in 
favour of applied projects. 
The creation of a U.S. Department of Science, which would 
serve as a central science policy agency for the u.s. government, 
has been proposed from time to time since the Truman Administra-
tion in the late 1940's. In the most recent proposal of this 
concept, developed by the U.S. Presidentis Commission on Indus-
trial Competitiveness in 1987, a Cabinet-level Department of 
Science and Technology was to be created to administer U.S. 
government non-military research activities and provide a central 
science voice. "Such a department would transform the current, 
fragmented formulation of policies for science and technology into 
one that would be far more effective in meeting long-term national 
goals" (Commission, 1988). 
This latest proposal, like similar attempts in the past, has 
been controversial. Some well recognized members of the U.S. 
scientific community have been less than enthusiastic about such a 
"Science Department" in the U.S. government. Joshua Lederman, 
Director of the Fermi National Laboratory, for example, has stated 
that such a department would be a mistake, because it would be 
dependent on a single personality, and if not administrated well, 
would result in a reduction in u.s. government funds for science. 
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Other members of the U.S. scientific community have been even more 
strongly opposed to such a Department. James Carey, Executive 
Officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
has described the proposal as "an extremely bad idea" and has 
contended that the present pluralistic arrangement in the u.s. has 
been highly successful for the support of the research and 
development activities in the u.s. 
Long term research projects are rejected by U.S. industry 
sectors. The cardinal criterion for seiecting and undertaking 
research activity by U.S. private sector firms is that the 
results of such activity have a measurable and immediate impact on 
the financial balance sheet of the enterprise undertaking such an 
activity (Bergsten, 1980; Tatom, 1986). In the U.S. the balance 
sheet for all private enterprises appear on a quarterly basis, and 
are referred to as "quarterly reports." The importance of these 
"quarterly reports" on the management of U. 5. industrial firms 
cannot be overemphasized, because these are used to determine the 
prices of the firms' stocks and bonds and to a considerable degree 
determine the performance rating of industry executives. Under 
such conditions there are few U. 5. industry executives who are 
willing to risk public criticism of their management skills, 
provided on a quarterly basis, for the sake of improving a firm's 
financial performance, sales and income at some future date 
(Nelson, 1982). 
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However, the highly decentralized structure of the science 
policy leadership in the U.S. allows for flexibility and respon-
siveness to research opportunities. Further, advocacy and 
guidance for scientific and related activities in the U.S. are 
provided by several highly prestigious scientific associations 
such as the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science. In the U.S. scien-
tists also play an important role in decision making in all 
science related funding agencies through various advisory and peer 
review groups. Advisory groups also influence science policies at 
the level of U.S. Congress, the Executive Office of the President 
and among u.s. federal government departments and agencies (Hilts, 
1988). 
Attempts to influence the direction of the scientific and 
research activities of industry have increased, as a result of the 
declining technological status of U.S. industry and increased 
competition from abroad.(2) Industry sectors have also initiated 
several innovative approaches to research and development 
activities. Research projects undertaken jointly by university-
industry groups is one such innovation. Another is the establish-
ment of joint research ventures between private firms, until 
recently prohibited by antitrust regulations in the u.s. With the 
passage of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, the 
number of joint research ventures between U.S. industrial firms 
has increased at a very rapid rate. 
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The U.S. ' science and research structure contains several 
other unique features, which do not exist to the same extent in 
other nations. One of these is the presence of large numbers of 
independent non-profit and commercial laboratories, technical 
establishments, and research organizations which undertake 
research and related activities. Another is that many, if not 
most, of the larger U.S. manufacturing firms have established 
significant research and development entities. These not only 
conduct research and development activities related to the mission 
of the parent firm, but also undertake significant contract 
research. Finally the U.S. DOD is a very important client for 
scientific, research and development activities in the U.S. Such 
activities are undertaken by all types of research establishments 
including industrial firms, non-profit research laboratories, 
commercial testing facilities, academia and others (Tirman, 1984). 
11. 2 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PERFORMERS IN TBB UNITED STATES 
The dominant characteristic of the U.S. resource pool for 
the performance of scientific, research and development and 
engineering activities is that these resources are available to a 
wide variety of institutions and organizations. 
There are at least five types of diversified organizations 
that perform scientific research and related activities in the 
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U.S.: a) the federal government; b) industry; c) universities and 
colleges; d) Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
(FFRDCs); and e) other non-profit institutions. 
The meaning of 
except for the FFRDCs. 
these five categories is self-explanatory 
FFRDCs (probably the nearest U.S. equiva-
lent to "national laboratories" in France, the U.K., and Germany) 
are research and development organizations exclusively or sub-
stantially financed by the U.S. federal government in order 
either to meet a particular objective of a government directed 
project or to provide facilities and equipment at certain U.S. 
universities for research and training purposes. The administra-
tive structure of FFRDC's varies. Some FFRDCs are administered by 
private industrial firms, others by universities, and some by 
non-profit institutions. 
11.2.1 Universities and Colleges 
Universities are the predominant performers of basic research 
in the U.S. and contribute significantly to applied research and 
development efforts. Universities and colleges account for almost 
half of the total U.S. basic research effort. Almost all such 
research is conducted by about 170 doctorate granting institutions 
in the U.S., of which 35 percent are privately controlled. 
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In most U.S. universities, a decentralized structure 
prevails, with authority for decisions resting with university 
departments rather than with central administrations. The 
university system in the U.S. allows for diversity in the conduct 
of research, as emphasized in a recent report by the u.s. 
National Research Council, "The university, through its reward 
system and the freedom it provides, allows its faculty to conduct 
research in ways that are difficult to replicate outside of 
academia. The criteria 
creativity, novelty, and 
findings" (NRC, 1986). 
for promotion in academia emphasize 
widespread dis~emination of research 
Since the mid-1970s, university-performed research in the 
u.s. has included at a growing rate, large scale research projects 
conducted through organized university research centres. Many of 
these centres are funded by the DOE (in nuclear sciences) and the 
DOD. 
Table 11 • 1 presents a percentage breakdown of research and 
development expenditures at U.S. universities by source of funding 
for 1987. Over half (55 percent) of total university research and 
development is devoted to the life sciences, specifically the 
biological and medical sciences. Other fields of concentration 
include: engineering, which accounts for 14 percent of the total; 
physical sciences, 11 percent; and environmental sciences, 7 per-
cent. A relatively small number of universities receive a dispro-
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TABLE 11.1 
R&D Expenditures at Universities and Colleges, 
by Source of Funds, Character of Work, and 
Science/Engineering Field: United States, 1987 
Source, Character, and Field 
Source of Funds: 
Federal Government 
State and Local Government 
Industry 
Institutional Funds 
All Other Sources 
Character of Work: 
Basic Research 
Applied Research and Development 
Field: 
Engineering 
Physical Sciences 
Environmental Sciences 
Mathematical/Computer Sciences 
Life Sciences 
Other Sciences 
Percent of Total 
100.0 
65.4 
8.1 
4.5 
15.1 
6.9 
100.0 
66.8 
33.2 
100.0 
14.1 
11.3 
7.7 
3.4 
54.7 
8.8 
Source: National Science Foundation, "National 
Patterns of Science and Technology Resources 
1988," NSF 84-311, 1988. 
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portionate share of the federal government support and therefore 
account for a large percentage of the research performed, with 
about 25 percent of total federal government support for 
universities received by about ten universities.The concentration 
of performance is even more apparent when the ranking of the u.s. 
universities is taken into account. The top SO universities 
accounted for about 64 percent of all government research and 
development funding provided to academic institutions. 
11.2.2 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
FFRDCs are performers of research and development activities 
for which the primary source of support is the U.S. federal 
government. FFRDC's are established either to meet a particular 
scientific or research objective often associated with a specific 
large scale project, or to provide major facilities for research 
purposes. Individual Centres may be administered by a university, 
an industrial firm or a non-profit institution. 
FFRDCs can be differentiated into four types: a) research 
laboratories, b) R&D laboratories, c) study and analysis centres, 
and d) system engineering/system integration centres: 
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a) Research laboratories are principally used for 
the pursuit of research (as distinguished from 
development). Most concentrate on basic 
research in one particular area and many 
provide major, unique, research facilities for 
national use. There are ten such laboratories 
in the u.s.; 
b) R&D laborat aries engage in various facets of 
the R&D process. Most are mul tiprogramme 
laboratories active in a variety of science 
and/or engineering areas, though some 
specialize in a broad functional area such as 
national security or nuclear energy. Most of 
these institutions contain major national 
research and/or testing facilities. There are 
twenty such laboratories; 
c) Study and analysis centres are involved 
exclusively in analytical activities no 
hardware-related laboratory research or 
development is carried out. There three such 
centres in the u.s.; and 
d) System engineering/system integration centres 
primarily provide systems engineering, R&D 
system integration, and management support for 
definition and development of large technical 
systems. There are two system engineering/ 
system integration centres (Tirman, 1984). 
A list of the principal FFRDCs categorized as defined above 
is shown in Table 11. 2. Together, these U.S. FFRDCs expended 
about $3 billion in 1987. 
11.2.3 In-Bouse u.s. Government Research and Development 
Facilities 
Research and development and related activities performed by 
the federal government in its own facilities (excluding FFRDCs) 
accounts for about 15 percent of the total national basic research 
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TABLE 11.2 
FFRDCs by Categories by Sponsor and Funding, 1987 
Research Laboratories 
Department of Energy sponsored: 
a) Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Universities 
Research Association, Inc.), Batavia, Illinois ($139.8 
million) ; and 
b) Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (Stanford 
University), Stanford, California ($71.2 million). 
National Science Foundation sponsored: 
a) Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory (Association of 
Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc.), La 
Serena, Chile ($6 million); 
b) Kitt Peak National Observatory (Association of 
Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc.), Tuscan, 
Arizona ($11.2 million); 
c) National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center (Cornell 
University), Arecibo, Puerto Rico ($5.3 million); 
d) National Center for Atmospheric Research (University 
Corporation for Atmospheric Research), Boulder, Colorado 
($32.5 million); 
e) National Radio Astronomy Observatory (Associated 
Universities, Inc.), Green Bank, West Virginia ( $15.1 
million) ; and 
f) Sacramento Peak Observatory (Association of Universities 
for Research in Astronomy, Inc. ) , Sunspot, New Mexico 
( $2 million). 
R&D Laboratories 
Department of Defense/Air Force sponsored: 
a) Lincoln Laboratory (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology), Lexington, Massachusetts ($155.1 million). 
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Table 11.2 (continued) 
Department of Energy sponsored: 
a) Ames Laboratory (Iowa State University of Science and 
Technology), Ames, Iowa ($15.5 million); 
b) Argonne National Laboratory (University of Chicago and 
Argonne Universities Assn.), Argonne, Illinois ($223.9 
million); 
c) Brookhaven National Laboratory (Associated Universities, 
Inc.), Upton, Long Island, New York ($164.4 million); 
d) E.O. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (University of 
California), Berkeley, California ($130.7 million); 
e) E.O. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (University 
of California), Livermore, California ($590.3 million); 
f) Los Alamos National Laboratory (University of 
California), Los Alamos, New Mexico ($490.2 million); 
g) Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 
($9.3 million); and 
h) Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (Princeton 
University), Princeton, New Jersey ($125.3 million). 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration sponsored: 
a) Jet Propulsion Laboratory (California Institute of 
Technology), Pasadena, California ($208.5 million). 
Study and Analysis Center 
Department of Defense/Navy sponsored: 
a) 
Source: 
Center for Naval Analyses (University of Rochester), 
Arlington, Virginia ($21.9 million). 
National Science Foundation, "Federal Funds for Research 
and Development Fiscal Years, 1987," NSF 87-319. 
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effort and for about 36 percent of the research and development 
effort in the U.S. 
The U.S. federal government agencies which are the principal 
performers of these activities are the so-called "mission-
agencies," whose research and related work is carried out directly 
by their own personnel, i.e., public servants in these facilities. 
The principal U.S. "mission agencies" are the U.S. Departments of 
Agriculture, Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services, as 
well as the National Aeronautics and Space'Administration (NASA). 
Four u.s. government agencies, the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF), the DOD, the DOE, and NASA undertake significant 
research and development efforts in advanced technology areas. 
11.2.4 National Science Foundation 
The NSF has been categorized as the U.S. equivalent of a 
central science agency in other industrialized nations. The NSF 
provides about 18 percent of all u.s. federal government support 
for basic research and 13 percent for all research and development 
undertaken in the U.S. Unlike the central science agencies in 
other industrial nations, the NSF does not establish a national 
science policy for the U.S. 1 nor is it required to follow the 
recommendations of the President's Science Advisor. The areas of 
science, research, development and engineering, that are funded by 
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the NSF reflect the opinions expressed by the U.S. scientific 
establishment, such as major academic institutions, the NAS, the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science {AAAS), 
research institutes and scientists employed by various u.s. 
federal government agencies. 
The NSF, in its present format, was established in 1954 to 
support primarily basic research in all disciplines through grants 
to scientists. In the last twenty years the NSF has funded an 
increasing proportion of applied research. Concepts for 
scientific, research and related activities are. generated by 
individual scientists and submitted to the NSF as unsolicited 
proposals. These are reviewed through an external, elaborate, but 
not always satisfactory, peer advisory system, with final evalu-
ation and determination for funding made by the NSF staff. 
The fields of science funded by the NSF in 1987 included: 
physical sciences {30 percent); environmental sciences {24 
percent); life sciances { 18 percent); engineering { 15 percent) ; 
and mathematics/computer sciences {8 percent). 
11.2.5 Department of Defense 
The U.S. DOD provides 13 percent of all federal government 
support for basic research and approximately 3 3 percent for all 
research and development in the u.s. The DOD's support of 
research 
largely 
products. 
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activities is based on specific 
directed toward the development 
objectives that are 
of defence-related 
About 48 percent of all DOD basic research funds are alloca-
ted to U.S. universities and colleges (including FFRDCs), with 30 
percent of these funds allocated for engineering activities. 
11.2.6 Department of Energy 
About 17 percent of all U.S. federal government support of 
research and development is provided by the U.S. DOE. DOE 
support frequently, but not always, takes the form of large block 
funding to the various FFRDCs. About 85 percent of DOE research 
funds support research in the physical sciences, with 75 percent 
supporting research in physics, and 10 percent devoted to 
engineering research. 
11.2.7 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASA accounts for 10 percent of total U.S. federal government 
basic research funds, and 15 percent of all research and develop-
ment funding. NASA conducts over half (53 percent) of its basic 
research internally, and, as a typical mission agency, the 
majority of NASA's extramural funding is for specifically targeted 
projects that complement its intramural efforts. 
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Over half of NASA's support to research is for the physical 
sciences, with about 30 percent devoted to engineering. Most of 
the research activities consist of research in fundamental 
aeronautical disciplines such as fluid and thermal physics, 
materials and structures, and propulsion. 
11.2.8 Industry Sector Laboratories 
The U.S. industrial sector includes research and related 
activities undertaken by both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing 
firms in the U.S. 
The breakdown qf industrial performance of research activ-
ities by field of science in 1987 was as follows: physical 
sciences (40 percent); engineering (25 percent); life sciences (15 
percent); mathematics ( 1. 6 percent); and environmental sciences 
(1.4 percent). 
11.2.9 Independent Non-profit Research Institutions 
The research and development effort of the U.S. non-profit 
research institutions is fairly equally divided among basic 
research, applied research and development. There are consider-
able variations in management structures, sources of funds and 
types of research undertaken by the U.S. non-profit research 
institutions. Some of the U.S. non-profit institutions are 
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substantially endowed or supported by foundations, and resemble 
universities in their research activities. Others are engaged 
primarily in contract research, and resemble other private profit-
making research enterprises. 
11. 3 0. S • FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
The U.S. government does not exercise science and technology 
policies to the same extent as do, for example, the French or 
Japanese governments. There do exist, however, at any one time in 
the U.S. a set of informal science and technology goals that 
implicitly determine priorities of science and technology 
activities and implicitly allocate support for these activities. 
Official intervention by the U.S. government in the free market 
mechanisms, however, has taken place from time to time. As stated 
by Vernon (1989, 1989): 
Not that the United States has been altogether lacking 
in such policies. The Department of Defense, operating 
under the exceptional license that goes with "national 
security" programs, has promoted one industrial sector 
or another through its investments in research or 
through procurement contracts. The agricultural 
research and farm extension policies of the United 
States have been among the broadest in the world. The 
U.S. government also has helped to fend off bankruptcy 
for Chrysler and Lockheed, by providing those companies 
with financial support that has kept them in operation. 
U.S. savings and loan associations have been the object 
of extensive government support programs. And most 
recently, the u.s. government has promoted a joint 
effort of the semiconductor industry to enhance its 
research on the production of chips. 
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These cases, however, have not added up to a national 
policy. They have covered only small patches of the 
American economy and have usually been labeled as 
exceptional measures, responsive to extraordinary 
circumstances or outright crises. 
There are other examples of explicit policies enacted by the u.s. 
government to advance technology or industry sectors. The U.S. 
government has subsidized the development of the nuclear power 
industry for many years. In the mid-1970's, the U.S. government 
provided funding for extracting oil from shale and sand. The U.S. 
tax system is far from neutral. The U.S. has had tax credits for 
research and development for new investment in equipment, and for 
the use of new energy technologies. Exports have received favour-
able treatment under the Export-Import Bank whose loans have sub-
sidized U.S. exports of commercial aircraft and electric generat-
ing equipment. The rules on accelerated depreciation favour 
certain types of investments over others (U.S. Congress, 19 8 2 ) • 
However, these tax measures have rarely been part of u.s. govern-
ment targeting of specific civilian industries. u.s. subsidies, 
explicit and ~plicit, have generally encouraged a broad range of 
activities and have seldom been coordinated with other efforts to 
develop a specific advanced technology industry (SHC, 1986). 
The same can be said about expenditures by the U.S. govern-
ment's departments and agencies on various research and develop-
ment efforts. The total annual budget of the U.S. government for 
science, research and development has averaged over the last 
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decade or so some $103 billion (in 1982 dollars) as compared to 
$35 billion in Japan; $19 billion in Germany; $14 billion in 
·France and $12 billion in the U.K. The U.S. government funds 
approximately one-half of the expenditure for science and related 
activities. U.S. government funds designated for science and 
technology activities are dispersed among many U.s. government 
agencies and therefore may impact on many industry sectors. 
Since 1982, the DOD share of the U.S. government's science 
and technology funds has significantly ·increased to about 65 
percent of all federal government research and development 
expenditures. Other U.S. agencies of importance include the DOE, 
9 percent -- more than half of which serves defence objectives; 
the National Institute of Health, 9 percent, NASA, 7 percent; the 
NSF, 3 percent; and the Department of Agriculture, 2 percent. 
Four government agencies: the NIH, the NSF, the DOD and the DOE, 
account for about 85 percent of the total U.S. federal government 
support of academic research and development. Three agencies: 
the DOD, NASA, and the DOE, account for over 95 percent of federal 
government support for industrial research and development. 
It must be noted that the magnitude of the U.S. government 
funds allocated to research and development is very large when 
compared to research and development budgets in the U.K., France 
or Germany. Even the relatively small (by u.s. standards) 
expenditures of single U.S. departments, such as the Defense 
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Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are 
total research development and related funds 
German government for its electronics sector. 
larger than the 
provided by the 
In broad terms, however, the U.S. government has not enacted 
science policies of the type used by the French or Japanese 
governments. Aside from DOD procurement, the u.s. has not 
generally used the industrial policies employed by other nations. 
Except for restrictions on classified defence work, U.S. markets 
are open to imports of foreign advanced technology goods or 
investments by foreign firms. There have been no attempts by the 
government to subsidize loans for specific industries, to help 
plan their development, or to provide 'incentives for investing in 
specific industry sectors (Gruber, et al., 1967). 
Furthermore, the U.S. government has been generous in 
allowing exports of U.S. technology abroad, in terms of intellec-
tual property exports, exports of goods and services and "exports" 
of u.s. owned manufacturing facilities (Dreamer, 1976; Gruber and 
Vernon, 1970). With regard to this latter category, such 
"exports" are not insignificant. In the 1980's u.s. firms ex-
pended on average about $40 billion per annum for the construction 
of manufacturing plants in foreign nations, approximately 8 per-
cent of the total annual value of industrial facility construction 
in the U.S. 
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The relative decline of advanced technology sectors since 
1980 and the large and increasing trade deficit in manufactured 
products have prompted a number of members of the U.S. science 
establishment to call for an inquiry into the need for a u.s. 
science and technology policy (Hanger, et al., 1986). Few of 
these, however, recommended that a U.S. government directed 
science and technology policy be established. For example, the 
prestigious National Academy of Engineering in a recently issued 
and widely publicized statement, suggeste~ that the U.S. govern-
ment should improve technology advancement and bolster U.S. 
competitiveness by enacting the following policies: 
a) Reducing capital costs through policies and incentives 
for increasing the national savings rate and encouraging 
long-term investments in plans, equipment, and research 
and development; 
b) Revitalizing the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy or increasing the responsibilities of 
the Under Secretary for Technology in the Department of 
Commerce as a move toward coupling technology policy 
with economic and regulatory policymaking; 
c) Improving engineering education at pre- and post-
college levels and strengthening science, mathematics, 
and technical education; and 
d) Supporting the civilian technology base in addition to 
the science base in order to bolster advances in 
generic technology (NAE, 1988). 
The u.s. House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 
established a Task Force in 1988 to i~vestigate the role of the 
federal government in science, technology and industry policies. 
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In several reports published by this Task Force the following 
proposals were made. 
A new U.S. government office. 
Reflecting general dissatisfaction with the current 
arrangements for establishing technology policy, the Task Force 
recommended the establishment of a new organization to advise.the 
President and Congress on federal research and development 
priorities. The exact nature of such an entity was not spelt 
out, but the Task Force considered arrangements ranging from a new 
Department of Science and Technology to an expanded Office of 
Science and Technology Policy. 
Support for consumer electronics. 
Because the consumer electronics industry "has essentially 
been surrendered to the Japanese," (Task Force, 1988) a bold 
initiative was recommended by the Task Force. It recommended the 
establishment of a National Advanced Technology Center for 
Consumer Electronics that would work with the private sector on 
joint development projects. 
One agency of the U.S. Government -- the DARPA operating 
under the DOD has, since 1983, actually supported selected U.S. 
industry sectors by funding office projects which have consider-
able applications in the civilian economy. This effort by the 
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DARPA, which has not received the blessing of all other interested 
parties, includes the following five projects: 
a) Sematech, Budget: $100 million. 
Objective: Semiconductor industry consortium 
designed to restore the ability of U.S. com-
panies to compete with the Japanese; 
b) High-Definition Television, Budget: $30 million. 
Objective: Technology for hi9h resolution 
television displays, for use in consumer 
electronics and military applications such as 
sharper radar displays. 
c) Superconductivity, Budget: $25 million. 
Objective: Techniques for making and using 
recently discovered materials that lose 
resistance to electricity at higher temper-
atures than was possible before; 
d) Neural Networks, Budget: $33 million. 
Objective: Preliminary investigation of new 
kinds of computers modeled after how the brain 
is believed to function; and 
e) Mimic, (Microwave and millimeter-wave monolithic 
integrated circuits) Budget: $67 million. 
Objective: Development of advanced chips 
made of gallium arsenide for use in sensors 
and communications systems. 
565 
In addition, in 1989 the DARPA began to fund research 
projects directed at the High Definition Television (HDTV) 
industry. The role of the U.S. DOD and of the DARPA in taking the 
lead in these research efforts may appear odd, but it results 
directly from the absence of any other U.S. government agency to 
fulfill this function. 
The paucity or outright absence of U.S. federal government 
organizations which could administer research and development 
activities for industry sectors can be readily seen from 
developments surrounding SEMATECH, the u.s. government supported 
semiconductor project. 
As reported in an August, 1988 issue of Science: 
Ask a Washington insider why the defense budget 
contains money for SEMATECH, the industrial consortium 
to revive the U.S. semiconductor industry, and you get a 
wry smile. "I was one of the movers behind the SEMATECH 
project," said Clyde· Prestowitz, former counsel to the 
Secretary of Commerce. "I didn't want it in the 
Pentagon, but there's no other place to go." 
"We probably should be funded through the Commerce 
Department, but they don't have any money, " said a 
SEMATECH spokesman. 
Nor did anyone else have the inclination, according to 
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM). "You have a lot of 
ideologues in the Administration who object strenuously 
to the federal government taking a leadership role in 
something like SEMATECH unless it can be wrapped in the 
robe of national security," he said. 
As the United States continues to take its monthly 
drubbing from Japan in the statistics of international 
trade, Congress seems more and more willing to fund R&D 
projects aimed at strengthening American high-tech 
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industry. But advocates of such programs are in a 
quandary about which government agency should administer 
them. Programs like SEMATECH, the National Center for 
Manufacturing Sciences, and research on high-temperature 
superconductors have therefore ended up in the Defense 
Department more or less by default. 
The National Academy of Engineering recommended that 
the federal government focus its efforts to encourage 
the development of critical technology "through a 
designated agency," but failed to agree on which agency 
should do the job. 
William Howard, a senior fellow at the academy, ticked 
off the list of rejected options: The National Science 
Foundation would "not be appropriate;" the Department of 
Commerce "essentially has walked away from the job;" the 
Defense Department "is preoccupied with other motives." 
The panel eventually settled on the White House Office 
of Science and Technology Policy as the best of bad 
options (Daniel, 1988). 
The entry of the DOD and the DARPA into the funding of 
civilian sector research and development projects has received 
some encouragement from U.S. industry representatives, but the 
overall reaction to this by u.s. government executives, academia 
and private industry has been hostile. Charles Barfield, the 
Director of Science and Technology Policy Studies of the American 
Enterprise Institute, a conservative research organization with 
close links to the Bush administration writes: 
Sematech and the Darpa HDTV involvement represent an 
ominous trend, and a perversion of the Defense 
Department's highly successful role since 1945 as a 
public Godfather to the U.S. science and technology 
enterprise. 
The extraordinary success of the science-military 
partnership was based on two characteristics of Defense 
Department patronage: 1) Key Defense Department science 
agencies emerged as the most imaginative, farsighted and 
flexible instruments for basic-science funding in the 
government; and 2 ) the department kept a fixed eye on 
the defense goals of its technology mission and did not 
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attempt to enter the labyrinth of market economics. 
Unfortunately, both of these fundamental pillars of the 
Defense Department science and technology enterprise 
have been fundamentally altered. 
The department's overall funding of basic research as a 
percentage of total defense funding has declined from 
5.2 percent in 1965 to an estimated 2.2 percent in 1990. 
Further, since 1980, the basic research share of the 
Darpa budget has decreased by about two-thirds. This 
means that scientific seed corn for future advanced 
defense technologies has been persistently underfunded. 
Further, since basic research ultimately produces 
substantial payoffs for civilian sectors as well, this 
underfunding undoubtedly has been detrimental for 
overall U.S. competitiveness. 
In addition, the Defense Department has increasingly 
expressed support for industrial-policy and technology-
commercialization proposals that it has little 
competence to evaluate and that often merely advance the 
goals of special interests to raid the public treasury. 
Over the past few months, Darpa representatives have 
talked of the necessity for guaranteed markets for HDTV, 
mandated U.S. production, mandated use of U.S. semicon-
ductor chips and microprocessors in new television 
equipment, and exclusive licensing to u.s. companies. 
These policies constitute a dream list for industrial-
policy advocates and protectionist special interests, 
and are at cross purposes with U.S. trade-policy goals 
to end subsidies, beat back spurious infant-industry 
arguments and keep markets open for investment. 
Before committing scarce public resources and revising 
regulatory practices for HDTV or any other technology 
program, the Bush administration should set forth 
stringent criteria and high thresholds for government 
intervention (Barfield, 1989). 
Similar negative reactions to the DARPA's attempts (or 
"intrusions" as called by those unfavourable to these activities) 
to assist U.S. private industry sectors have been expressed by 
many in the United States. The fact remains that there is no 
other u.s. government agency which could undertake the lead role ~ 
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in the administration of such research project~. A similar 
situation exists in the White House, where the final authority for 
any and all science policies rests. At the present time the 
principal Presidential Advisor on u.s. science policy is the 
Special Assistant for Science and Technology who directs the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). 
A brief summary of the past roles of the Presidential 
Science Advisor, the key individual in U ~S. science policy with 
immediate access to the President and of the President's Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC) and the OSTP should be included because 
it explains the relative absence of science policy at the higher 
levels of U.S. government. Until 1957, the President did not have 
an individual responsible for advising on issues of science. As a 
result of the Sputnik satellite surprise in 1957, President 
Eisenhower created the post of Special Assistant for Science and 
Technology and appointed James R. Killian, Jr., then president of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to fill it. At 
Killian's suggestion, Eisenhower moved the Science Advisory Com-
mittee that then existed under the Office of Defense Mobilization 
into the Executive Office. Together with the Committee, Killian 
developed a system for advising the President on science policy 
issues that grew and flourished until 1973, when it was abolished 
by President Nixon. The position was restored and established by 
law in 1979. During the 1957 to 1973 period, the role of the 
Science Advisor was well defined and very useful in formulating 
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basic science and technology policies for the U.S. After the 
reestablishment of the. position of the Science Advisor and of the 
PSAC in 1979 their roles under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan 
declined. 
A factor which contributed to this decline was the fact that 
the PSAC over time became what Lord Zuckerman ( 1988) calls "part 
of the political fabric of the White House," and began publicly to 
advocate "political actions" rather than "render judgments on 
science." Harvey Brooks, a distinguished U.S. physicist who 
served for many years on the PSAC, points out that over time the 
members of the PSAC failed to distinguish between the concepts of 
"policy for science" and "science for policy." 
The root of these problems lies in the fact that the Office 
of Science Advisor and the membership of the PSAC were not civil 
servants but independent scientists appointed by the President and 
serving at the President's pleasure. As long as there was an 
agreement between the President and the members of the PSAC, the 
Office of Science Advisor functioned properly and effectively. 
When, however, disagreements arose, the proper functions of the 
PSAC were disrupted by issues such as political partisanship, 
scientific independence and objectivity. The membership of the 
PSAC and the Office of Science Adviser were always populated by 
very distinguished groups of scientists with national or world 
reputations who were capable and did from time to time disagree 
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with the President's views, and furthermore were willing and did 
make their disagreements public. 
It is of some interest to compare the functions of the PSAC 
with its U.K. counterpart, the Central Advisory Council of 
Scientific Policy. Lord Zuckerman, for many years a Chief 
Scientific Advisor to Prime Ministers, states that when the PSAC 
operated in harmony with the political programme of the U.S. 
President, it " . was a far more effective advisory body " 
than the British counterpart. 
However, in times of political crisis when political parti-
sanship becomes a factor, the U.K. system is better. 
The issue of political partisanship, independent and 
objectivity will always remain an open question. In 
dealing with it I would, however, commend the British 
system as a better model than the American. The post 
of chief scientific adviser to the British government 
follows civil service rules. Whatever party was in 
power, I served impartially, as all civil servants do. 
I was never expected to express -- and never did express 
-- a view about domestic issues that were the subject of 
party political debate. Nor was it ever expected that I 
would trim my own views about defence, or any other 
matters of policy with which I was concerned, to suit 
the views of the reigning party (Zuckerman, 1988). 
The need for more visible science advice at the highest levels of 
u.s. government has been advocated by many over the last few 
decades. The most recent such recommendation was made to 
President Bush in the spring of 1988 by the Carnegie Commission of 
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New York chaired by Joshua Lederberg, president of Rockefeller 
University. It recommended that: 
a) "The president appoint a new Science adviser, and that 
the job be upgraded to Assistant to the President, a 
title that would bring with it direct access to the 
President. 
b) The Science Adviser head the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP). 
c) The four Associate Directorships of OSTP, which have 
been vacant for many years, be filled by Presidential 
appointment. Two of those who fill the jobs should have 
dual appointments on the National Security Council staff 
and the Office of Management and Budget staff. 
d) The President appoints a panel of prestigious outside 
advisers 1 and the members should be willing to spend 
substantial time on the panel 1 s work, unlike current 
White House Science Council members who meet for fewer 
than two days every few months." (Sanger, New York 
Times, December 18, 1988) 
As of the summer of 1989, there has been no action taken on this 
by the White House. 
Clearly the U.S. government is not ideally structured to 
design and implement science and technology policies. The sharp 
decline in U.S. advanced technology industries as clearly 
evidenced by international trade statistics and the alleged 
decline in the U.S. scientific and research performance, can be 
partly attributed to the U.S. government 1 s science policymaking 
structure and institutions (Hatsopoulos, et al., 1988; Bau.mal, 
1989; Cline, 1983). 
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Several other developments may have also contributed to the 
decline of U.S. advanced technology industries and scientific 
activities. One such development is the decline and redistri-
bution of research and development funding by the federal 
government. 
spending, 
The real growth rate of research and development 
that is the percentage increase in research and 
development funds in the U.S., has significantly declined during 
the 1980's from about 7 percent in 1980 to about 2.8 percent in 
1988. During President Reagan's administration, the federal 
government's support for research and development activities 
indeed increased by some $29 billion, but almost 84 percent of the 
increase was for defence-related activities. Support for civilian 
research and development has actually fallen by 9 percent in real 
terms since 1980. The rise in the total u.s. federal government's 
research and development funding was driven by large increases in 
defence research (Tirman, 1984; Manufacturing Studies Board, 
1988). 
Another factor which may have contributed to this decline is 
the cumbersome process by which the u.s. Congress allocated 
research and development budgets. The allocation of public 
monies to the civilian research and development budget in the U.S. 
is indeed a complex and convoluted process (Bowen, 1980; CBO, 
1985). A total of thirteen committees in the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives undertake the allocation process. There 
is very limited interaction between these; no unified review of 
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the research and development budget and no research priorities are 
established. This is in spite of the fact that some one hundred 
Senate and House Panels are engaged in the review of research and 
development funding requests prior to the time such funding 
requests reach the thirteen committees responsible for funding 
approval (Science, 28 August, 1988). 
Furthermore, the members of the U.S. Congress are very 
susceptible to their own parochial inte::-ests and may allocate 
some research and development funds on a political rather than 
objective basis. Crawford (1988) states the following regarding 
the attempt by a u.s. Congressional Council to reform the funding 
process for some seven hundred federal government laboratories: 
In conjunction with reorienting U.S. R&D policy, the 
council recommends that the role of the government's 
700 laboratories in supporting the commercial 
application of technology needs to be examined. More 
resources should be directed toward R&D that is 
relevant to the needs of the private sector. To 
accomplish this, the activities of some federal labs 
will need to be redirected to support more applied 
research and in other cases laboratories should be 
closed where their work is of marginal utility. 
The political obstacles posed by an effort to 
restructure and consolidate federal laboratories, the 
council concedes, will be large. Members of Congress 
usually regard these facilities as prized possessions 
and because the labs are often mission-oriented they 
also have industrial constituencies that will lobby on 
· their behalf. 
In conclusion, the science, technology and industry policies 
of the U.S. federal government, with few exceptions, consist of 
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U.S. government procurement and funding of science, technology and 
related activities from public monies. The U.S. government's 
structure, which supports in terms of administration and manage-
ment these science policies, is divided among numerous u.s. 
federal government departments and agencies.· Science policies are 
influenced by numerous interest groups. There have recently been 
a number of suggestions made to centralize this science policy-
making apparatus in the u.s. (Golden, 1988). 
It is not likely that any such attempts will succeed because 
of the long standing tradition in the U.S. of reducing and not 
increasing the power of the federal government. Raymond Vernon 
says the following regarding the attempts to undertake measures 
which will result in some type of unified science, technology or 
industry policies in the U.S.: 
Americans should count themselves lucky that history 
seems to be moving in a direction that will limit the 
use of such measures. For if U.S. policymakers elected 
to develop a comprehensive national industrial policy, 
the odds are high that it would be applied in ways 
hurtful to U.S. national interest. 
The basic difficulty is not venality or stupidity on 
the part of the U.S. government, as critics sometimes 
complain. Nor is it a lack of analytical capability on 
the part of U.S. bureaucrats; on the contrary, for 
probity and competence, our federal bureaucracy scores 
among the highest in the world. It lies rather in the 
deep-seated preference of the American electorate, 
affirmed again and again in the country's history, that 
the federal government deal with citizens with a very 
light hand, applying neither fear nor favor. That 
basic preference for limits on governmental power 
stretches back in history to the American colonists' 
fears of the Tudors and the Bourbons. And in the 
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centuries that followed, it was solidified by the 
country's almost unbroken history of economic growth and 
by the absence of any mortal threats from outside the 
country's borders (Vernon, 1988, 1989). 
A similar observation on this issue is made by Jerome B. 
Wiesner, Science Adviser to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
B. Johnson and president emeritus of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology: 
Some people proposed that what is needed is a new 
Department of Science, comparable in scale and 
complexity to the Defense Department. I agree that 
some kind of new agency should · oversee civilian 
science, but it would be a serious mistake to sweep all 
government science projects into a single massive 
bureaucracy. Individual agencies should continue to 
manage their own scientific activities, and basic 
research should continue to be supported by the National 
Institute of Health, the National Science Foundation and 
other nationwide funding agencies (Wiesner, 1989). 
11. 4 U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES 
11.4.1 U.S. Government Policies in the Microelectronics IndustkY 
U.S. government policies to assist the microelectronics 
industry in the U.S. have varied in accordance with the three 
evolutionary phases of this industry in the U.S. : a) military 
gestation and incubation, from 1956 to 1962; b) commerciali-
zation, from 1963 to 197 3; and c) large-scale integration and 
international competition, from 1973 to the present. The shift 
from one phase to another has been characterized by significant 
breakthroughs in microelectronics technology, diversification in 
end-product applications, as well as different kinds of u.s. 
government policies. Military-related demand, which accounted for 
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as much as 90 percent of total microelectronic products in the 
initial phase was replaced by commercial demand, during the 1963 
to 1973 decade, required by U.S. computer and industrial equipment 
manufacturers with limited U.S. government involvement. This was 
followed by the last evolutionary phase of the microelectronics 
sector, beginning in 1973. During this phase, the u.s. federal 
government directed and funded large scale projects focused on 
defence-related uses of microelectronic products. 
u.s. government policies related to research and development 
funding and procurement of microelectronic products were of the 
utmost importance at the inception of the microelectronics 
industry in the 1956 to 1962 period and to a lesser extent during 
the later development of integrated circuits in the early 1970's 
(Finan, 1981; Borrus, et al., 1982). 
The two major U.S. government agencies which exercised these 
policies were the U.S. DoD and NASA. The DOD in particular 
virtually assured a market for all microelectronic products during 
the early phases of such products. Tilton (1971) for example 
estimates that in the case of one type of microelectronic device 
-- the monolithic integrated circuit, in the three initial 
production years ( 1962-1964) the DOD purchased 100 percent, 94 
percent and 85 percent, respectively, of the total output. In 
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1968, six years after the introduction of the monolithic inte-
grated circuit, the DOD purchased only 37 percent of the total 
output. 
The enormous importance of these U.S. government policies 
should become even clearer when one considers the unit cost of 
these devices. The average unit value of monolithic circuits in 
the initial years of production was $50.00; in the mid-1960's it 
had declined to $31.60; and in the late-1960's, it had dropped to 
$18.50. Thus, government procurement policies fostered the 
learning curve effect which in turn allowed for cost reductions 
and development of the industrial market. Asher and Strom (1977) 
concluded the following: 
the integrated circuit was dependent upon the 
technology of the semiconductor industry by both heavy 
R&D support and by providing a large market for high 
quality semiconductor products. Furthermore, following 
the invention of the integrated circuit, DOD again 
provided R&D support to its development and, probably 
more importantly, accelerated the use of integrated 
circuits by providing the early market which supported 
the development of production capability. 
These conclusions are also supported by another study, 
prepared by Charles River Associates Incorporated (1981). 
The combination of the rapid development of new devices 
and the assured demand provided by the government 
induced many firms to pursue innovative strategies and 
new market opportunities. As military production 
proceeded, learning economies were realized, costs fell, 
and firms were able to price products more cheaply, 
enabling them to penetrate consumer and industrial 
markets. 
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Many industry experts concur that military (and to a 
certain extent NASA) procurement of semiconductor 
devices had a strong, positive impact on the growth and 
development of the industry. Procurement contracts 
facilitated the speed of development of new devices and 
reduced the time needed for these devices to enter new 
markets. 
Goldberg (1979) provides an excellent summary of u.s. 
government policies which assure markets for new technological 
products: 
The Federal government effectively absorbs the risks 
inherent in the new technology by providing an assured 
outlet for an agreed quantity at predetermined prices 
and profit margins. Long-term contracts confer 
stability on the vendor. Production planning can 
proceed secure in the knowledge that it will not be 
subjected to disruptive variations in the volume and 
pace of manufacturing activity reflecting fluctuations 
in orders received. The stability of the long-term 
procurement contract accordingly provides an environment 
highly conducive to yield improvement and it is this 
which often lies at the root of the precipitate reduc-
tion in unit cost observable in the early production 
stage of a new device technology. 
In addition to procurement policies, the U.S. government 
also contributed significantly to the development and growth of 
the domestic semiconductor industry by providing large research 
and development funds. As stated by Charles River Associates 
(1980): 
Government funding of research and development for 
semiconductors originated in the Department of Defense 
and NASA as a means of developing new technology to meet 
the nation's military and space needs. These government 
agencies became convinced at an early stage of the 
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importance of semiconductor electronics to the military 
and space programs and therefore pushed for the develop-
ment of more reliable, faster, and smaller circuits. 
The Air Force was an important source of R&D funds 
through its research programs for missiles and air 
defense. Between 1959 and 1964, Air Force integrated 
circuit R&D funding accounted for about 55 percent of 
total government R&D on integrated circuits in 1960. 
This "technology push" factor had an indirect impact on 
the industry by emphasizing the importance of research 
in this area and thus stimulated other firms to conduct 
extensive research activities. 
R&D funding by the public sector proceeds in a manner 
simil..ar to procurement. Basically, the government is 
"buying" a product as it does under procurement rules, 
but that product in this case is the research (and/or 
development) of a new product or process. R&D contracts 
can have either a relatively short term (one year) or a 
longer term (two to five years). During the 1950's the 
majority of R&D funds went to the "established" firms 
that had good reputations for research. However, by the 
early 1960's many of the newer, highly innovative 
companies were being given lucrative research contracts. 
RCA, Motorola, and TI were three of the major recipients 
of R&D funds in the early 1960's. 
Two policy impacts may be immediately visualized. 
First is the effect on strategies. R&D funding by the 
government functioned to emphasize the urgency of the 
situation, thereby inducing greater R&D investments by 
private firms. Again, timing was all important. 
Government push in this direction of research compelled 
firms to follow, thereby increasing significantly the 
research effort toward developing new and better 
circuits. This government effort may not have been 
directly responsible for new innovations, but it 
certainly sped their realization. 
Clearly, U.S. government policies provided major assistance 
in the initial phase of the u.s. microelectronic industry as well 
as in the development of integrated circuits by u.s. firms. 
As the commercial markets for microelectronic products 
increased during the 1963 to 1973 period, the relative importance 
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of U.S. government procurement policies diminished, but continued 
to represent a stable market for U.S. firms. U.S. government 
support for research and development remained an important source 
of assistance to the industry; between 1970 and 1979, this funding 
averaged about $40 million per annum, approximately one-half of 
the industry's research and development budget. 
Defence consumption accounted for well over a third of total 
u.s. microelectronic product production from 1956 to 1962, 
reaching a high of 45 percent in 1958. Microelectronic products 
were used extensively for installation in. Minuteman missiles and 
the Apollo spacecraft, which, by themselves, accounted for a large 
portion of defence consumption. Around 1963, with commercial 
opportunities rapidly expanding, the military proportion of total 
production began falling off. By 1977, defence-related con-
sumption constituted only 12 percent of total production; but in 
absolute and constant dollars, the amount continued to rise 
steadily. Defence procurement rose to $536 million in 1977, 
nearly ten times the figure twenty years before. 
The data indicate that during the early years, the average 
price of microelectronic products sold to the DOD was several 
times higher than those sold on the open marketplace. This 
functioned, in effect, as a kind of hidden subsidy. Firms were 
able to set commercial prices lower than strict calculations of 
costs and profits would have allowed, because the comfortable 
margin of profits obtained from military sales could be used to 
cover losses. 
foundation for 
Military 
the U.S. 
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procurements thus provided a solid 
microelectronic companies seeking to 
establish a permanent basis for commercial operations (NAS, 1988; 
Moxon, 1983). 
The combination of defence-related R&D and military procure-
ments may have also enhanced the microelectronic industry's 
capacity to secure capital. By signalling the U.S. Government's 
confidence in, and commitment to, the industry's development, such 
tangible forms of support also helped to instill the kind of 
public confidence so necessary to secure financial backing: e.g., 
issuance of stocks and bonds, bank credit and loans, venture 
capital, etc. (Brinkman, 1988). 
In the second phase of the microelectronic industry's evolu-
tion in the U.S., from 1963 to 197 3, the principal government 
assistance to the industry consisted of providing a stable demand 
for a relatively small proportion of microelectronic products. 
During the last phase of the microelectronic industry's 
development, starting in the year 1973, the government provided 
significant assistance to microelectronic firms by funding large 
scale research and development projects. The federal government 
has undertaken since 1972, and in particular during the late 
1970's and 1980's, a number of programmes to support the native 
microelectronics sector. Some of these have been directed 
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explicitly at the research and development phase of the micro-
electronics sector, others have contributed to the design and 
production of advanced microelectronics devices. 
11.4.1.1 Very High Speed Integrated Circuits CYHSICl Programme 
The U.S. VBSIC programme, initiated in the late 1970's, is 
funded and directed by the DOD and was the initial industrial 
cooperative research venture for the microelectronics industry in 
the u.s. 
The VBSIC programme represents a $900 million, fourteen-
year effort (1976-1990) to meet military needs for highly 
specialized silicon-based digital integrated circuit technologies 
that will be used in various weapons systems, principally in 
ballistic missiles. The specific goal is the development of 
highly specialized semiconductor devices which perform according 
to rigid DOD specifications. The VBSIC programme has the overall 
objective of: 
• • • the creation of chips with 'clock rates, ' the 
speed at which they process data, of 25 million hertz, 
or cycles per sound. The second is aimed at clock rates 
of 100 million hertz • • • Phase One of VBSIC achieved 
feature sizes of 1.25 microns, while Phase Two aims at 
half a micron • • • Some specific VBSIC projects include 
ones with application to 1 smart 1 flying bombs, sonar 
buoys that detect enemy submarines, jamming pods for 
electronic warfare, radars, electronic packages for 
fighter aircraft, sonar-guided torpedoes, surface-to-air 
missiles, and tank weapon-control systems. ( Gutmanis, 
1983) 
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There are three main phases of the programme with the number 
of prime contractors decreasing in each phase. Phase Zero, 
launched in the late 1970's, involved programme definition by nine 
u.s. microelectronic product manufacturers: 
a. General Electric/Intersil 
b. Honeywell 
c. Hughes Aircraft/Signetics 
d. IBM 
e. Raytheon/Fairchild Semiconductor 
f. Rockwell 
g. Texas Instruments 
h. TRW/Motorola 
i. Westinghouse/National Semiconductor 
Phase One involved the design and fabrication of 1.25 micron 
semiconductors. This included the design and fabrication of a 
viable prototype defence sub-system or brassboard, using Phase One 
chips. Six of the original nine contractors participated in this 
phase: Honeywell, Hughes Aircraft/Signetics, IBM, Texas Instru-
ments, TRW/Motorola, and Westinghouse/National Semiconductor. 
Phase Two, begun in late 1984, was devoted to half micron 
feature size semiconductors and was conducted by three of the 
Phase One contractors: 
a. IBM, 
b. TRW and Motorola, and 
c. Honeywell and Motorola. 
Phase Three, instituted in 1986, has continued the research ' 
effort of the previous phase with the same participants. 
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A key aspect in the VHSIC programme is the potential com-
mercial spillover. Transfer of VHSIC's accomplishments into 
commercial applications by u.s. microelectronic firms has 
occurred at a rapid pace. 
benefits derived by U.S. 
Of particular importance have been the 
microelectronic firms of advanced 
knowledge in the fabrication of microelectronics products, such as 
significantly improved lithographic processes used in the manufac-
ture of microelectronic devices (SHC, 1988). 
11.4.1.2 SEMATECH 
In 1985, the U.S. microelectronic industry established the 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Institute, or "Sematech," 
with the goal of undertaking research and development on produc-
tion equipment used in the manufacture of microelectronic products 
(New York Times April 1, 1988). 
Sematech is the first consortium of private firms to receive 
U.S. government funding. Formed by the Semiconductor Industry 
Association, Sematech received $100 million in funding from its 
member companies and $100 million from the DARPA. 
"In overall dollar terms, the investment our government is 
making here is not large," said Robert Costello, Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition. "Yet in terms of potential, the invest-
ment has enormous implications not only for a strong semiconductor 
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manufacturing base for America's defence, but also in providing a 
unique role model for other industries critical to the health and 
security of the nation: 11 (NAS, 1988). · 
The idea ·for Sematech was derived from a Defense Science 
Board (DSB) task force report that found that shortcomings in the 
U.S. electronics industry's manufacturing base could undermine 
national security (Daniel, 1988). 
Sernatech's primary goal is to develop and integrate advanced 
materials, processes, and equipment into semiconductor manufac-
turing systems. To this end, Semetech has formed a subsidiary 
organization called Semi/Sematech, which consists of 150 U.S. 
materials and equipment manufacturers. Sematech is also funding 
research at 25 U. 5. academic institutions and federal labor a-
tories. As already noted, the DOD's strong support for Sematech 
has not been received with equal enthusiasm by all. The New York 
Times reported: 
Another consequence is that the .Defense Department is 
taking a more active role in planning, the industry 
sources said. Its role is controversial in any case. 
The consortium is not designed to develop computer chips 
. directly for military use. Rather I the rationale for 
Pentagon involvement is that a healthy commercial 
semiconductor industry is vital for an overall healthy 
electronics industry in the United States, which in turn 
is vital for national defense. While the industry is 
grateful for the federal funds, some executives have 
hoped that the Defense Department would play only a 
small operational role in the consortium. They fear 
that too much Pentagon influence could poison the 
project because the department might insist on 
developing technology, such as the ability for chips to 
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resist nuclear radiation, that has military uses but is 
not applicable to commercial products (New York Times, 
April 1, 1988). 
11.4.1.3 Microelectronics and Computer Technology·corporation 
The Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation 
(MCC) was established in Austin, Texas in 1983, with partial 
government funding and leadership by the DOD, and has a decidedly 
national purpose: "to help maintain U. 5. technological preemi-
nence and international competitiveness in microelectronics ·and 
computers" (SHC, 1983). The MCC is owned by 21 American share-
holder companies in both microelectronics and computers. The 
technical programme is focused on packaging, software technology, 
VLSI/CAD, and advanced computer architecture. The MCC had a 
budget of approximately $62 million in 1987, $87 million in 1988 
and $122 million in 1989 and a staff of scientists and engineers 
of over three hundred. 
The MCC is unusual in that it found widespread bipartisan 
support in the U.S. Congress. Congress removed the major 
restraint to the founding of the MCC by passing the Cooperative 
Research Act of 1984, which allowed U. 5. industrial firms to 
cooperate in certain kinds of long-range research and development 
projects without fear of antitrust regulations. 
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At present, the MCC is engaged in four research projects of 
importance to microelectronics product commercial applications 
(Spring, 1989): "packaging" (development of architecture of 
microelectronic components); "software technology" (producing 
. procedures and computerized tools that simplify the task of 
writing complex programmes for specialized applications); "very 
large scale integration/computer-aided design" (developing a set 
of tools that can be applied to the design of complex integrated 
circuits), and "advanced computer architectures." The last 
programme is itself split into four separate research programmes: 
"parallel processing" (hardware and software that enable computers 
to operate at high speed and to solve certain kinds of complex 
problems by performing many parts of a task simultaneously); 
"data-base-system management" (methods of storing and retrieving 
complex information); "human-factors technology" (flexible means 
of communication between human beings and computers, perhaps 
including speech or handwriting); and "artificial intelligence 
[AI]/knowledge-based systems" (computer systems that make 
decisions by applying new ways of storing knowledge). 
11.4.2 The Machine Tool Industry in the United States 
The U.S. machine tool industry experienced a rapid growth in 
the second half of the 19th Century, but has experienced a 
decline in the recent past. According to Daly and Jones (1987): 
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The United States accounted for about a third of world 
exports of machine tools throughout the first half of 
the century; given the great absolute size of the 
American industrial sector, and the way its high labour 
costs encouraged the development of more sophisticated 
techniques, it is perhaps not surprising that American 
machine tools should have attained such a large share of 
international trade. But more recently, in the past 
twenty years, the United States gradually lost its great 
share in world exports following the rise of machine 
tool industries in other countries (such as Japan, Italy 
and, more recently, Korea and Taiwan). 
In the 1960's, when advanced machine tools and robotics were 
introduced in the U.S., the growth pattern of this industry was 
dampened by two major factors: first, the hourly cost of direct 
labour was lower than the hourly cost of operating an advanced 
machine tool or industrial robot; and second, the benefits 
expected from the new, unproven technology were still uncertain. 
As a result, by 1970, ten years after their introduction, only 
about 200 industrial robots were in use throughout the u.s. 
(Fawcett, 1976). 
During the 1970's and 1980's, however, the U.S. economic 
environment changed significantly. Manufacturing productivity 
declined steadily and labour costs increased, while machine tool 
and robot costs did not rise excessively. These trends were 
taking place at the time when machine tools and robots were 
becoming more sophisticated in both manipulative and control/ 
sensing capabilities. Usage of robots in U.S. manufacturing began 
to increase significantly in the late 1970's. The robot popula-
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tion in the U.S. increased from about 200 in 1970 to about 1700 in 
1978 and facilities increased to about 6000 in 1988 (Feeder, 
1988). 
The U.S. government's role in assisting U.S. machine tool 
makers is primarily centred on research and development funding 
through the DOD, NASA, the NSF, and the National Bureau of 
Standards (NBS). The objective of DOD funding was to develop 
manufacturing technologies with 
NASA's funding was focused on 
specific military applications. 
space-related automation tech-
nologie~. The objective of NSF funding was to assist applied 
research projects undertaken by U.S. universities. The objective 
of NBS funding was to provide support for automation research. 
11.4.2.1 Department of Defense 
Most of the DOD sponsored research in machine tools and 
manufacturing automation technology is conducted under its 
Manufacturing Technology Program (ManTech), with funding of $200 
million per annum. ManTech essentially began in 1960 with the 
aims of developing and applying productivity-enhancing manufactur-
ing technologies (DOD, 1986). 
There were abou~ 400 to 500 ManTech projects active in the 
U.S. machine tool industry in 1989. In addition to the ManTech 
programmes, two other DOD agencies fund longer term, more basic 
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research in the machine tool sector. The DARPA funds research in 
robotics, sensory control, and artificial intelligence, while the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) supports university-based research 
in precision machine tools. 
11.4.2.2 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASA's funding of the machine tool sector has averaged about 
$7 million per annum during the last decade. Three specific areas 
are the focus of NASA's funding: 1) robotics and teleoperator 
research to develop manipulators for applications on space 
missions; 2) development of an advanced computer-aided planning 
systems, and 3) integrating and computer-aided engineering systems 
and linking them with data management software packages. 
11.4.2.3 National Science Foundation 
The NSF, with an annual budget of about $10 million for 
machine tool research and development, provides support for 
programmes with application to manufacturing automation. The 
various areas of research include discrete manufacturing, CAD, 
CAM, computer-aided testing, robotics use in materials handling, 
touch and vision sensors, robot programming languages, computer 
architectures, and control systems (NSF, 1986). 
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11.4.3 u.s. Government Policies in Advanced Materials Sectors 
The advanced ceramics sector has been the focus of u.s. 
government support among advanced materials industries (Beinent, 
1986). The government has sponsored R&D in advanced ceramic 
engineering products since the early 1970s. Much of this support 
(around $350 million from 1971 to 1988) has been aimed at 
vehicular engines, reflecting the potential impacts of advanced 
ceramics on fuel efficiency. In 1987, the U.S. federal government 
spent almost $23 million for R&D in engineering ceramics (Table 
11.3). Many of these programmes in the early 1970s were first 
funded by the DARPA, and later picked up by the DOE. 
Within the federal government, DOD (DARPA) research and 
development has been focused on adiabatic diesel _engines, 
particularly for tanks, on automotive engine propulsion, and on 
aerospace engines. In addition, several U.S. National Labor-
atories are engaged in basic research on advanced ceramics, 
including the Argonne National Laboratory, the NBS, the Naval 
Research Laboratory, the Army Materials and Mechanics Research 
Center, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Johnson, et al., 
1983). 
A large portion of U.S. federal 
actually provided to private industry, 
design and testing (U.S. DOC, 1984). 
government monies is 
especially for product 
A list of U.S. private 
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sector contractors, 
advanced engineering 
subcontractors, and 
ceramics effort is 
suppliers to the 
shown in Table 
DOE 
11.4. 
Funding is also provided to 24 U.S. universities which have 
substantial advanced engineering ceramics programmes such as MIT, 
Rutgers, and Pennsylvania State University. 
and 
U.S. government policies, 
other assistance to the 
research and development funding 
advanced polymer and composite 
manufacturers cannot be discussed because most of the advanced 
polymers and composites are produced for defence-related 
application. The very limited information available suggests that 
the U.S. government provides funding for some sixty research and 
development projects undertaken by U.S. universities and private 
sector firms. At least seventy-seven U.S. federal government 
laboratories are engaged in activities related to advanced polymer 
and composite research. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The science, industry and technology policies of the U.S. 
federal government are limited to government procurement and 
funding of research and development activities. The U.S. govern-
ment funds research and development either directly by allocating 
public monies to u.s. government laboratories and private sector 
research entities, or undertakes funding of large scale research 
and development projects. There is no central science, 
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TABLE 11.3 
Engineering Ceramic Technology 
Federal Government Funded, R&D 1987 
Agency 
Department of Energy 
Vehicle and Engine Research and Development 
Industrial Program 
Energy Systems Research 
Advanced Research and Technology Development 
Advanced Energy Conversion Systems 
Surface Coal Gasification 
Basic Energy Science 
NASA 
Lewis Research Center 
NSF 
Department of Defense 
Defense ARPA 
U.S. Air Force 
u.s. Army 
U.S. Navy 
Total 
Amount 
(S Million) 
$ 9.28 
0.32 
0.20 
1.23 
1.93 
0.30 
1.00 
1.50 
1.00 
2.00 
1. 70 
1.27 
1.00 
$22.83 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Vehicle and Engine R&D, 
1989. 
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TABLE 11.4 
Private Sector Contractor, Subcontractors, and 
Suppliers to DOE Advanced Engineering Ceramics R&D 
Garrett Turbine Engine 
G.M. Allison Gas Turbine 
Ford Motor Company 
Cummins Engine Company 
Airearch Casting Company 
Carborundum Company 
Dow Corning Company 
General Electric Company 
TRW Corporation 
SKF Industries 
GTE Labs 
IIRT 
Norton Company 
Pure Carbon Company 
COORS Porcelain Company 
AC Spark Plug 
ERG 
Kyocera International 
NGK Insulators 
Source: u.s. Department of Energy, 1989. 
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technology or industry policy making apparatus in the u.s., rather 
the policymaking structure is one of dispersed interest groups 
with both competing and complimenting interests. 
The absence of a central science, technology or industry 
authority in the U.S. may be partly explained as the result of 
society's inate suspicion of government intervention. The fact, 
however, that science and ~echnology activities in the U.S. take 
place in a very large number of enterprises (there are over 700 
research and development entities alone), makes it very difficult 
to establish a central government authority over these entities. 
In the light of the decline in the performance of some ad-
vanced technology sectors (especially when this performance is 
measured in terms of trade), it is likely that some additional 
control over science and technology policy by the U.S. federal 
government will be attempted (U.S. ITC, 1984; Hiets, 1988). The 
obvious location of such additional control would be in the Execu-
tive Office of the President. The present Office of Science and 
Technolody Policy located in the White House has not been a.llowed 
to perform with either legal or political authority during the 
last several decades, although this office performed well in the 
1960's. 
In addition to the poor performance by advanced technology 
industries in terms of declining exports and sharply increasing 
imports, there are two other major deficiencies in U.S. science 
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and technology activities which may require policy guidance by the 
U.S. federal government. The first of these is the unwillingness 
or inability of private sector firms to allocate funding for 
research and development for sufficiently long-term periods in 
order to obtain the benefits from these activities. The current 
corporate culture of the U.S. requires that benefits from any 
corporate expenditures are shown four times during a year in 
quarterly financial reports. Funding of research and development 
activities which would reap results at some time in the future are 
discouraged. As the distinguished U.S. economist and member of 
the prestigious National Academy of Engineering, Professor 
Rosenberg states: 
The resulting preoccupation with short-term problems 
has contributed to an economic environment inhospitable 
to the stability required for carrying out long-term R&D 
strategies. (Rosenberg, 1988) 
The unwillingness or inability by private sector corporations to 
allow sufficient elapsed time for their research and development 
projects to become profitable have resulted in the loss of very 
large potential future revenue sources (Bowen, 1980). For 
example, the present sales volume of VCRs in the U.S. alone is 
estimated at $5 billion. The u.s. does not have a single 
manufacturer of VCRs. Rather, almost all of the VCR units sold in 
the U.S. have been produced by Japanese firms. The research, 
development, design and engineering work for the VCR was, however, 
conducted by a relatively small U.S. firm, Ampex Corporation, 
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which sold its completed VCR technology to Japanese firms in order 
to generate immediate cash flow into the corporation. Likewise 
the principal microelectronic components on the world markets--
the various "memory" devices, were developed by U.S. firms and 
sold for immediate cash to the Japanese. The total world-wide · 
annual market value of the "memory" device is approximately $12 
billion. The Japanese manufacturers produced over 80 percent of 
these devices in 1988. 
The other principal area where the u.s. government may need 
to enact appropriate policies in order to improve the competitive 
position of the u.s. is in manufacturing technologies. The tech-
nological advances in the United States' manufacturing processes 
for many industry sectors (including advanced technology sectors) 
have not kept pace with those of international competitors such as 
the Japanese. 
In a recent study, the Manufacturing Studies Board, National 
Academy of Sciences, states the following: 
Japanese companies have concentrated on manufacturing as 
their core competence. In contrast, manufacturing 
processes in the United States have been a secondary 
consideration. United States managers do not emphasize 
manufacturing as a means of achieving world leadership 
in electronics. The manufacturing function and managers 
in charge of manufacturing activities have tended to be 
less influential than their research-and-development and 
marketing counterparts. As a result, the Japanese have 
captured the bulk of the world's consumer electronics 
business by emphasizing careful attention to the details 
of electronics hardware manufacturing (NAS, 1988). 
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The u.s. federal government has undertaken only marginal or 
limited intervention in advanced technology sectors. In the case 
of microelectronics, this industry sector has declined in the u.s. 
from a premier position in the world to one in which the u.s. must 
share the world markets with the Japanese. 
Analyses of the U.S. microelectronic sectors, science, 
research and development activities and technology advancement 
clearly establish the fact that the performance of the U.S. in 
these areas up to the late 1970's was equal or superior to its 
chief competitor -- the Japanese. Yet, the U.S. microelectronic 
industry has lost ground steadily to its Japanese competitors from 
the late 1970's to the present time. The principal, most likely 
reason for this decline was the inability of U.S. microelectronic 
product manufacturers to expend the very large funds required to 
design, engineer and construct microelectronic product manufac-
turing facilities. 
As presented elsewhere in this volume the capital cost 
requirements for microelectronic product manufacture, driven by 
very rapidly advancing technologies were increasing at a 
phenomenal rate (U.S. DOC, 1985) • U.S. microelectronics enter-
prises could not obtain the required monies from either 
internally generated funds or from public offerings. Funding 
assistance from the federal government represented the only 
remaining possibility for obtaining the required capital funds. 
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The required action by the u.s. federal government, in the light 
of the general reluctance by the U.S. to disrupt free market 
functions, was not offered and perhaps was not politically 
feasible. Conversely, Japanese firms, partly because of Japan's 
unique banking system and financial markets, were able to obtain 
the required funds for capital expenditures (SHC, 1988; Steel, ~ 
gl..' 1985) • 
Japanese microelectronic product facilities constructed in 
the late 1970's and early 1980's employed the most advanced 
production equipment and were very large and therefore able to 
take advantage of economies of scale and reduce unit production 
costs. As of the mid-1980's, the Japanese enjoyed absolute cost 
advantage over U.S. microelectronic firms. World-wide microelec-
tronic product market penetration by the Japanese was the obvious 
outcome. The above chain of events, as noted, took place in the 
late 1970's and early 1980's. These events may be repeated again 
in the near future as described by Hector: 
Demand for capital is already vast -- and growing. A 
first-rate fabrication facility for mass-produced 
memory chips now runs about $200 million. By the early 
1990s the cost will easily top $300 million, as each new 
generation of products requires larger and more 
expensive equipment. G. Dan Hutcheson, an analyst at 
·VLSI Research, a market research firm in San Jose, 
California, suggests that if current advances in 
technology continue, sometime in the 1990s the cost of 
such a facility could hit $1 billion -- a sum beyond the 
reach of almost any U.S. chipmaker except IBM or AT&T. 
Yet Japanese semiconductor companies, which are part of 
larger corporate groups like NEC and Toshiba, are big 
enough to handle that kind of investment. " Japan's 
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large, vertically integrated companies can invest 
heavily and accept low rates of return for long periods 
in order to gain market share. IBM and AT&T can match 
the investment if necessary, and niche chipmakers can 
simply avoid competing with the Japanese, but other 
large U.S. merchant manufacturers, particularly Intel, 
AMD, and National, cannot avoid some direct Japanese 
competition and probably don't have the stamina to 
withstand it (Hector, 1988). 
Clearly, some appropriate policy by the U.S. federal government 
may be desirable to forestall the further decline of U.S. micro-
electronic firms. 
The U.S. government's willingness to undertake appropriate 
policies may not, however, suffice to save the U.S. microelec-
tronic industry. Equally important is the cooperation of the u.s. 
microelectronic firms themselves. However, a significant number 
of the microelectronic product manufacturers in the u.s. are 
smaller, "niche" firms with a strong bias against u.s. government 
involvement of any kind in their enterprises. 
As reported by Richards (1989), regarding the microelectronic 
industries response to the U.S. government's assistance in the 
SEMATECH project: 
Most of the large chipmakers -- the top five control 
half of the market -- for example, favor at least a 
limited partnership with government. But the 
industry's smaller, more entrepreneurial companies are 
determined to go it alone. Among the most outspoken is 
T.J. Rodgers, founder and president of Cypress 
Semiconductor Corp. of San Jose. Rodgers considers 
Sematech a flawed concept nourished by a $100 million 
"bagful of candy" from government. 
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In Japan, of course, 
successfully "forced" 
government policies can be more 
on the private industry sectors. 
or less 
In the 
U.S. this may not be feasible. 
The u.s. machine tool sector has declined substantially' 
during the last several decades. U.S. government policies to 
arrest this decline have been very modest (Stanley, et al., 
1982). The principal reason for the reduction in U.S. machine 
tool makers production, sales, exports and profits was their 
inability to absorb the advanced technology used in machine 
tools, that of microprocessors and related devices. 
the 
Machine tool makers in 
U.K.) were principally 
the U.S. (as well as in France and 
"steel men," machine shops which 
engineered various metal cutting devices with mechanical power 
sources. Many of these shops were small, owned and operated by 
experienced master metal workers, machinists, even mechanical 
engineers. 
understand, 
electronics 
These enterprises were not technically able to 
absorb and put to use in their shops the micro-
technology with which they had had essentially no 
previous contact. 
In the light of the above, it is doubtful if any u.s. 
government policy would have been able to arrest the decline of 
the U.S. machine tool sector. 
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Advanced materials sectors represented the cutting edge of 
several technology areas. Information on u.s. government 
policies in these sectors is scarce due to the defence-related 
uses of these advanced materials. Fragmentary evidence suggests, 
however, that the U. 5. government policies essentially dominate 
this industry sector by virtue of its almost total dependence on 
military products. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 11 
( 1) There exists another relatively widely accepted categori-
zation of industrial nations with regard to technology 
policies. A well prepared statement of this can be found in 
the chapter prepared by Henry Erg as, a trade councellor at 
the OECD, in a Guile and Brooks ( 1987) report on a recent 
symposium on technology and social priorities organized by 
the U.S. National Academy of Engineering. Erg as, in his 
chapter "Does technology policy matter?", compares technology 
policies in different countries and finds that they basically 
fall into three groups. 
In "mission-oriented" countries (such as the U.S., the U.K., 
and France), governments generally try to boost the emergence 
of a specific emerging technology -- the breeder reactor, the 
space programme, or the supersonic airplane. In contrast, 
countries pursuing "diffusion-oriented" policies (Switzer-
land, Germany, and Sweden) do not target specific technol-
ogies, but rather construct environments -- through strong 
support of education, cooperative research efforts by 
universities and industry, and industry standard-setting--
that are designed to promote the development of mature 
products and processes. Only Japan has taken a third course, 
mixing elements of each of the first two strategies but 
focusing its greatest effort on assisting industries in their 
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"consolidation phase" well after new technologies have 
emerged but before final product designs have been estab-
lished. 
( 2) These attempts originate for the most part from elected 
representatives in the U.S. Congress, particularly those 
which represent geographic areas with declining industrial 
employment. It should be noted that, for the most part, the 
declining employment takes place in the so-called "rust 
belt", located in the midwest region of the u.s, with a 
significant concentration of iron and steel processing firms. 
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CHAPTER 12: 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
Japan's . economic growth during the last three decades has 1 
been pronounced and accelerating, especially since the early 
1980's. The increase in the GNP of Japan, which in 1987 was 
valued at $1231.1 billion (in constant 1982 dollars) was matched 
by a large increase in its current account balance, which has 
shown an exceptional growth since 1981. 
Japanese exports, a very large portion of which are exports 
of advanced technology products, as a percentage of the Japanese 
GNP have shown significant annual fluctuations, but a secular 
growth trend since 1967. This growth and development of the 
Japanese economy is surprising in the light of the fact that the 
advanced technology sectors in Japan are responsible for much of 
this outstanding economic performance at home. and in export 
markets. 
It is surprising because Japanese achievements in science and 
technology have been modest in the past. For ·example 1 only 5 
Nobel Prizes have been awarded to scientists born in Japan to the 
U.S.'s 188; France's 87; the U.K.'s 101; and Germany's 62. 
Japanese scientists have been responsible for very few tech-
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nological innovations in the post-World War II period. A review 
of the world's scientific literature in physics, chemistry, 
biology, mathematics, etc. authored by Japanese scientists is 
modest as compared to scientists from the U.S. , the U.K. , the 
Soviet Union or Germany. There exists, however, almost unaminous 
agreement that in the application of innovations and advanced 
technologies, developed elsewhere, the Japanese have performed 
extremely well (Johnson, 1982). 
Much of the credit for this must be awarded to the Japanese 
government's science and technology policies. The Japanese 
government has exercised a direct influence on the nation's 
science and technology activities, with numerous notable successes 
in most advanced technology industries (Gerstenfeld, 1982). 
The Japanese government's role in directing the nation's 
economy, science, and technology activities has a long history.(!) 
Since the beginning of the Meiji era (in 1868), Japan has used 
various industrial policy measures to shape the structure of its 
economy and to direct productive resources toward certain tech-
nological, industrial, and social goals (Johnson, 1982). In the 
initial decades of the Meiji period, the Japanese government 
directed the transformation of the Japanese economy from a tech-
nologically primitive, essentially rural society to an industri-
alized nation, surpassing all other countries on the Asian conti-
nent. In the 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s, Japanese governments directed 
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industrial development with a heavy hand to prepare Japan for its 
conquest of Southeast Asia and ultimately to confront the Allies. 
In the immediate post-World War II period, Japan's economic and 
industrial policies were directed towards recovering its economy 
from the destruction of WWII. Yamamura ( 1986) summarizes this 
period in Japanese economic history as follows: 
First the Japanese had a strong, shared motivation -- a 
national consensus -- to recover as quickly as possible 
from the humiliation of defeat in World War II and to 
achieve rapid economic growth, which was regarded as the 
only means to regain national pride. This consensus 
made a progrowth policy (explicitly f~voring growth over 
equity) politic ally possible and ensured the uninter-
rupted dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic 
Party ( LDP) over the next thirty years. Unlike in 
England (and elsewhere to a varying degree), there was 
little danger of debates on progrowth policies becoming 
ideological debates over distribution, which would have 
rendered the policies finally adopted totally ineffec-
tive, if not perverse; and 
• Japan's institutions have been crucial in 
determining the type of policy adopted. • few can 
quarrel with the observation that Japan's resilient LDP 
government, supported by rigorously selected elite 
bureaucrats in the ministries in Tokyo, commanded more 
power and a wider range of policy tools at its disposal 
than did, for example, the American or British counter-
parts. France comes closest to having an equally 
"strong" bureaucracy, but its political stability cannot 
be compared to that enjoyed by Japan. 
The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan created an economic 
consensus in Japan, referred to as the "grand coalition." This 
consisted of: the "labour intensive" sectors of society and big 
businesses -- the large corporations which were then and are now 
at the heart of Japan's industrial development. 
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Japanese science and industrial policy for the last hundred 
or so years has been primarily planned, designed and executed by 
Japan's central bureaucracy which occupies a much more important 
place in the national government than do its counterparts in the 
U.K., the U.S., France or Germany (Sakikabara, 1982). The 
ministries in Tokyo, led by career bureaucrats recruited from 
elite universities, draft most of the legislation that comes 
before the Diet, exert extensive control over the financial 
system, prepare the national budget, and use their substantial 
discretionary power to influence scientific, technological, and 
economic activities through what the Japanese call "administrative 
guidance." This flexible, quasi-legal "guidance," backed by 
implicit threats and rewards, not explicit legal authorization, is 
the backbone of Japanese science, technology, and industrial 
policy. To a considerable extent this type of government 
intervention in Japan continues to the present time (Fuji, 1983). 
The Japanese government "guidance" in matters concerning science 
and technology is one of the instruments which accounts for the 
present growth of Japanese advanced technology industries. Gov-
ernment policies in the immediate post-World War II period were 
much more autocratic compared to current Japanese policies, 
although these policies created an economic environment conducive 
to technological advancement and economic growth. Specifically, 
these policies in the late 1940's and 1950's directed and 
restricted investment, controlled technology imports, and 
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implemented a tax system which encouraged significant investments 
in the Japanese economy (ITC, 1986). 
The success of these policies in terms of economic redevelop-
ment and growth in Japan cannot be denied. However, these 
policies represent the most direct government involvement in a 
nation's economy, short of complete governmental control. A 
summary description of these policies serves as background infor-
mation for current Japanese policies (ITC, 1986). 
Directed Investment in Japan was accomplished by the applica-
tion of two "temporary" laws enacted in 1949 and 1950 and 
remaining in effect throughout the 1950's. The Japanese Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) made loan capital available to the largest banks 
in Japan (the thirteen "city" banks), which in turn were "guided" 
to make loans available to specific industry sectors and even 
The MOF and MITI maintained a standing committee specific firms. 
to identify the industries and the firms to benefit from the 
former's "guidance." 
Control of Technology Imports was an important source of 
MITI's power in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. MITI acted as a 
"doorman" to all vital imports of Western technology which 
Japanese firms sought out and purchased. Because prior approval 
by MITI for the purchase of foreign technology was required, MITI 
was able to dictate the timing, composition, and allocation of a 
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flow of technical knowledge that was essential to the competitive 
success of innovating Japanese firms. 
The Japanese tax system was designed to favour savings and 
investment. Japanese fiscal authorities accomplished this by: 
a) reducing double taxation of corporate income 
through preferential treatment of dividends; 
b) excluding from . taxable income the interest 
income of small savers; 
c) favouring capital gains over dividend income; 
and 
d) keeping the average tax burden (combined with 
a high savings rate) low as compared with 
other industrialized countries. 
During the period beginning in 1951, i.e., at the end of 
occupation and lasting until about 1954, Japan's policies were 
autocratic and singularly focused on the economic reconstruction 
of the Japanese economic base. 
During the 1955-64 period, the Japanese government focused on 
"catching up" with the U.S. and European nations. 
From the year 1964 to the present, Japanese science, technol-
ogy and industry policies have been designed and implemented to 
achieve a pre-eminent status in the world's market for advanced 
technology products as well as for such commodities as steel, 
automobiles, consumer electronics, and others (SHC, 1988). 
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The essentials of Japanese industrial policy since 1964 have 
been the deliberate protection of domestic markets from foreign 
sources and the oligopolization of major domestic industries. 
This has allowed Japanese firms to set high domestic prices for 
products in the domestic market. Japanese firms in selected or 
"targeted" sectors are guided initially to expand their production 
and sales in the domestic market. The expansion of production 
results in a large volume of production and relatively low 
production costs which in turn allows these firms to compete in 
the world markets. One of the principal policy tools the Japanese 
government in general, and MIT! in particular, have used to assist 
specific industry sectors in Japan were so-called "temporary 
measure laws" enacted for limited time periods with the specific 
objective of assisting a targeted industry (!nose, 1979; Japan 
Society for Promotion of Science, 1987). 
The two principal temporary measure laws were the Law on 
Extraordinary Measures for the Promotion of Specific Electronic 
and Machinery Industries, or "Kidenho", and the Law on Extra-
ordinary Measures for the Promotion of Specific Machinery and 
Information Industries, or "Kijoho." The Kidenho, which was in 
effect from 1971 to 1978, combined a series of promotional 
measures for the Japanese machinery and electronics industries. 
In 1978, the Kijoho was enacted, and lasted until 1985, with the 
objective of promoting Japanese software development. 
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The Kidenho provided government support for research and 
development, commercial production, and manufacturing improvement 
in the Japanese microelectronics industry. With this support 
Japanese microelectronic product firms developed advanced tech-
nologies in integrated circuits and eventually produced third 
generation computers. The Kidenho empowered MITI to provide 
government assistance through "enhancement programmes" to the 
Japanese electronics firms in close cooperation with the Elec-
tronic and Machinery Industry Council. It also allowed MITI to 
direct certain joint activities which were exempted from · the 
Antimonopoly Law (ITC, 1986; SHC, 1988). 
12.2 SCIENCE 1 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 1 AND INDUSTRY POOL IN JAPAN 
There are three principal institutions in Japan engaged in 
science and technology activities: higher educational establish-
ments; private industry sectors; and non-profit research institu-
tions and Japanese government agencies. 
12.2.1 Higher Educational Establishments 
There are three categories of higher educational establish-
ments in Japan: national universities, administrated by the 
Japanese central government; public universities, operated by 
prefectural (i.e., local) governments; and private universities. 
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National universities are responsible for over one-half of 
the scientific research and development and related activities, 
while private universities expend some 38 percent of research 
funds allocated to higher education institutions in Japan. Public 
universities operated by prefectural authorities undertake limited 
scientific and research activities (Table 12.1). 
In 1971, the so-called "national inter-university research 
institutes" were established at several of Japan's universities. 
The number of these institutes has increased and now represents an 
important resource for scientific, research, development and 
technology activities in Japan (Table 12.2). 
12.2.2 Industry 
Japanese private sector firms represent an important compo-
nent of establishments which perform science and technology 
related activities in Japan. 
Most of the science, technology, research and development 
effort undertaken by Japanese industry sectors is concentrated in 
large industrial enterprises. Most of the funding for these 
activities is obtained internally (ITC, 1983). 
Japanese private sector firms receive very limited funding 
from the Japanese central government, averaging at less than 2 
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TABLE 12.1 
Expenditures for Science and Technology 
Activities by University Type, Japan, 1981 
University 
~ 
National 
Public 
Private 
Science and 
Technology 
Expenditures 
57.1% 
5.4 
37.5 
100.0 
Source: Indicators of Science and Technology ( 1987), Science 
and Technology Agency, 1987, Japan 
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TABLE 12.2 
Joint and National Inter-University 
Research Institutes, Japan 
University of Tokyo 
Institute for Cosmic Ray Research 
Institute for Nuclear Study 
Institute for Solid State Physics 
Ocean Research Institute 
Nagoya University 
Institute of Plasma Physics 
Kyoto University 
Research Institute for Fundamental Physics 
Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences 
Research Reactor Institute 
Primate Research Institute 
Osaka University 
Institute for Protein Research 
Welding Research Institute 
National Laboratory for High Energy Physics 
National Institute of Polar Research 
Institute of Space and Astronautical Sciences 
Okazaki National Research Institutes 
Institute for Molecular Biology 
Institute for Basic Biology 
Institute for Physiological Sciences 
Source: An Outline of the University-based Research System in 
Japan. Monbusho, Japan 1987 
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percent per annum of the total industry expenditures for science 
and technology during the last several decades (SHC, 1988). 
12.2.3 Nonprofit Research Institutes in Japan 
Four types of non-profit research institutes undertake 
science and technology related activities in Japan: national 
government-owned, local government-owned, private, and public 
corporations. The u.s. National Science Foundation reports that 
the distribution of activities are as follows: 13.1 percent for 
basic research, 33.4 percent for applied research and 43.5 percent 
for development activities. 
Japanese central government operated research institutes are 
established by many Japanese government ministries. MITI and its 
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology operates 16 such 
institutes. The Science and Technology Agency of the Japanese 
Prime Minister's Office operates a total of seven research 
institutes in Japan. Personnel in all of these institutes are 
Japanese civil servants (Johnson, 1982). 
Essentially all large Japanese corporations have established 
separate non-profit research entities to perform science, techno!-
ogy research and development activities. The three principal 
institutes are the Mitsubishi-Kasei Institute of Life Sciences, 
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Matsushita Tokyo Research Institute, and Japan Light Metals 
Research Institute. 
Close cooperation exists between these institutes and the 
Japanese private sector. Furthermore all Japanese central 
government departments and agencies utilize a large number of 
advisory councils from industry executives to guide Japanese 
government-conducted academics in science and technologies 
·activities. A listing of research institutes operated by the 
Japanese government is presented in Table 12.3. 
12.3 JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY FORMULATION 
Four principal Japanese central government agencies 
formulate and execute Japanese government plans and policies for 
economic, science, technology and industry activities. 
Overall economic policy in Japan is formulated by the 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA); science, technology and industrial 
policy by MITI; and monetary and fiscal policy, by the MOF and 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ). 
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TABLE 12.3 
Principal Government Research Organization 
and Institutes, Japan 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY 
National Aerospace Laboratory 
National Research Institute for Metals 
National Institute of Radiological Sciences 
National Research Centre for Disaster Prevention 
National Institute for Research in Inorganic Materials 
National Institutes of Resources 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute 
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation 
Japan Information Centre for Science and Technology 
Institute of Physical and Chemical Research 
Research Development Corporation of J~pan 
Japan Nuclear Ship Research and Development Agency 
National Space Development Agency of Japan 
Japan Marine Science and Technology Centre 
DEFENCE AGENCY 
Technical Research and Development Institute 
HOKKAIDO DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 
Civil Engineering Research Institute 
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY 
National Institute for Environmental Studies 
National Institute for Minamata Diseases 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
Research Institute of the Government Printing Bureau 
National Research Institute of Brewing 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE 
National Science Museum 
National Institute of Genetics 
Institute of Statistical Mathematics 
International Latitude Observatory 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE 
Institute of Public Health 
National Institute of Mental Health 
National Institute of Nutrition 
National Institute of Health 
National Institute for Leprosy Research 
National Institute of Hygienics Sciences 
National Institute of Hospital Administration 
Institute of Population Problems 
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TABLE 12.3 (Continued) 
National Cardiovascular Disease Centre 
National Cancer Centre 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHERIES 
National Institute of Agriculture Science 
Agricultural Research Centre 
National Institute of Animal Industry 
National Grassland Research Institute 
Fruit Tree Research Station 
Vegetable and Ornamental Crops Research Station 
National Research Institute of Tea 
Agriculture Experiment Station 
National Research Institute of Agricultural Engineering 
National Research Institute of Agricu~tural Economics 
Sericultural Experiment Station 
National Institute of Animal Health 
National Food Research Institute 
National Institute for Plant Virus Research 
Tropical Agriculture Research Centre 
Forestry and Forest Products Research Centre 
Regional Fisheries Research Laboratory 
National Research Institute of Aquaculture 
National Research Institute of Fisheries Engineering 
MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
National Research Laboratory of Metrology 
Mechanical Engineering Laboratory 
National Chemical Laboratory for Industry 
Electrotechnical Laboratory 
Industrial Products Research Institute 
National Research Institute for Pollution and Resources 
Fermentation Research Institute 
Research Institute for Polymers and Textiles 
Geological Survey of Japan 
Government Industrial Development Laboratory -- Hokkaido 
Government Industrial Research Institute -- Osaka; Nagoya; 
Kyushu; Tohoku; Shikoku; Chugoku 
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT 
Ship Research Institute 
Port and Harbour Research Institute 
Electronic Navigation Research Institute 
Traffic Safety and Nuisance Research Institute 
Meteorological Research Institute 
MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Radio Research Laboratory 
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TABLE 12.3 (Continued) 
MINISTRY OF LABOUR 
Research Institute Laboratory 
National Institute of Industrial Health 
MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION 
Geographical Survey Institute 
Public Works Research Institute 
Building Research Institute 
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS 
Fire Research Institute 
Source: Japan, Science and Technology Agency, 1987. 
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12.3.1 The Economic Planning Agency (EPA) 
The EPA is located within the Japanese Prime Minister's 
office. The EPA formulates general plans for Japan's economy 
including trade, production, prices, consumption, and government 
income and expenditure policies. The EPA essentially provides a 
policy framework for the entire set of Japanese macroeconomic 
activities. The economic framework established by the EPA is 
general, but is considered of singular importance by private 
sector firms in Japan. 
12.3.2 The MinistkY of International Trade and Indust~ (MIT!) 
MITI plans and enacts all of the specific science, technology 
and industrial policies in Japan. MITI also enacts and supervises 
specific Japanese trade policies, environmental laws, energy and 
natural resource policies, small business, and regional develop-
ment policies. From the mid-1950's to the early 1980's, MIT! 
officials had effectively "regenerated" private sector research 
and development activities, managed innovations in industrial 
sectors and supervised the introduction of advanced technologies. 
MITI 's "regulation" of these critical trends was accomplished 
through the unique Japanese approach to industry policies, best 
described as "administrative guidance" (ITC, 1983). 
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The Industrial Structure Division of MITI's Industrial Policy 
Bureau is the principal agency within MITI which provides 
administrative guidance and in effect plans, formulates .and 
executes science, technology and industrial policies in Japan. · 
This process is closely coordinated with the Japanese private 
sector represented by the Industrial Structure Council, an 
advisory body comprised of industry executives and academics to 
the Industrial Structure Division.{2) 
.. 
Periodic publication of general plans for future development 
of specific economic sectors in Japan by MITI, the so-called 
"visions," provide overall guidance and inform the Japanese public 
of the government's economic, industrial and social policies. 
Since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has 
issued three such visions, all formulated by MITI. As noted, 
Japanese visions, or Bijou, are coherent but unspecific programmes 
for future trends they will attempt to accomplish by other, more 
specific policies. MIT.I 's visions may differ markedly from the 
EPA's economic plans, in that visions are not specific with regard 
to production goals of targeted industries, availability of 
advanced technologies, investment recommendations and other 
related instructions. The visions provide, however, a common 
development plan for all sectors of the Japanese economy and all 
participants in economic activities {Anderson, 1984). 
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The Industrial Structure Council also issues very specific 
reports and recommendations for industry sectors in Japan. These 
reports contain detailed analyses of prospects and problems for 
growth in special industries including recommendations for 
scientific activities and the adaptation of advanced technologies 
for specific industries. These reports also include information 
on cost structures of important industries in Japan, and different 
technologies and scales of production, with similar information· 
for foreign countries and foreign firms which may be competitors 
for Japanese firms. These reports represent the cardinal 
document, issued on a periodic basis for industrial policy in 
Japan (SHC, 1988). 
MITI's principal activity, with regard to science and 
technology policies, prior to the mid-1980's was to select so-
called "target industries" in Japan, i.e., destined for favourable 
treatment by the Japanese government. The following were the 
criteria used by MITI to select the "target industries": 
a) Value added -- MITI' s policy favoured indus-
tries that produced a high percentage of the 
final value of output such as computers, 
telecommunications equipment, aerospace, and 
similar electronics. 
b) Feeder effects MITI encouraged those 
industries that produced materials or 
components (ceramics, microelectronics)--
that were used by major Japanese industries. 
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c) Economies of scale MITI encouraged the 
expansion of g7owth sectors in Japan to 
achieve econom~cs of scale in industry, 
Government policy was to encourage investment 
in that industry; 
d) Importance to the economy -- MIT! favoured 
industries whose output was essential to the 
Japanese economy. 
During the 1950's and 1960's, iron and steel, aircraft, auto-
mobiles, electric power, petrochemicals, nonferrous metals, 
machinery, and shipbuilding were among the industries selected by 
MIT! as "target industries". In the 1970's and early 1980's, MIT! 
selected advanced technology industries for targeting, such as 
computers, advanced machine tools, and microelectronics (Anderson, 
1984). 
The criteria for a Japanese industry sector to be designated 
as "targeted" by MITI changed over time. Targeted assistance by 
MITI in the 1950's and 1960's was focused on the development of 
production processes of a given basic industry with "feeder" and 
"linkage" or inter-industry effects. For example, advances in the 
Japanese chemical industry provided inputs for microelectronic 
sectors which in turn provided the basis for consumer electronic 
growth. Starting in the 1970s, MITI directed targeted assistance 
toward industry sectors with potential for scientific and technol-
ogical advancement for which there was export potential and from 
the late 1970s to the mid-1980's, to industrial sectors that 
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could make a contribution across the industrial base of Japan and 
were in demand in world markets (SHC, 1988). 
Since the mid-1980's, MITI's selection of "target industries" 
has become much more muted because the overall growth of Japanese 
private sector firms made these firms less willing to accept 
special government assistance when the price for such assistance 
was an obligation to follow "rules" set forth by the Government 
(Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1988). 
As noted, MITI was the principal Japanese government agency 
which selected industry sectors for targeting. However, other 
Japanese government agencies, notably the Science and Technology 
Agency have, at times played some role in the selection process. 
During the period from 1971 to the mid-1980's, a total of twelve 
industry sectors were selected in Japan as "target industries", 
MITI selected eleven of these, while the Science and Technology 
Agency selected the aerospace industry as a "target industry" in 
1985 (SHC, 1988). 
MITI 's influence in the "target industry" selection process 
was derived from its other important role, that of providing 
financing to private sector firms. Between 1971 and the mid-
1980's, the Industrial Finance Division of the Industrial Policy 
Bureau of MITI selected industry sectors for low-interest loans 
through the MOF' s Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme ( FILP) • 
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MITI 's low interest loans, however, were provided to private 
sector firms on the condition that the firms would follow MITI's 
. investment guidance(3) (Inose, 1979; Johnson, 1982). 
MITI "guided" firms to invest such that each firm in a market 
expanded its production capacity in proportion to its current 
market share -- no firm was to make an investment so large that it 
would destabilize the market. The policy was effective in 
encouraging competition for market share while reducing the risk 
of excessive investment. These MITI policies, in fact, promoted 
the aggressive expansion of capacity necessary to increase the 
productive efficiency and output of Japanese firms with 
increasing domestic sales and exports. In the light of these 
activities, a brief discourse on economic theory may be useful to 
understand fully MITI's role in Japanese economic growth 
(Anderson, 1984). 
Economic theory maintains that market share competition such 
as administrated by MITI, cannot be sustained over long periods 
because of price competition among firms. MITI' s solution to 
possible price competition among Japanese firms was to establish 
cartels along lines of economic sectors or among firms engaged in 
the manufacture of similar products accompanied by price controls. 
As a result "administered prices" were established by MITI in 
steel, chemical, microelectronic, optics, consumer electronic and 
other sectors of the Japanese economy. MITI' s control of the 
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allocation of market shares combined with price controls success-
fully and completely overcome the logical result of "market share" 
competition postulated in economic theory, that of ruthless price 
competition among firms and consequently a lack of stability in 
sectors of the economy (SIA, 1983; Shimo, 1986). 
MITI 's selection of "target industries" in Japan and its 
creation of a comparative advantage for these industries in world 
markets changed gradually during the last two decades from an 
emphasis on the industrial processes which could be enhanced by 
the use of advanced technologies and scale of production, to 
industry sectors producing advanced technology products. The 
recognition by MITI of the importance of advanced technology 
products rather than advanced technology processes for Japanese 
economic growth via increased exports developed gradually, and was 
"officially" recognized in the Japanese government's visions for 
the 1980's (Shimo, 1986). 
Although specific industries had not been designated in 
visions for the 1980's as targets, a number of industries were 
specified as meeting the criteria for potentially large exports 
and income generated from such exports. Microelectronics, 
computers, aircraft and robotics were pointed out as the obvious 
industries representative of advanced technology products. MITI 
has announced, since 1980, a total of ten industry sectors in 
Japan and provided these with funding assistance with the common 
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aim of leading the world markets in advanced technology products 
(Shimo, 1986). 
The emphasis on the need to develop advanced technology 
products officially recognized in the visions for 1980, was 
initially identified in 1977 in a report by the Japanese Council 
for Science and Technology which pointed out the importance of 
advanced technology products for the Japanese economy (SHC, 1988). 
The Japanese Seven Year Socio-Economic Plan, published two 
years later in 1979, expressed the hope that innovation in 
advanced technology sectors would result in advanced technology 
products and would provide the key to economic growth in the 
1980s. According to this Plan advanced technology processes and 
products would: 
a. Ensure stable growth in the Japanese economy; 
b. Relieve energy restrictions in Japan; 
c. Make Japanese industry more knowledge-intensive, more 
productive and more profitable; 
d. Enlarge Japan's role in international relations; and 
e. Permit more effective use of land in Japan. 
The emphasis on science and technology issues has been repeated 
in several policy statements by MITI since 1980.(4) In 1983, the 
economic policy plan prepared by MITI and other Japanese govern-
ment agencies entitled "Outlook and Government Outline for the 
80s" was adopted by the Nakasone cabinet and clearly emphasized 
629 
the Japanese government's programme to advance science and 
technology in Japan (ITC, 1983; Shimo, 1986). 
The latest economic plan for Japan, that of Prime Minister 
Noboro Takeshita, was released on April 1, 1988, and identifies 
the goals of Japanese economy through to March 31, 1993, with the 
emphasis on the advancement of science and technology. This plan, 
the eleventh in the postwar period, with a theme of "Japan Living 
Together with the World," was prepared by MITI in close collabo-
ration with the Economic Council -- a group of 27 academics, 
industry leaders and labour representatives. The group was headed 
by Gaishi Hiraiwa, the chairman of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., 
one of the best known advocates for advanced technology adoption 
in Japanese industries (SHC, 1988). 
In summary, in the last three decades MITI' s role in the 
selection of industrial sectors in Japan for growth and the 
provision of government support of various kinds has been of 
cardinal importance in the planning and execution of the Japanese 
government's science and technology policies. 
The very rapid growth of the Japanese economy in the 1980's 
has limited the influence of MITI's activities, because Japanese 
private sector firms need not depend on the Japanese government 
for financial assistance or policies which would enhance the 
export sales of Japanese firms. While MITI' s ability to direct 
the Japanese economy via 
reduced, MITI 's willingness 
been diminished (SHC, 1988). 
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"administrative guidance" has been 
to provide such direction has not 
12.3.3 The Minist&Y of Finance CMOF) 
The Japanese MOF influences science, technology and indus-
trial policies in Japan through its control of financial insti-
tutions, including the Japanese government's own financial 
, agencies. The MOF is the principal agency which determines the 
allocation of Japan's budgets, and therefore exerts considerable 
influence over the Japanese government's assistance to private 
industry sectors. The MOF also participates in the determination 
on which industrial activities and industrial sectors in Japan 
will be encouraged by special Japanese tax measures. It is 
however, in the Japanese budget allocations that the MOF has its 
strongest influence on Japanese science and technology policies. 
The Japanese government budget consists of two parts: the 
General Account budget consisting of funds obtained through taxes, 
and payments to the Japanese Treasury, and the Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Program (FILP), a capital budget, consisting of funds 
obtained through the Japanese postal savings system and from 
pension funds. Together, the two budgets represent an increasing 
proportion of the total Japanese GNP ranging from 20 to 30 
percent in the last decade. 
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The FILP component provides a number of Japanese institutions 
with lending and investment authority including the Japan Develop-
ment Bank (JDB) and the Small Business Finance Corporation 
(SBFC). Approximately 14 percent of corporate financing in Japan 
originated in Japanese government financial institutions in the 
1980's. Approximately 26 percent of the annual FILP budget is 
directed by the MOF to industrial policymaking banks in Japan such 
as the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM). 
12.4 JAPANESE GOVERNMENT POLICY TOOLS TO ADVANCE SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY 
The Japanese government, with MITI as the principal agency for 
policy execution, has used a large number of policies to advance 
science, technology and industry sectors. The many policy tools 
may be conveniently categorized into two groups: 
a) Those policies used against foreign competition, 
which allow Japanese industrial sectors and firms 
to operate in Japan without the need to face 
competition from abroad in Japanese domestic 
markets; and 
b) Those policies which provide Japanese government 
support to the industry sectors and firms in 
Japan, in order to allow them to compete in 
domestic markets, i.e. , in Japan, but equally 
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important, to facilitate their ability to compete 
in the international market place. 
Table 12.4 illustrates the policy tools used by the Japanese 
government. 
The objective of Japanese government policies in both 
categories is the same, namely to provide Japanese industry with 
opportunities to operate and grow in both domestic and interna-
tional markets without interference or competition from foreign 
firms (Anderson, 1984; SHC, 1988). In economic terms both types 
of policies aim at establishing for Japanese industry comparative 
advantage over firms and sectors of the economy of other nations. 
In this respect, these policies in fact violate the fundamental 
principles for economic growth and development prescribed by 
classical economic theory. The fact that Japanese government 
policies have not adhered to the prescribed principles of economic 
theory in order to achieve economic growth cannot be questioned, 
it is well documented and known. It is also a fact that these two 
types of Japanese policies have resulted in unprecedented economic 
growth in Japan. There are, however, some differences between 
these two groups of policies, both directed to achieve comparative 
advantage for Japanese industry sectors (Curren, 1982; SHC, 1988). 
The anti-foreign competition policies are used by the Japanese 
government, as a rule, only during periods when an industry sector· 
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TABLE 12.4 
Tools-Policies Used by the Japanese Government 
to Advance Japanese Industry Sectors 
in Domestic and International Markets 
Tools-Policies 
Used Against 
Foreign Competition 
Tools-Policies Used to 
Support Japanese Industry 
in Domestic and Inter-
national Markets 
a. home-market protection a. direct government grants 
b. barriers to trade b. 
c. closed government procurement c. 
d. administrative guidance d. 
e. restrictions to foreign e. 
investment 
government sponsored 
scientific and R&D 
activities 
loans to private sector 
R&D 
cooperative scientific and 
R&D activities 
control over technological 
licenses 
f. tax policies 
g. export incentives 
h. antitrust exemptions 
Source: SHC, 1988. 
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is in its early stages of technological development. During this 
period the Japanese technology may be inferior to that available 
to foreign firms and the output of Japanese sectors or firms may 
be relatively small and therefore production costs relatively 
high. Many of the Japanese policies of this type (used against 
foreign competition) are discontinued when Japanese technology is 
equal to that used by foreign firms and when output has reached 
the volume sufficient to enable the Japanese to construct and 
operate large scale production facilities with scales of produc-
tion adequate to significantly lower operating costs (ITC, 1983; 
Shimo, 1986) • 
The anti-foreign competition policies are visible and may 
violate international agreements in trade, investment, patents, 
etc. Such policies, may be subject to punitive reactions by other 
nations and therefore are used by the Japanese government with 
considerable caution. 
Japanese government policies to support Japanese industry in 
domestic and international markets are less controversial and may 
be similar to the policies of other nations. These policies are 
less likely to result in punitive reactions by foreign nations. 
The anti-foreign competition policies as used by the Japanese 
government are unique in that few other nations have attempted the 
use of such anti-foreign policies to the same extent as the 
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Japanese. Conversely, most nations have used at least some of the 
policies employed by the Japanese to support their domestic and 
international markets. 
12.4.1 Anti-Foreign Competition Policies by the Japanese 
Government 
The Japanese government has used some five different types of 
policies to protect the economy or firms from foreign compet-
ition: 
a. home-market protection; 
b. formal barriers to trade; 
c. closed government procurement; 
d. administrative guidance; and 
e. restrictions to foreign direct investment. 
12.4.1.1 Home-market Protection 
Home-market protection was an important policy used by the 
Japanese until the mid-1960's. Such policies took the form of 
complete import controls through foreign-exchange allocation. 
Essentially those policies required all purchases by industry and 
consumers to be made for goods and services provided by Japanese 
firms unless a product was not available from Japanese sources. 
The specific mechanism used to enforce these policies consisted of 
quotas on many products until the early 1970's; high tariffs on 
some items until 1973; limits on direct foreign investment in 
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Japan until 1973; and closed government procurement until the mid-
1980's. 
Most Japanese advanced technology industries were protected by 
severe tariffs, quotas, and investment restrictions until 1976. 
Throughout this period, Japan also used a variety of nontariff 
barriers to trade e.g., rigorous inspection of foreign goods at. 
port; procedures necessary to obtain certification that foreign 
goods meet Japanese standards, shipment declarations, safeguard 
health standards, etc. (Johnson, 1982; ITC, 1983). 
12.4.1.2 Formal Barriers to Trade 
One of the most effective mechanisms used by Japan to protect 
the domestic markets in the 1950's was the law which allowed MITI 
to allocate foreign exchange for import purchases. The Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was enacted in 1950 and 
provided MITI with a very effective means of controlling imports 
of goods and technology. It also allowed MITI to direct foreign 
exchange to Japanese industry sectors and activities considered 
vital to the Japanese economy. Foreign exchange allocation was 
also used to support the value of the yen in international 
currency markets (Shimo, 1986). 
In the early 1950's, Japan also used so-called "Link trading" 
to control imports. Under the link trading system Japanese 
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exporters of designated products were authorized to import various 
types of goods. During this period foreign exchange and import 
restrictions were very restrictive and certain imported goods were 
in very short supply in Japan. Imported foreign products under 
the Link System were therefore effectively controlled. It also 
must be added that the link system provided a significant 
incentive to increase Japanese exports (Johnson, 1982; SHC, 1988). 
During the 1950's and 1960's, only industrial equipment and 
machinery which were not produced in Japan, were allowed to be 
imported. Equipment and machinery which were available from 
Japanese sources regardless of its quality or technology, could 
not be purchased from foreign sources. 
Japanese government policies to control imports were gradually 
allowed to expire beginning with a plan to liberalize some of 
Japan's imports in the mid-1960's. The Japanese government, 
however, maintained control over specific imports to protect 
targeted industries or industries considered crucial to Japan's 
economic development by requiring cumbersome license review 
processes for such imports until the mid-1970's. Only in the late 
1970's did the Japanese government withdraw most of the barriers 
to imports. As can be seen in Table 12.5, Japan's tariff rates in 
1987 were comparable with those of the U.S. and EC nations. 
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12.4.1.3 Nontariff Barriers 
The use of various nontariff barriers to imports was practised 
extensively by the Japanese government during the 1950's, 1960's 
and 1970's. These consisted of: demands for excessive documenta-
tion, rigid adherence to customs regulations, frequent and lengthy 
inspection of imported products upon arrival in Japan, enforcement 
of design rather than performance standards, changes in standard 
regulations and many others. Some of these barriers, particularly 
for advanced technology products, such as microelectronic devices 
which compete with Japanese products, remain in place at the 
present time (ITC, 1983; English and Brown, 1984). 
12.4.1.4 Closed Government Procurement 
Purchases of goods and services from Japanese firms by Japanese 
government departments and agencies was another effective policy 
against imports. There are 115 public corporations in Japan, with 
a combined budget totalling one-half of the Japanese government's 
annual General Account budget. During the 1950's, 1960, and even 
1970's, these corporations followed explicit "buy Japan" policies, 
which excluded bids from foreign firms. In the 1980's more 
informal barriers have served to limit foreign participation in 
Japanese government contracts, such as long-time ties between 
Ministries and their domestic suppliers (SHC, 1988). 
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TABLE 12.5 
Tariffs in Japan, the United States, and the 
European Community, by Specified Items, 1987 
(Percent) 
United European 
Item Japan States Community 
Autos 2.8% 10.6% to 21.3% 
Parts of autos 1.3% to 16.3% 5.3% to 12.3% 
Trucks 4.0% to .. 25.0% 7.0% to 22.0% 
Computer mainframes 4.9% 4.7% 5.94% 
Computer peripherals 6.0% 4.7% 11.62% 
Parts for computers 4.9% 4.9% 5.3% to 8.9% 
Semiconductors 4.2% 4.2% 17.0% 
Optic cables 8.1% 9.3% 16.3% 
Machine tools 5.0% to 6.0% 2.0% to 9.0% 
Source: MITI, 1988. 
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12.4.1.5 Administrative Guidance 
During the 1960's and 1970's, specific administration guidance 
by the Japanese government's departments and agencies was 
frequently used to require the purchase of domestically produced 
goods and services. 
The specific administrative guidance used essentially consisted 
of instructions issued by Japanese government departments and 
agencies to private sector firms falling within their jurisdic-
tion. These instructions included explicit directives, requests 
and warnings, to purchase goods and services from specific 
(Japanese) firms (SHC, 1988). 
12.4.1.6 Restrictions to Foreign Direct Investment 
Restrictions on direct foreign investment were used from the 
1950's to the late 1970's to protect Japanese domestic producers 
from foreign competition in Japan (Johnson, 1982). 
The entry of foreign firms into Japan during the 1950's and 
early 1960's was essentially prohibited under the Foreign 
Investment Law of 1950 which allowed the Japanese government to 
regulate the impacts of foreign capital and technology on Japanese 
industry sectors. In 1967, the Japanese government allowed for up 
to one-half foreign ownership in a number of Japanese industry 
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sectors. Further allowances for direct foreign investment in 
Japan were implemented in 1970 and 1983 although these were 
closely monitored by MITI (SHC, 1988). 
12.4.2 Japanese Domestic IndustkY Support Policies 
The Japanese government has exercised a set of comprehensive 
policies to support industry sectors in domestic and international 
markets. Principal among these are: 
a. direct government grants; 
b. government-sponsored research and development 
activities; 
c. loans to private sector research and development; 
d. cooperative scientific 
development activities; 
and research and 
e. control over technological licenses; 
f. tax policies; 
g. export incentives; and 
h. antitrust exemptions. 
A large number of these policies have been enacted to foster 
the advancement of science and technology in Japan as well as to 
ensure that research and development activities are undertaken by 
Japanese firms with appropriate levels of funding. 
The three specific policies used by the Japanese Government to 
foster the advancement of science and technology consisted of tax 
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incentives for research and development, research and development 
grants and preferential financing for research and development 
projects. 
12.4.2.1 Direct Grants for Research and Development 
Japanese government departments and agencies with MITI as the 
principal government agency, have provided direct grants for re-
search and development activities to Japanese research institu-
tions, academia and private firms. MITI's annual funding for this 
purpose in the last three decades averaged about 10 to 15 percent 
of the total Japanese government's expenditure for research and 
development. In 1987, MITI funded about 12 percent of the 
Japanese government's total research budget, or about $700 
million. 
12.4.2.2 Government Sponsored R&D Projects 
Japanese government funding of special research has been an 
important government policy tool in the science and technology 
area. Two principal objectives have guided such projects: a) to 
diffuse technology and b) to overcome technological bottlenecks. 
There are two categories of government-funded R&D in Japan: 
those that are funded entirely by the government and those which 
are funded by conditional loans to private sector firms. 
643 
In the case of research and development activities that are 
completely government funded, the government owns the results of 
the ·research and development effort. The results of these 
research and development activities are available to all inter-
ested parties for a fee. These types of research and development 
activities are conducted, either by National Research Labora-
tories, operating under the Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology (AIST) within MITI, or Japanese government contracts 
with private research institutes or firms to conduct research in a 
specified area of science, technology or product law. The 
government funds such research and development projects by either 
providing unconditional grants, referred to as consignment, or 
"itakuhi" payments; or provides funds through so-called success-
conditional loans or "hojokin" loans. The hojokin loans need to 
be repaid only if commercial production results from the research 
effort. 
Itakuhi, payments and hojokin loans are the two principal 
alternatives for the government's funding of research and develop-
ment performed by the Japanese private sector. 
12.4.2.3 Cooperative Research Associations 
Cooperative research associations of firms aimed at undertaking 
research and development funded by the Japanese government under 
the itakuhi or hojokin loan schemes are widely used in Japan. 
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A significant number of cooperative research associations such 
as the Electric Car Research Association have been established for 
specific research projects while others are established to 
undertake research in a specific industry sector. As of 1987 
there were about 30 cooperative research associations operating in 
Japan. 
12.4.2.4 Control Over Technology Licensing 
The Japanese government used extensively the Foreign Investment 
Law of 1950 as a control over technology licensing from foreign 
firms, during the 1950's and 1960's. Under this Law, firms were 
required to submit proposed international transactions to MIT! for 
approval which were granted or refused in concert with MIT! ' s 
plans and programmes. Since 1973 government controls in this area 
have been marginal. 
12.4.2.5 Special Tax Measures for R&D 
Special tax measures in . Japan have been enacted from time to 
time during the last three decades to encourage research and 
development and the diffusion of technology in Japan. The current 
tax measure in force, enacted in 1986, provides tax credit of 25 
percent of any year-to-year increase in research and development 
expenditures over the previous year. In 1987, Japanese corpora-
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tions realized tax savings of about $122 million using this tax 
credit. 
12.4.2.6 Export Incentives 
During the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's the government used 
various export incentives. These included various tax rebates for 
exports, export cartels, the already discussed "Link system" and 
regulations which permitted Japanese exporters to retain a 
percentage of the foreign exchange generated from their exports. 
There are no significant export incentives in force as of 1989. 
12.4.2.7 Antitrust Exemptions 
As presented elsewhere in this volume, Japanese government 
departments and agencies in the 1950's and 1960's exercised 
administrative guidance which essentially established quotas for 
production as well as price levels. Such "guidance cartels" 
functioned through MITI notifying either individual producers or 
an industry association of the desired production levels for 
domestic consumption and exports as well as prices to be charged. 
Guidance cartels provided a flexible mechanism to limit excess 
production of certain products in Japan and therefore to maintain 
price stability in export markets. They also effectively removed 
any and all antitrust laws existing in Japan. 
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12 5 J~u~uvsv GO~~uUMENT POLICIES FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SECTORS 
Japanese government policies to foster the three advanced tech-
nology sectors follow the pattern used for the general advancement 
of science, technology and industry in Japan. 
There are, however, some differences in the government's 
policies to direct the advanced technology sectors brought about 
by the presence of international markets in which Japan competes 
as compared to other industry sectors in Japan. 
12.5.1 Microelectronics Sector 
The Japanese government has targeted the microelectronic 
industry for growth and development since the early 1960's. 
Government attempts to establish comparative advantage for its 
microelectronics sector was based on the expectations of increased 
world-wide demand for these products and on the assumption that 
products in this sector would provide components for the Japanese 
consumer electronic, robot, and machine tools industries, the 
automotive sector, the instrument market, and other sectors in 
Japan. The Japanese authorities have been proved correct in this 
assumption (Kikuchi, 1983; Kodama, 1986). 
Until 1974, high tariffs, restrictive quotas, and investment 
restrictions protected the Japanese microelectronic product sector 
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from imports, and allowed competition-free development of the 
microelectronics industry in Japan. Since 1974, the main thrust 
of Japanese targeting efforts in the microelectronics industry has 
been Japanese government-funded cooperative research and develop-
ment projects (MITI, 1980; SIA, 1983). 
The success of the Fourth Generation Computer Development 
Project proposed by MITI in 1974 is illustrative of early Japanese 
cooperative research policies. This project focused on the 
development of large-scale integrated circuit development in Japan 
comparable to those used by IBM in the U.S., the dominant computer 
manufacturer in the world. In 1976, the Very Large Scale Integra-
tion (VLSI) project was organized in Japan by MITI as a component 
of the Fourth Generation Computer Development Project. MITI 
obtained cooperation in the VLSI project essentially from all 
Japanese microelectronics firms. Six Japanese companies--
Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi Electric, NBC, and Toshiba -- were 
organized by MITI as the principal research team. At the same 
time, a parallel project was undertaken by a backup team of three 
major Japanese firms: Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Oki. Both teams were 
successful, and one of the products that resulted from the 
Japanese VLSI project was the 64K RAM chip, the leading micro-
electronic memory device in the world in terms of sales from 1979 
to 1986. The research budget for the VLSI project including 
company contributions for both teams, was $325 million, with MITI 
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providing $136 million in the form of success-conditional loans 
( SIA, 1983) • 
Japan's Fifth General Computer Project (SG) was initiated in 
1981, at the conclusion of the very successful VLSI project. 
The SG project is a ten-year effort funded jointly by Japanese 
government and industry with a total budget of about $530 million. 
The principal goal of the SG project was the development of a new 
generation computer with artificial intelligence (Wheeler, et al., 
1982). 
There were two important characteristics of this project: 
a) International involvement was a stated policy of 
the project, thus marking a change in policy 
direction by MITI. 
b) The project was oriented toward basic rather than 
applied research. 
The project was conducted by an association of eight computer 
and microelectronics companies and two national laboratories 
(Table 12.6). A central facility for conducting the research and 
development was established in 1982 as the Institute for New 
Generation Computer Technology (ICOT). 
Related microelectronic research was organized by MITI under 
the Optoelectronics Integrated Circuits (OEIC) Project in 1983 and 
under the New Function Elements Project in 1984, which were 
Fujitsu Ltd. 
Hitachi Ltd. 
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TABLE 12.6 
Participants in the Fifth 
Generation Computer Project 
Industcy 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Company 
NEC Corporation 
Oki Electric Industry Company 
Sharp Company 
Toshiba Corporation 
Government 
Electrotechnical Laboratory of the Agency of Industrial 
Science and Technology {MITI) 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation 
Source: SHC, 1988. 
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partially funded by government and industry and were directed by 
MITI (Table 12.7). 
The OEIC effort involves nine Japanese companies and a central 
research laboratory operated by the Fujitsu Corporation. The 
budget for the OEIC project is approximately $98 million 
(Weinstein, et al., 1984). 
The New Function Elements Project is a ten-year programme, 
funded at about $114 million, with 11 participating companies 
collaborating through the Research and Development Association for 
Future Electron Devices (FED). There are three areas of concen-
tration: superlattice devices, three-dimensional IC's, and 
fortified IC's. 
The most recent example of government funded research projects 
is the New Function Semiconductor Research Project (NFSRP) 
established in 1985 in which ten Japanese microelectronics firms 
participate Fujitsu, Hitachi, Matsushita, NEC, Oki, Sanyo, 
Sharp, Sumitomo, and Toshiba with the Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph Corporation (NTT) acting as coordinator ( SBC, 1988). 
These ten firms, under the leadership of MIT!, have established a 
comparative association explicitly for the purpose of undertaking 
the required research for the NFSRP. 
Members 
Project 
Goals 
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TABLE 12.7 
New Functions Elements Project - 1980-1990 
MITI Funds 
Research and Development 
Association for 
Future Electron Devices 
Fujitsu 
Hitachi 
Sony 
Super lattice 
Devices 
Develop lamina-
tion techniques 
for building 
multiple-
layered struc-
tures in which 
each layer is 
one atom thick; 
develop tech-
niques for 
reducing 
cathode-to-anode 
distance within 
individual semi-
conductors to 
within 5000 
Angstroms 
Matsushita 
Mitsubishi 
NEC 
San yo 
Sharp 
Toshiba 
3 Dimensional IC's 
Develop methods 
for incorporating 
IC elements into 
chips in layers 
to increase 
density of 
elements by.40-
50 times 
Hitachi 
Mitsubishi 
Toshiba 
Fortified IC's 
Develop element, 
mounting inte-
gration and 
evaluation 
technologies 
with the ulti-
mate aim of 
producing highly 
integrated IC's, 
IC's capable of 
withstanding 
extremes of heat 
and radiation 
Source: u.s. Embassy, Tokyo, May 1982, presented in English; and 
Brown, "Japanese National Actions in IT," European 
Communities, July 1984; and the Research and Development 
Association for Future Electron Devices," presented in 
JST News, Volume 3, Number 4, August 1984. 
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The NFSRP cooperative project differs from all others in that 
the NTT plays the crucial role of research coordination for the 
project. The NTT has often conducted research with its "family" 
of firms or shares the results of its own research with· the 
"family," (NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi and Oki). It is very unusual for 
the NTT to collaborate with other Japanese firms or to share 
research results. The NFSRP project is an exception, and 
indicates the importance the government places on cooperative 
research projects in the microelectronic sector. The NTT' s own 
experience and capabilities in the microelectronics sector 
significantly enhances NFSRP projects (SHC, 1988). 
The NTT has four extensive research laboratories with employ-
ment of over 3000. These NTT facilities in 1988 were conducting 
research in wide areas of the microelectronic industry, electronic 
switching systems, memories, semiconductor integrated circuits and 
components, data processing, systems, and optoelectronics. Con-
currently other internal NTT research projects were underway in 
1988 to develop a very high-speed computer for scientific purposes 
and to develop optical measurement and control devices. These 
areas of research essentially represent all of the advances in 
microelectronic technology as of 1989. 
The combined multiyear funding from the Japanese government and 
industry for all four microelectronic cooperative research and 
development projects is about $1.3 billion. 
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A recent OTA Report underscores three distinct features of the 
Japanese approach to cooperative research and development: 
Compared with other countries, Japan's approach to aid for 
electronics is unique in at least three ways: (1) govern-
ment-supported programs are multiple but carefully 
coordinated with one another; (2) they are oriented toward 
facilitating the activities of industry, rather than telling 
industry what to do; and (3) the time horizons are unusually 
long. The last point is critical: the 8- or 10-year plan-
ning horizons for many current Japanese R&D projects--
with every indication that, while projects will be adapted 
to evolving circumstances, continuity will be preserved--
point to the depth of the government's commitment (Emphasis 
in original.) (OTA, 1983). 
12.5.1.1 MITI'S Modus Operandi in the Microelectronics Sector: 
Cooperative Research Projects 
MITI, as presented in previous sections, has the principal 
responsibility for implementing science and industry policies in 
Japan. Japan's industry structure consists of a number of 
permanent industry associations for major Japanese industry 
sectors and a large number of cooperative research associations 
are formed for specific research objectives (OTA, 1983). 
MITI has the responsibility of directing both types of pro-
grammes and projects.· In most nations such arrangements would not 
be allowed, because these violate basic anti-trust policies. In 
Japan's so-called Kidenho provisions, MITI has the authority to 
direct Japanese manufacturers to collaborate in undertaking the 
required research projects, in setting industrial standards, 
undertaking technology improvements, negotiating joint procure-
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ments and directing other activities which in most other nations 
would represent a grave and explicit violation of antitrust laws. 
In Japan, however, as discussed in the following section, the 
Kidenho provisions "legalize" MITI 1 s activities. MITI also has 
the complete confidence of the Japanese business community. As 
stated by Gregor (1984): 
Vast amounts of information -- much of it quite sensitive--
are exchanged between MITI and industry through formal and 
informal channels. Although Japanese business leaders are 
normally very guarded about company information that might 
be used up by rival firms, they are willing routinely to 
divulge sensitive, proprietary information to MITI officials 
in full confidence that it will not be leaked or used 
against them. Obviously a strong sense of trust binds 
business leaders to MITI officials. To maintain that trust, 
MITI officials scrupulously observe neutrality, and work for 
the general interests of industry. Young MITI officials at 
the level of Division Director (kacho) and Deputy Division 
Director (kacho-hosa) from the Electronics Policy Division 
(Denshi Seiska-ka) and the Electronics and Electrical 
Machinery Division (Kikai Joho Sangyo Kyoku), stay in 
constant contact with key managers and leaders in the 
semiconductor industry. Usually, MITI 1 s point of contact 
includes a technical specialist with engineering or 
technological expertise in semiconductors and an admini-
strative official with legal or economic expertise, who is 
capable of framing issues or problems in terms of policy 
options. 
Through such information collection, MITI has the capability to 
design and execute plans and programmes for industry sectors in 
accordance with overall Japanese industry policies. 
MITI 1 s leade.rship and activities can be readily seen from the 
following description prepared by a reporter of Asahi: 
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To challenge IBM, the VLSI research and development was 
begun, uniting government and the private sector. To carry 
out the research, the VLSI Technology Research Association 
was formed in April, 1976. Its membership consisted of five 
firms in two groups of domestic computer producers: 
Fujitsu-Hitachi-Mitsubishi and NEC-Toshiba . Approxi-
mately 100 researchers from the member firms and MITI 's 
Electronic Research Institute gathered at the [newly estab-
lished] joint research institute. During the following 
four years, about 70 billion yen, including a government 
subsidy of 30 billion yen, was spent. The technology 
necessary to develop VLSI was developed and the Association 
disbanded • • • 
Initially, given the differing ideas concerning VLSI 
development among the member firms, decisions on the extent 
and nature of the joint research and which firm was to be 
responsible for which aspects of development, were extremely 
difficult to make. Interests of the member firms con-
flicted. And, even after the research topics were settled, 
there were the numerous problems to be expected in such a 
joint venture. Thus, six research rooms were created, each 
headed by a leader from one of the five member firms and one 
headed by a person from the Electronics Research Institute. 
During the first year, the walls between these rooms were 
thick. Participants tried to prevent others from finding 
out the progress being made in each room. "In extreme 
cases, the entrance was barricaded to prevent other 
researchers from coming in," recalls Nebashi [of MITI], who 
headed the joint research institute. 
Nebashi did his best to eliminate the egoism of the 
member firms and to create the harmony among researchers 
necessary for joint research. In the evenings he went to 
the rooms and listened to the researchers' opinions and any 
dissatisfactions they had. At times, he drank sake with the 
researchers. • • The monthly meetings, attended by senior 
officers of the member firms, were intentionally held at the 
joint research institute • • • The purpose was to let these 
officers become familiar with the projects and boost the 
morale of the researchers. In time, tennis and golf clubs 
were organized among the researchers • • • and the walls of 
secrecy dividing the research rooms were gradually removed 
(Yamamura, 1986). 
In summary, the Japanese government policies to advance the 
Japanese microelectronics industry have included: 
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a) General agreement on industry-wide goals beteen 
MIT! and industry; 
b) Formulation of Visions for microelectronic 
product development and its integration within a 
comprehensive industrial policy; 
c) Coordination of, and subsidies for, large-scale, 
national research projects of high priority for 
the industry as a whole; 
d) A rough division of labour in research effort 
between government laboratories '(basic research 
with high costs and risks) and industrial 
laboratories (applied and commercially oriented 
research); 
e) Extensive information flow and communication 
exchange between government and industry; 
elaborate channels for on-going dialogue; 
f) Special tax incentives 
i) Accelerated depreciation 
ii) Research and development tax credits 
iii) Deferrals 
iv) Special reserve funds to protect against losses 
g) Special financing and credit for small-medium industries 
h) Japan Development Bank (JOB) and other public and 
semi-public financial institution loans; 
i) Determination of interest rates; general monetary 
and fiscal policies; 
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j) Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Co. (NTT) and other 
public agency procurements; 
k) Indirect measures to boost aggregate growth rates 
and hence semiconductor demand; 
The results of the Japanese government's policies to achieve 
comparative advantage for the microelectronics industry in Japan 
can only be described as outstanding. 
In a period of a decade or so Japan has become the leading 
manufacturer of microelectronic products with more than one-half 
of all world microelectronic devices produced in Japan. Japanese 
achievements in the microelectronic sector can be best understood 
with a very brief account of the market shares and trends in the 
leading microelectronic product, that of "memories." In 1975 the 
U.S. produced over 85 percent of the total memory devices in the 
world. In 1980, the u.s. produced over 70 percent of memories 
and Japan about 25 percent. In order to dominate the world's 
memory device market, Japanese electronic firms rapidly expanded 
their production capacity (in the face of very slow demand) and 
suffered losses estimated at $4 billion between 1979 and 1987. 
However in 1987 the Japanese share of memory devices had increased 
to 80 percent and u.s. share had fallen to 19 percent. 
As the result of the increased Japanese production capacity 
between 1979 and 1987, the prices of these devices were reduced 
below break even level in world markets, and a number of U.S. 
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memory device producers stopped the manufacture of these products. 
More important 1 the U.S. firms also reduced their research and 
. development efforts 1 related to technology advances in memory 
devices. The reduction in research and development activities by 
the U.S. firms occurred at a time (from 1982 to the present) when 
technological advances in memories made it possible to replace 64K 
memories with 256K memories only to increase the "size" further to 
one megabit memories in 1987. The advanced memories are used in 
most computers and comprise about 25 percent of the computer cost. 
With the demand for computers increasing significantly in the 
1986-1989 period there occurred a dire shortage of advanced memory 
devices 1 which only Japanese firms were able to satisfy. The 
prices for megabit memories charged by the Japanese increased and 
in 1988 alone the prices increased by a factor of four or five. 
Japanese firms have the advanced "memory" world market essentially 
alone as the U.S. microelectronic firms manufacture only a 
negligible quantity of these advanced products (SBC, 1986 and 
1988). 
These developments are summarized in a recent article (Hector, 
1988) : 
Armed with mountains of capital, the Japanese added DRAM 
capacity steadily throughout the 1970s. By the 1985-86 
slump they had helped create a huge oversupply. To minimize 
losses on capital invested in factories, Japanese producers 
flooded the market with DRAMs and to a lesser extent with 
other commodity chips with EPROMs (erasable, programmable, 
read-only memories) • While this behavior was perfectly 
rational for the Japanese, it led to cries to dumping in the 
659 
U.S., where domestic manufacturers lost more than $2 billion 
battling to keep market share. 
By operating their plants at full capacity an average of 130 
hours a week, Japanese producers achieve significant economies 
on large production lines. In some cases their costs have been 
30% or more below U.S. manufacturers. Even so, security anal-
ysts estimate that they lost some $4 billion in 1985-86. That 
experience alone should help head off future price wars--
especially since the highflying yen has knocked the Japanese 
out of their position as the industry's low-cost producer. 
They now lag behind competitors in Korea and other Asian 
nations that have not been so hard hit by rising currencies. 
Despite the good news, most U.S. chipmakers aren't comfortable 
enough to go charging back into the DRAM market. 
12.5.2 Japanese Government Policies to Advance the 
Machine Tools Sector 
As in the case of the microelectronics industry, MITI has 
exerted a strong influence over the direction of Japanese machine 
tool development through low-interest loans, the approval of 
licensing agreements for the sale or acquisition of new technol-
ogy, and the control of international trade flows. MITI has 
encouraged heavy investment in machine tools and the willingness 
of Japanese banks to finance machine tool firms has enhanced the 
ability of Japanese firms to undertake research and development 
and long-term capital expansions and investments in the machine 
tool/robotics sector far beyond that undertaken in the U.S. or 
Germany (Baranson, 1983; MITI, 1985; Aron, 1982). 
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Government-sponsored R&D in the machine tools sector is 
prevalent in Japan with a high level of cooperation between 
Japanese government and industry. 
The involvement of the Japanese government in the machine tool 
sector dates back -to the 1950's and 1960's when it began using a 
variety of policies to develop the industry. These measures 
included legislation to provide the legal basis for the Japanese 
government's planned rationalization and promotion of the indus-
try, the formation and subsidization of industry associations, the 
provision of antitrust immunity for interfirm activities under-
taken to achieve the Japanese government's planned objectives, 
temporary bans on imports of certain foreign machinery to 
stimulate domestic production, Japanese government-sponsored 
research and development, low-interest loans, tax incentives, 
favourable depreciation schedules, etc. (Crossley, 1979; Baranson, 
1983). 
In particular, three laws were enacted and implemented under 
Cabinet Enforcement Orders which have directly helped the 
development of the Japanese machine tool industry as reported by 
MITI (1986): 
Extraordinary Measures Law for Promotion of the Machinery 
Industry (June 1956) 
This law laid the groundwork for the promotion of the 
machine tool industry. It directed MITI to prepare a basic 
rationalization plan; authorized MITI to instruct industry 
to take "concerted actions" such as restricting the kinds of 
661 
products to be manufactured, setting production and export 
quotas, arranging for joint purchases of parts and 
materials, restructuring industry, establishing price 
guidelines, etc. and provided antitrust immunity for 
interfirm activities performed under MITI 's instructions. 
The Cabinet Enforcement Order for this law (July 20, 1956) 
selected the metalcutting machine tool business for 
promotion and authorized necessary funds or loans ( MITI, 
1986) • 
Extraordinary Measures Law for Promotion of Specific 
Electronic Industries and Machinery Industries l1971l 
This new law replaced the expiring 1956 law. It empowered 
MITI to 1) adopt rationalization/development plans for 
designated industries, including the NC and CNC metal-
cutting and metal-forming machine tools as types of 
machinery to be promoted; 2) conferred upon MITI the 
authority to instruct industry to engage in cooperative 
activity under immunity from antitrust prosecution; and 
3) committed the government to provide the necessary 
financial assistance, i.e., directed MITI to ensure that the 
funding required to reach development plan goals would be 
available (MITI, 1986). 
The ExtraordinakY Measures Law for the Promotion of Specific 
MachinehY and Information Industries (1978) 
This law replaced the 1971 law. In content it was almost 
identical, except that the 1978 law includes the promotion 
of the software industry. As such, the 1978 law promotes 
the introduction of modern production techniques and 
rationalization of production. The Cabinet Enforcement 
Orders of September 1978 specify for promotion several types 
of CNC metal-cutting machine tools, as well as the most 
advanced types of metal-forming machine tools (MITI, 1986). 
The 1978 ExtraordinakY Measures Law was in effect until 1987. 
It required MITI to prepare development plans (known as "Elevation 
Plans") for selected industries which used machine tools and 
robots extensively. The law empowered MITI to direct firms to 
engage in "concerted action," such as collaborating on production 
volume, research and development, specialization, standardization, 
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etc., and exempted such interfirm cooperative activity from 
antitrust prosecution (ITC, 1983; Baranson, 1983). 
The 1982 Export and Import Trading Law, had a direct impact.on 
the Japanese machine tool industry and provided a legal foundation 
for cooperative activity by allowing antitrust immunity for 
interfirm cooperative activities (approved by MITI) involving 
machine tool products designated for export. In the event that 
collaborating firms failed to achieve the export volumes of the 
Export and Import Trading Law for machine tools, MITI had the 
authority to force cartelization of export trading of the machine 
tool firms. In such cases, MITI had the authority to prescribe 
not only export prices, but also product design and quantity to be 
exported (MITI, 1983). 
Under these laws, and on the direction of MITI, the Japan 
Machine Tool Builders Association (JMTBA) arranged and coordinated 
the machine tool industry's compliance with Japanese government 
objectives, in cartel fashion, i.e., through three industry-wide 
agreements that required member firms to: (a) concentrate produc-
tion in machines which constituted more than 5 percent of their 
market and more than 20 percent of their production; (b) observe 
monthly production guidelines for specific types of machine tools; 
(c) reject orders for machine tools not authorized for production; 
(d) achieve overall product targets by rearranging production 
among member firms, but without increasing the number of firms 
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manufacturing each major type of machine tool; (e) share tech-
nology acquired from foreign sources and gain "group approval" for 
prospective technical links with foreign firms; and (f) notify the 
JMTBA of intent to market new machine tool products in order to 
obtain manufacturing approval by members of the association 
(Baranson, 1982; ITC, 1983). 
The Japanese government also provided financial assistance to 
the machine tool industry directly, in the form of subsidies and 
loans, and indirectly through loan guarantees. During the 1957-
1978 period, MITI implemented eight Elevation Plans for the 
machine tool industry, with a total financial commitment of over 
$804 million to promote their development. Of that amount, $444 
million was spent between 1978 and 1982, mainly for the promotion 
of the machine tool sector (MITI, 1983; ITC, 1986). 
Indirect MITI assistance since 1978 has enabled the Japanese 
machine tool industry to obtain $114 million in loans at "prefer-
red" interest rates from the Japan Development Bank (JDB) and the 
Small Business Financing Corporation ( SBFC), of which over $89 
million were provided since 1978. Financing was also provided for 
certain foreign sales by the Japan Export-Import Bank . (JEIB) 
(MITI, 1986) • 
Tax reforms were adopted by the Japanese government in 1984 to 
"promote modernization of medium and small-size enterprises." 
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Under the new tax law, medium and small-size businesses that 
fulfilled certain conditions were able to use either a special 
depreciation ( 30 percent of acquisition cost) or a special tax 
exemption ( 7 percent of acquisition cost) to purchase machine 
tools and robots (MITI, 1986). 
Direct government grants to encourage and support research and 
development in the Japanese machine tool industry have been made 
during the 1970 to 1986 period by the Japan Research Development 
Corporation ( JRDC), an arm of the Science and Technology Agency 
(STA), and by MITI's Agency for Industrial Science and Technology 
(AIST) (ITC, 1983; Baranson, 1983). It has been estimated that 
the value of these grants from all Japanese government sources 
has provided the Japanese machinery industry with $35-45 million 
per year over the 1970-1986 period (MITI, 1986). 
From 197 4 to 1980 MITI was conducting a seven year, S 150 
million research programme for the development of intelligent 
robots. Emphasis was placed on improving the sensory perception, 
language systems, and motion capabilities of advanced robots 
(MITI, 1983; MITI, 1986; Baranson, 1983). 
For the purpose of promoting the utilization of robots by small 
and medium-size manufacturing firms, the Japan Robot Leasing 
Company, Ltd. (JAROL) was established in April 1980 at the 
encouragement of MITI. JAROL was established initially as a joint 
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venture between 24 private Japanese machine tool manufacturers and 
10 insurance companies, and was capitalized at approximately 
$500,000. In 1986, the JDB lent about $7.8 million to JAROL, 
while the annual level of private sector funding was approximately 
$5 million. 
12.5.3 Advanced Materials Sectors in Japan 
Japanese government policies in the advanced materials sectors 
focus on the advanced ceramics industry. Japan is already a world 
leader in advanced ceramics, accounting for about half of world 
production, and it dominates the electronic components business, 
particularly in integrated circuits packaging. Kyocera Interna-
tional alone has a 70 percent share in both the world and U.S. 
markets (valued at $350 million and $250 million, respectively) 
for advanced ceramics. Advanced ceramics markets in other elec-
tronic applications, such as ferrite heads in consumer electronics 
and computers are dominated by Japanese firms such as TDK Elec-
tronics and Murata Manufacturing (Kenney and Bowen, 1983). 
In the electronic components business, Japanese leadership in 
advanced ceramics has been gained largely without direct or 
specific government assistance. Since engineering products, 
particularly heat engines for transportation and electric power 
generation, represent potentially larger but less certain 
applications, the role of the Japanese government is more 
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prominent in this area. There is an overall Japanese national 
effort to promote the development of new technologies in advanced 
ceramics including government organized and financed joint 
research and development programmes with universities and 
industry. 
12.5.3.1 The Role of the Japanese Government in the Advanced 
Materials Sector 
The Japanese government anticipates that the development of an 
advanced ceramics industry will make a major contribution to some 
of Japan's most important national goals: 
a) Being a natural resource poor nation, the use of 
advanced ceramics would enable Japan to substitute 
indigenous for imported raw materials and would also 
contribute to energy conservation, lowering its 
dependence on imported petroleum; 
b) Superiority in advanced electronic ceramics adds another 
advantage to their already strong electronics industries; 
c) Becoming the world leader in advanced engineering ceramics 
will result directly in sizable new exports of the 
products themselves and indirectly add to the value of 
automotive, machine tool, and perhaps -- aerospace 
exports. 
Current Japanese government measures to support advanced ceramics 
must be understood in the context of a long tradition of govern-
ment support for large-scale industrial technology. The Japanese 
National Research and Development Program (popularly known as the 
Large-Scale Project) was founded by the AIST in 1966 and involved 
a variety of high-technology projects. 
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This programme envisioned five major categories of future 
applications of advanced ceramics: electronic components, machine 
tools, machine parts, medical appliances, and coatings. 
a) Electronic Components. The application of advanced 
ceramics in the field of electronics will be further 
expanded, including materials for IC substrates, IC 
packages, condensers, varistors, piezoelectric elements, 
sensors, optical communications, and lasers. 
b) Machine Tools. Research is to continue on materials for 
new high performance cutting tools, in particular the 
development of titanium boride-based materials is being 
emphasized. 
c) Machine Parts. R&D is being accelerated for the applica-
tion of non-oxide advanced ceramics to numerous machine 
parts. 
d) Medical Appliances. Advanced ceramics R&D is being 
focused on artificial joints and dental applications. 
Artificial bone structures are in the initial stages of 
research and development. 
e) Coatings. The coating of advanced ceramics on metal parts 
(metallic inner walls of engine cylinders and chemical 
pumps) improves heat resistance, lubrication and corrosion 
resistance of these parts. R&D to allow the multilayer 
coating of advanced ceramics on complicated parts, in 
order to prevent the separation of the coated ceramics 
layers, is also undertaken. 
The centerpiece of current Japanese efforts to implement MITI's 
"Vision for the 1980's" and to promote new materials -- including 
advanced ceramics -- is the ten-year "Research and Development 
Project of Basic Technology for Future Industries" initiated by 
the AIST in 1981 (MIT!, 1986) • The focus of high performance 
advanced ceramics in this project is on the development of 
engineering applications for nuclear energy, aerospace, and heat 
engines, as opposed to electronic components. 
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In response to this initiative, Japanese industry in 1981 
established a Fine Ceramics Technology Research Association 
representing Japanese companies involved in the development of 
advanced ceramics for nuclear fusion reactor walls and heat 
engines. In addition, an Association for New Metal and Compound. 
Materials R&D, composed of major Japanese metal and chemical firms 
was established. In 1982, MITI established a Fine Ceramic Office 
in its Consumer Goods Industries Bureau to coordinate implementa-
tion of the vision in the ceramics area, to promote standardiza-
tion of advanced ceramics technology, and to develop cooperation 
between producers and users of advanced ceramics (MIT!, 1986; U.S. 
DOC, 1983). 
In addition to these MITI-sponsored advanced ceramics pro-
grammes, the STA in 1981 initiated a five-year programme in 
materials science, which included advanced ceramics. In 1982, the 
Japanese Ministry of Education allocated about $1 million to "New 
Investigations of Functional Ceramics. " The Council for Science 
and Technology (an interagency group titularly chaired by the 
Japanese Prime Minister) is said to provide overall coordination 
for the efforts of the various ministries and R&D authorities 
(including the national laboratories). 
Japanese government policies in the other areas of advanced 
materials is very limited, although MITI has prepared a long term 
research programme for composites (SHC, 1988). 
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12.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Japanese success in advanced technology industries has occurred 
largely due to the Japanese government's aggressive science 
technology and industry policies. 
These policies, especially Japanese industry sector policies, 
have in fact violated many of the prescriptions for a nation's 
economic growth and industrial development contained in classical 
economic and international trade theories. The growth of the 
Japanese economy and the very rapid increase in Japanese exports 
in spite of these "violations" may be explained by two interde-
pendent factors. The first of these, is the fact that Japanese 
policies did not abuse the prescriptions for orderly markets in 
which the forces of supply and demand dominate. Rather, Japanese 
governments policies were sufficiently bold and comprehensive to 
override all of the orderly free market mechanisms. Thus, the 
Japanese government not only "controlled" the level of production 
but also "controlled" the level of prices. The adherence by the 
Japanese private sector to these "controls" which took the form of 
"administrative guidance" must be attributed to the cohesiveness 
of the Japanese people. 
The second factor which made it possible for the Japanese 
government policies to work was the fact that the principal 
trading partners with Japan, the u.s. and the EC nations, did very 
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little to retaliate against these policies, or at least did very 
little until the mid-1980 1 s. The reasons for this unwillingness 
to react to Japanese policies, (some of which were obvious 
transgressions of established rules and order which govern 
international trade) were of course political. 
The same political considerations on the part of the u.s., EC 
member countries and other Western democracies allowed Japan to 
concentrate on economic development and growth, without requiring 
Japan to expand resources for their national defence. 
While the Japanese government deliberatly broke the rules of 
economic theory in its growth and international trade activities, 
the same government either deliberately or by chance followed the 
guiding economic principles in industrial development for a nation 
which is a "latecomer" or behind other nations in industrial de-
velopment. As outlined by the economic historian A. Gerschenkron 
(1947) the best chance for a latecomer nation to catch up with the 
others in industrial development is to close the gap as quickly as 
possible with government policies similar to those executed by the 
Japanese. 
Not all Japanese policies and MITI projects have met with 
outstanding success however, indeed among MITI 1 s projects which 
were not successful were the attempted development of a native 
Japanese aluminum smelting industry on which the Japanese 
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government spent $2.5 billion, and which in 1988 consisted of two 
marginal smelters, 
other examples of 
operating at a considerable loss. 
policy errors, including the now 
There are 
abandoned 
project to design and construct a nuclear-powered blast furnace 
for steel making which MITI supported in the 1973 to 1980.period 
at a cost of $110 million, or MITI's project from 1980 to 1986 to 
design a process of petrochemical production from carbon monoxide 
which cost the Japanese government $84 million and was abandoned 
in 1987. 
For the most part, however, the Japanese government and MITI's 
selected policies and projects have worked very well. MITI' s 
emphasis on the need to obtain technologies developed by others 
was very successful. Many, if not most, of the advanced tech-
nologies used in Japan have been developed elsewhere and obtained 
by the Japanese through licensing and other means. Indeed the 
Japanese "imports" of advanced technology licenses have increased 
continuously over time. James Abegglen and George Stalk in their 
book "Kaisha-the Japanese Corporation" (1988) estimate that 
between 1950 and 1980, in 30,000 separate agreements, Japan spent 
$10 billion to acquire technology from the U.S. and the EC 
nations. The Japanese demand for foreign technologies has not 
declined since 1983. 
However the policies of the Japanese government over the last 
several decades have stressed basic research as well as applied 
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research and development activities. There is some evidence that 
this emphasis on the need for basic scientific research is 
increasing basic scientific activity in Japan. For example, 
Japan's share of the world's scientific literature increased from 
5.1 percent to 7.6 percent over the 1973 to 1984 period, and u.s. 
patents granted to Japanese inventors increased from 4 percent in 
1970 to 19 percent in 1986. Similarly, the ratio of Japanese 
payments for foreign technologies to Japanese receipts for 
technologies purchased by other nations during the 1980 to 1986 
period shows a very rapid decline, indicating the increasing 
stature of Japan's own science and technology achievements. 
In the case of the microelectronics sector, Japan has certainly 
overcome the U.S. and most probably will dominate this advanced 
technology industry in the future. The fundamental reason for 
Japan's success up to the present time has not been, however, 
advancement in microelectronic technology but access to capital to 
construct microelectronic device manufacturing facilities. John 
Markoff ( 1989) in his review of a book by Fred Warshofsky "The 
Chip War: The Battle of the World Tomorrow" summarizes the 
critical differences between the U.S. and the Japanese microelec-
tronics industry as follows: 
The image that emerges in "The Chip War" is of an industry that 
is dangling by a thread, in danger of going the way of the 
television and videocassette recorder industries before it. In 
his final chapter Mr. Warshofsky, a science writer, captures 
the bitter frustration of the president of a modest-sized 
Silicon Valley chip-making equipment company. The businessman 
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is trying to match the investment of his Japanese competitors, 
with their easier access to capital and their insulation from 
greedy Wall Street shareholders who look no farther than the 
next quarter's profit-and-loss statement. 
The future demand for the microelectronic product market will 
require further expansion of microelectronic product facilities. A 
1989 Economist article places Japanese capital commitments for 
their own expansion at about $4 billion. The private microelec-
tronics sector in the U.S. cannot match these requirements and it 
is not likely that the U.S. government, for all its concern about 
the U.S. microelectronics sector, will attempt to provide the 
required funds • Even· if such an attempt is made, it may be 
refused by the independent minded U.S. firms. There are more 
problems ahead for U.S. microelectronic manufacturers. As 
reported in the Economist: 
American semiconductor firms can expect still-more sleepless 
nights. MITI wants to get Japanese semiconductor makers out of 
low added-value memory devices and into the lucrative top end 
of the market --making advanced microprocessors ("computers on 
a chip"). Not only are microprocessor devices more valuable, 
but each one sole requires a handful of other proprietary 
circuits to support it. Thus the company that gets its 
microprocessor specified as the "brain" of a particular brand 
of personal computer or workstation wins orders for many more 
supporting circuits as well. 
Intel and Motorola have dominated the worldwide microprocessor 
market. To ensure adequate supplies, they have traditionally 
licensed other manufacturers to act as second sources. But 
with their latest generation of designs (Intel's 80386 and 
Motorola's 68030), the two American companies have steadfastly 
refused to sell second-source licenses, fearing the loss of the 
technology as much as an erosion in prices. 
The inevitable has happened. Japan's top-notch electronics 
firm, NEC, has gone it alone and produced a full range of 
similar (but cleverer) microprocessors. The signal to commit 
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itself whole-heartedly to microprocessor manufacturing came 
last month when a Californian court ruled that NEC had not 
infringed Intel's patents when it developed its V-series of 
"work-a-like" microprocessors that were plug-compatible with 
the American firm's but worked faster. 
With the long-running legal problems out of the way, NBC has 
moved quickly to announce a new series of 32-bit microproc-
essors that out-perform anything Intel or Motorola has on 
offer. NBC's only worry now is not the next generation of 
American microprocessors but the ingenious tricks being 
conjured up by Fujitsu, Toshiba and Matsushita. Next year, 
Japanese semiconductor firms are expected to produce almost as 
many advanced microprocessors as memory circuits. And 
America's chipmakers will face another tough fight." 
(Economist, March 18, 1989). 
In the case of the machine tools industry, the Japanese have 
been able to penetrate the international markets for machine 
tools, formerly held by the Germans and U.S. because of the 
Japanese ability (MITI directed) to merge the old vintage "steel" 
technology of machine tools with microelectronic devices. The 
German and U.S. machine tool makers, bound by tradition and 
limited by expertise to the old vintage technologies in machine 
tools did not and could not master the new and rapidly changing 
microelectronics component in machine tools. It is not likely 
that any policy or inducement by German or U.S. governments would 
have persuaded their machine tool makers to utilize microelec-
tronics in their design, engineering and production of machine 
tools. The presence of existing and well established, albeit old 
vintage, machine tool industries in Germany and the U.S. prevented 
new enterprises from entering this sector of the industry. 
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In Japan the ever obedient industry establishments followed the 
guidance of MITI and, supported by Japanese government funding, 
were able to design and manufacture machines tools and robots 
technologically far more advanced than the German and u.s. 
competition. The policies of the Japanese government to provide 
assistance to Japanese firms in the sales of these Japanese 
products and in after-the-sale services have resulted in a rapid 
increase in Japanese machine tool exports. 
The advanced ceramics industry sector has recei~ed significant 
assistance from the Japanese government and represents the tech-
nological advancement of a major and historical Japanese industry. 
It is reasonable to assume that the Japanese advanced ceramic 
industry will become a major factor in the future. 
Advanced materials based on polymers are essentially a tech-
nological extension of the organic chemicals industry with 
petrochemicals as the percursor. The Japanese petrochemical 
industry has not been well developed in the past, principally 
because of the absence of the raw material -- crude· oil -- and 
therefore it is not surprising that this segment of the advanced 
material industry cannot be included among Japanese technological 
advancement. 
In the case of composites, the absence of Japanese policies or 
projects to engage in research and development activities for this 
.•' 
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very important technology is surprising. Certainly, the Japanese 
automotive industry, instrument makers, and anticipated Japanese 
future emphasis on aerospace, would dictate a serious research 
effort by the Japanese on composites. 
One explanation for this is the virtual absence of technical 
information on composites. Most of the research, development and 
engineering activities associated with composites undertaken by 
the U.S., the principal nation engaged in composite manufacture, 
are conducted for defence-related applications and therefore·not 
readily available. Certainly, that the Japanese vigorously 
attempted in 1989 to reach an agreement with the U.S. on the pro-
duction of the new fighter plane FSX, which utilizes composites to 
a significant extent, supports the above suggestion. 
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FOO'l'NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 
( 1) Japan had adopted an active strategy for technology 
transfer and modernization from the time of the Meijii 
Restoration in 1968. However, the techniques and 
policy instruments have varied according to both 
domestic and international circumstances. 
(2) MITI employs an elaborate system of support of indus-
trial R&D that includes 0 the operation of its own 
laboratories and the award of contracts and loans to 
industry. A distinguishing feature of MITI's R&D 
function is its employment of a National Project system 
to concentrate on R&D areas considered to be of special 
importance to the nation's future. The MITI institutes 
participate in these projects although they are carried 
out primarily by industry. Industry is expected to 
share in . the cost as a condition of participation. 
MITI determines which industrial organizations are to 
be permitted to join a given project. Typically only 
the largest corporations with the best research 
capabilities are invited. In the past, these projects 
were heavily biased toward applied research or experi-
mental development, but now are moving more toward the 
basic end of the research spectrum. 
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(3) Government funding is usually predicated on the forma-
tion of an association of participating companies. For 
example, the Civil Transport Development Corporation 
was set up to represent three Japanese manufacturers in 
the Boeing 767 joint venture with Boeing and Aeritalia. 
The Japanese Corporation is responsible for 15 percent 
of the project, and the three participating Japanese 
companies have divided workshares. The Corporation 
acts as the conduit for government money and as the 
agency responsible for coordinating the project~ 
Although a small group within the Corporation is cur-
rently studying the next generation aircraft project, a 
new association may be set up as the coordinating body 
once the project gets underway. Similarly, the 
Japanese Aeroengine Corporation represents three 
Japanese manufacturers in the joint engine development 
project with Rolls Royce. 
( 4) The special corporation established in 1981 by the 
Science and Technology Agency, called the Research 
Development Corporation of Japan, inaugurated a new 
research system in 1981 for the purpose of fostering 
innovation in advanced technologies. Termed "ERATO" 
(Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology) the 
system is centred around key individuals who serve as 
project directors. Each project team is made up of 
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scientists from the academic, government, and private 
sectors, as well as from other countries. They engage 
in research on open-ended projects for periods of up to 
five years. The fields of research are outside the 
traditional academic disciplines and are designed to 
generate break-throughs in various interdisciplinary 
areas. Seven projects were underway in 1987 with a 
total annual budget of 2, 210 million yen. Another 
special corporation, called the Institute of Physical 
and Chemical Research (Rikagaku Kenkyusho or "Riken" in 
Japanese) is also under the aegis of the STA; and is 
one of the oldest research organizations in Japan. 
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER 13: 
ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The three advanced technology sectors discussed in this thesis, 
microelectronics, machine tools and advanced materials comprise a very 
important advanced technology segment of any nation's industrial apex. 
Microelectronic products are cardinal to the manufacture of all 
computers, all communications systems 1 most home entertainment products, 
a very large proportion of instruments and control devices of all kinds. 
Microelectronic technology and the industry itself emerged only in the 
early 1960s. Technology advancement in microelectronics has no equal in 
the annals of technological growth (NAS 1 1983} . The machine tool 
industry was established in the mid-1850's, and remains a major 
manufacturing sector in any industrial society (NAE 1 1982). Machine 
tool sectors manufacture the machinery that produces all other 
machinery, including other machine tools. During the last twenty years, 
the technology embodied in machine tools was radically advanced by 
combining the metal cutting and working components of machine tools with 
the controls based on microelectronics (NAS 1 1983}. Advanced materials 
represent a very recent technological innovation reported about a decade 
ago. The potential future economic impact of advanced materials on all 
industrial sectors is exceptional because advanced materials may 
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replace most of the traditional raw materials used in the production 
of industrial and consumer products (NAE, 1988). 
13.2 SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Table 13. 1 presents the past trends and immediate future 
prospects for worldwide sales volumes of these three advanced 
technology products. 
The differences between France and Japan lie in the manner of 
the administration of these policies. Japanese policies were admin-
istered after a consensus of these policies was reached among the 
sectors of Japanese society. The French government essentially 
dictated its policies without an attempt to reach a consensus. 
Both nations selected "target" industry sectors destined for 
rapid growth; both France and Japan enacted policies that estab-
lished very large scale, government supported programmes to advance 
the selected industry sectors; both countries provided significant 
funding to the selected sectors; and both countries attempted to 
protect the selected sectors against international competition. The 
Japanese government succeeded in its policies, whereas the French 
did not. The reason for these different policy outcomes lies in a 
difference in how the policies were administrated and in the 
geographic, political, economic and social environment of a country 
within which all government policies must operate. The Japanese 
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Table 13.1 
Microelectronic Products; Machine Tools and 
Advanced Materials Past Trends and Mean Term 
Projections of Worldwide Production, 1960-1995 
(in billions of current dollars) 
1970 1980 1988 1990 
Microelectronic 
Products $3.1 $12.6 $47.4 $132.0 
Machine Tools $8.3 $13.6 $38.4 $ 61.0 
Advanced Materials 0 $ 3.0 $19.0 $ 88.0 
Source: SHC, 1988 
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were able to utilize Japan's social and political characteristics as a 
receptive environmental for their policies, with a deliberate effort to 
achieve consensus among the population. The French, faced with a dual 
economy and preoccupied with government-controlled enterprises, issued 
regulations not accepted by large sectors of the French population, 
instead of attempting to achieve consensus. 
The evidence suggests that there is no single optimum model for 
government policies that intervene in the markets and result in 
economic growth, the rapid technological and economic development of an 
industry sector or the enlargement of domestic and international market 
shares. On the contrary, the dominant requirement would seem to be a 
diversity of government policies, custom tailored to the geographic, 
political, economic and social characteristics of a nation and to 
specific industry sectors. 
It should also be emphasized that there may be a need to change 
government policies over time to respond to changes in a nation's 
geographic, political, economic and social characteristcs. 
For example, in the case of Japan, MITI 's policies that were 
successful in the 1960s and 1970s may be ineffective in the 1980s 
because Japan's industrial firms have ample resources for operations on 
their own and therefore do not require MITI's assistance. Likewise, 
some of the government's policies prescribed by the "new" economic 
theory may not be feasible for Western European nations after 1992 
because of the Common Market's agreements and provisions. 
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The empirical evidence on international trade presented in 
Chapter 3 combined with the analyses of governments' policies in the 
five countries (Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12), clearly identifies 
the major role government policies can play in the growth of 
industry sectors in a nation as well as in that nation's ability to 
expand its international trade. These analyses indicate that 
government interaction in the free markets may, for a specific 
nation foster industrial development and increase exports, as in the 
case of Japan, or may yield little, if any, improvements in a 
country's economic growth as in the case of France. An analysis of 
the various factors that may account for this discrepancy suggests 
that it may be explained by examining the process by which 
government policies are enacted. This process is determined by the 
unique characteristics of the various components that make up the 
government policy-making process (Allen, 1978; Arnold, 1986; 
Balcerowicz, 1980). The unique characteristics of the various 
components, in turn, are determined by the socio-economic charac-
teristics of a nation's population, its geographic attributes, 
history, economy and industrial base. These components shape the 
political system of a nation which in turn produces a government 
which enacts government policies. Government policies, of course, 
have an impact on the various components that make-up the entire 
policy-making process. 
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The role played by the characteristics of the various 
government policies for a nation may best be illustrated by a 
summary description of the five nations. 
13.2.1 France 
France had a distinguished history of industrial and tech-
nological advancement in the 19th century supported by a growing 
population in Metropolitan France as well as French colonies in 
Africa and Southeast Asia. since World War II however, France's 
industrial accomplishments have been marginal. Part of this can be 
explained by the loss of the French colonies and the political 
upheavals that accompanied this loss. However, a major reason for 
the lacklustre French technological and industrial performance has 
been the effect of the French government's policies. As presented 
in Chapter 8, the French government throughout the post-World War II 
period attempted to create advanced industry sectors that matched or 
even surpassed those of the U.S. (Chararon, 1989; Fabian, 1984; 
Gilpin, 1968). These sectors were to represent French "national 
champions" and were to be created by the use of a very comprehensive 
set of French government policies, the so-called "grands pro-
grammes," such as the Plan Calcul (Gilpin, 1968). These policies 
were applied to such advanced industry sectors as microelectronics, 
computers, steel, telecommunications,· aerospace and motor vehicles. 
.. 
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None of the French government plans was successful, partly 
because French government planners emphasized the supply of advanced 
technology products rather than the market demand (SHC, 1988). 
French plans failed also because the government failed, or did not 
even try, to explain and achieve acceptance for the policies from 
all segments of French community (SHC, 1988). competition from the 
U.S. and Japan also helped to negate French government 
policies. 
One of the components of the French government intervention in 
the free market mechanism was its ownership or control of the French 
industrial base. As of 1989, about 50 percent of French industry is 
government owned or controlled. This in turn has resulted in a 
distinctly dual nature of the French economy. On the one hand there 
are French industrial establishments that are controlled by the 
government and equipped with state-of-the-art technology in produc-
tion facilities, on the other there are the privately owned 
industrial firms that are relatively small and employ old vintage 
manufacturing methods and production machinery (Gruber and Vernon, 
1970; Mistral, 1980) . The demand for advanced industrial goods 
generated by these privately owned industrial enterprises is modest 
and not sufficient to establish domestic demand for the products of 
the French government-owned sectors (Sheperd, et al., 1983). 
International markets for French advanced technology products, as 
noted in Chapter 8, are limited because of the French government's 
policies of designing and manufacturing industrial goods that are 
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uniquely French and therefore difficult to match with industrial 
products manufactured by other nations. French export policies also 
did not match the inducements provided for exports by the Japanese, 
German and to a lesser extent U.S. firms (Shima, 1982). The French 
political system continues to be dominated by French government 
"functionnaires" and continues to emphasize rigid policies dictated 
by the French government offices, rather than seeking consensus and 
considering the views of the French (and foreign) markets 
(Luscovitch, 1985). 
Government policy making in France has always emphasized the 
need to develop and sustain a uniquely French capability in science, 
technology and industry. French government industry sector policies 
continue to be directed from the top down and continue to exclude 
consideration of other nations, and, to a certain extent, interna-
tional agreements (Saunders, 1978; SHC 1988). For example, while 
the French government has decreased its defence-related spending, 
there exist in 1989, French government directives focused on 
providing financial assistance to the French defence firm Thomson-
CSF to become a major contributor to the force de frappe (Rowen, 
1989). Advanced technology industries in France remain relatively 
ineffective in world markets. The output and sales of advanced 
technology goods, produced by multinational firms located in France 
is increasing at a moderate rate. Japanese exports of advanced 
technology products to France increased significantly in 1988 (SHC, 
1988) • 
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13.2.2 Germany 
Following World War II, the German industrial base, heavily 
damaged during the war, was rebuilt with significant assistance from 
the Marshall Plan (Kocka, 1980). By the year 1958, German 
industrial capacity in most sectors of the economy exceeded that of 
1941. Most of the rebuilt industrial facilities were equipped with 
state of the art technology and operated by an exceptionally well-
trained labour force. The homogeneity of the German labour force 
and the cooperative relations between German labour unions and 
management resulted in high industrial productivity (Massow, 1983; 
Peacock, 1980) . The German federal government, as a result of the 
experience during the Nazi era, deliberately abstained from central 
policy making in all areas including science, technology and 
industrial developments. German industry, therefore, has operated 
essentially in free markets. 
Some premises of the "new" economic theory have been observed 
by Germany's private sector and a number of initiatives in concert 
with some of the elements of the new economic theory have been 
undertaken by German firms. 
For example, in order to achieve economies of scale, avoid 
duplication in research, development and distribution, and to 
increase funding for research, development, engineering, and capital 
expenditures, several German microelectronic firms have concluded 
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cooperative, joint production and similar arrangements, with other 
German enterprises as well as with the firms of other nations. 
These include Siemens A.G.'s arrangements with the Japanese Toshiba 
Corporation; Siemens A.G.'s joint venture with N.V. Philips from the 
Netherlands and extensive cooperation joint distribution 
arrangements by Telefunken A.G. and several u.s. microelectronic 
firms (Rowen, 1989). 
As analyzed in Chapters 6 and 9 the German machine tool 
industry has experienced a relatively severe decline as a result of 
Japanese competition. The principal underlying reason for the 
Japanese success was their ability to advance machine tool technol-
ogy by merging microelectronics-(microprocessors) with metal 
cutting operations. The German machine tool manufacturers have 
recognized this Japanese achievement and have during the last 
several years attempted to match Japanese technology. They have 
been largely successful in their endeavour, but have still lost a 
significant segment of their domestic and international markets for 
machine tools to Japanese firms. 
In advanced materials, German industry has had limited interest 
in the past, except for advanced ceramics used in internal 
combustion engines. Since 1988, German industry has recognized the 
potential value of advanced materials in numerous applications and 
has initiated research and development activities in this area. The 
merger, in the autumn of 1989, of the largest German industrial 
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firm, Daimler-Benz with Messerschmitt-Balkow-Blohn (MBB) is of 
particular significance to German advanced material development, 
because both firms have been the leading German enterprises in 
advanced materials research, development and engineering. 
In summary, German advanced technology firms have undertaken a 
number of actions that correspond to some of the prescriptions for 
industrial growth advocated by the new economic theory. In concert 
with the past German adherence to the free market, these activities 
have been carried out by the German private sector in the context of 
free market activities and not by the German government's·policies. 
13.2.3 The United Kingdom 
The post World War II era left industry in the U.K. without the 
assured markets of the colonies for industrial and consumer 
products. The home market was not of sufficient magnitude to 
support the large industrial base in the U.K. (Palmer, 1987; Prais, 
1976) • Unlike the cases of Japan and Germany where industrial 
facilities had to be rebuilt, and were rebuilt with advanced 
technology machinery and equipment, a large segment of the U.K. 
industrial plants after World War II remained equipped with old 
production facilities. 
The declining demand for U.K. goods resulted in a reduced 
demand for employment. The Labour government attempted to maintain 
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employment levels through a series of policies that included 
nationalization of industry sectors and firms (Strott, 1981). As the 
result, entrepreneurship in U.K. industry decline with a corresponding 
decline in the utilization of advanced technologies in industrial 
production. Prime Minister Thatcher's three successive governments 
since 1979 have radically changed economic policies in the U.K. with 
the privatization of industry (since 1979 a total of 54 state-owned 
companies have been sold to the private sector) and aggressive science 
and technology policies (SHC, 1988). U.K. industry has attempted to 
become more competitive by creating, via takeovers, industrial 
enterprises with sufficiently large manufacturing facilities to gain 
advantages from economies of scale in production. For example, in the 
autumn of 1989, GEC in cooperation with Siemens took over another U.K. 
electronics firm, Plessey, in order to be able to compete against such 
American firms as Boeing, Lockheed and MacDonald Douglas. However, 
U.K. industry is facing formidable competition in the domestic as well 
as international markets from Japan, the U.S., Germany and from 
increasing numbers of multinational firms. 
In the last decade, several industry sectors in the U.K. have 
experienced radical changes, as compared to what occurred under 
previous U.K. governments. Defence-related industrial activities 
increased in importance to the point where approximately 60 percent 
of the U.K.'s microelectronic production was defence-related in 
spite of the government's attempts to reduce this trend (Waterson 
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and Lopez, 1983). There have however been increases in industrial 
output and profits for some industry sectors and a modest increase 
in U.K. exports has occurred. Some of these changes may be 
attributed to the conservative political philosophy of the Thatcher 
government. The privatization of important sectors of the economy 
such as communications, steel and motor vehicle production is part 
of this conservative policy trend. The relatively recent trend of 
mergers, takeovers, and acquisitions on the part of U.K. firms may 
be partly attributed to the prevailing philosophy of the British 
government. 
improved the 
The resulting aggregation of U.K. enterprises has 
competitiveness of U.K. firms vis-a-vis foreign 
entities. In the area of science and technology, the government has 
enacted policies to encourage the application of commercialization, 
fully recognizing that applied research in the U.K. has not kept 
pace with other nations (Bide, 1986). 
In spite of these changes in industry and the government's 
attempts to convert U.K. accomplishments in science into marketable 
products, the U.K.'s presence in world markets for most products and 
certainly for advanced technology products has been reduced. In 
microelectronics the performance of native U.K. firms has been 
modest in terms of domestic and international sales as well as 
technological advancement. An increasing proportion of microelec-
tronic products used in the U.K. or·exported are manufactured by 
u.s. and Japanese facilities located in the U.K. The one attempt by 
the government to establish a major native microelectronic device 
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manufacturer (!NMOS) resulted in only partial and temporary success. 
Conversely, foreign microelectronic firms in the U.K. are expanding 
their production, as well as domestic and international sales. 
Recent mergers and takeovers in the U.K. microelectronics 
sector (such as that of the General Electric Company's takeover of 
Plessey) have created microelectronic enterprises of sufficient size 
to undertake the required research and development effort to advance 
the technology of the U.K.'s microelectronics industry. 
The U.K.'s machine tool sector has been plagued historically by 
the existence of many small toolmaking enterprises. For at least 
the last thirty years, various governments have pursued a continuous 
policy of arranging or forcing mergers between some of the smaller 
toolmakers (Gibbons and Gummett, 1979; Hart and Morgan, 1977). To 
a considerable extent these policies have been successful and the 
remaining U.K. machine-tool firms are fewer in number and larger in 
size. Nevertheless, most of these remaining firms do not have the 
required resources to compete with the German or Japanese toolmakers 
in the manufacture of advanced technology machine tools. 
Research, development and engineering efforts in advanced 
materials have received marginal attention in the U.K. industrial 
community with only limited activity undertaken by science 
establishments in the U.K. However, the well developed chemical 
industry sector in the U.K., combined with U.K. scientific 
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establishments engaged in materials science, surface chemistry, and 
solid state physics, offer promise for the advanced materials sector 
in the U.K. 
13.2.4 The United states 
In the immediate post-World War II years, the U.S. was the 
principal industrial nation that dominated all others. The very 
large size of the domestic market in the U.S., combined with the 
relative scarcity of consumer goods during the war years allowed 
U.S. industry to concentrate on domestic markets with very limited 
attempts to export (Chandler, 1980). Government policies with 
regard to market functions have traditionally been limited to health 
and welfare considerations and have not addressed other issues. 
However, the emergence of the Communist threat in the late 1940's 
forced the u.s. government to enact some limited policies to enhance 
defence-related research, development, engineering and industrial 
production activities (Jorgenson, et al., 1988; Kennedy, 1987). 
Government interventions in market functions, however, in the 
two decades after World War II remained essentially non-existent. 
In the late 1960s, u.s. firms began to compete in the international 
markets mostly using u.s. based multinational corporations as the 
vehicle (Lunn, 1983; Modigliano, 1983). The growth of Japanese 
exports which competed both in u.s. domestic markets and with the 
U.s. based multinational firms in international markets, forced U.S. 
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industry to consider government policies that would enhance the 
u.s. 's capability to compete (NAS 1 1988). Due to long-standing 
public opinion against most federal government policies (other than 
defence and health and welfare related) 1 market functions have 
however, remained relatively free from government intervention. 
This is in spite of the very significant decline of u.s. industry, 
in particular in the advanced technology sectors. 
Recent trends in the terms of trade in advanced technology 
products show a steep downward movement. Further, many observers 
suggest that in the areas of science and technology there has been 
some decline in the status of the u.s. (Abernathy and Rosenbloom, 
1981; Adams, et al. 1983). 
There is also some concern that the leadership and management 
of science and technology activities in the U.S. was not satisfac-
tory during the two terms of President Reagan (Hanger 1 et al. , 
1986). The available statistics on international trade identifies 
the u.s. as a nation with a rapidly declining performance in exports 
of advanced technology products during the two terms of Reagan's 
Administration. 
President Bush's promise to the American public during the 1988 
election that his Administration would install new leadership in the 
OSTP with broad policy powers has been fulfilled. The new Director 
of the OSTP, Dr. Allan Bromley, is a respected scientist with 
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considerable federal government experience. His previous assignment 
was that of Director of the Wright Nuclear Structure Laboratory at 
Yale University and he is well liked and respected by the scientific 
community in the u.s. 
Dr. Bromley's first task was to appoint a comprehensive 
President's Council of Advisers on Science and Technology (PCAST) 
consisting of twenty well known scientists representing academia, 
research laboratories and industry in the U.S. Dr. Bromley asked 
for and received an annual budget for the OSTP of $3 million as 
compared to $1.5 million during the Reagan years. Dr. Bromley's 
request for government sponsored annual research and development 
expenditure is over $20 billion as compared to $10.4 billion in 
1987. 
Even more important, Dr. Bromley is very much aware of the 
importance of science and technology policy in the development of 
advanced technology sectors and of the critical role that science 
and technology plays in foreign trade. In order to introduce 
coherent national science and technology policies in the development 
of u.s. advanced technology sectors and in order to reverse the 
large negative trade balance in advanced technology products, Dr. 
Bromley has initiated a number of OSTP policies intended to provide 
a comprehensive review of the present status in these areas and to 
organize a cohesive and unified research and development programme 
for the u.s. science establishment. All indications point to an 
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active federal government science and technology policy supported by 
the Bush Administration. 
directed 
This is not the case with the u.s. 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
industrial policy 
Secretary Robert 
Mosbacher. In spite of the fact that Mr. Mosbacher is a close 
personal friend of President Bush, his attempts to provide policy 
guidance to U.s. industry were turned down by the U. S. Budget 
Director Richard G. Darman and the Economic Council Chairman Michael 
Beskin. According to Rowen ( 1989) , Mr. Mosbacher was ". . • read the 
riot act," told that "· •• it's not the government's function to pick 
industry sectors winners and losers" and that there is no need to 
. "···adjust standard Republican free-market principles to political 
reality." Mr. Mosbacher's reply to the opposition was that he was 
being sniped at by"··· anonymous midgets at the seat of the mighty 
at the White House commenting on matters to which they were not a 
party" (Rowen, 1989). It appears, however, that Mr. Mosbacher's 
attempts to develop federal government policies for u.s. advanced 
technology industry sectors under the heading of "industry-led 
strategy," as a substitute for the Republican Party's rejected 
"industrial policy" concept, has failed. 
It is of some interest to note that Mr. Mosbacher's specific 
policies proposed under his "industry:...led strategy" were relatively 
mild as compared to the industry policies recommended by the new 
economic theory. They contained a modification of the u.s. 
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antitrust laws that would allow joint research and development 
expenditure, research and development tax credits, government 
financial assistance to selected advanced technology sectors for 
capital expenditures and some control over foreign (mostly Japanese) 
investment in key U.S. advanced technology sectors. 
All of these policies -are in force in Japan and France, and 
some (such as research and development tax credits and joint 
research and development activities) are practised in Germany. The 
u.s. government, however, continues to adhere to the classical 
economic prescription of non-government intervention of any kind. 
The status of advanced technology industry sectors in the u.s. 
has deteriorated in 1989 in that exports of advanced technology 
products have declined (although at a lower annual rate than during 
the previous six years). More important, Japanese firms have 
continued to establish their own production facilities in the u.s. 
The microelectronic industry in the u.s. has reacted to this by 
establishing research and development consortia and forming joint 
ventures. citing the critical need for domestic production of 
computer memory chips, seven u.s. semiconductor and computer 
manufacturers in 1989 banded together to finance the establishment 
of u.s. Memories Inc., only to dissolve this joint venture in 1990 
because of funding shortages. 
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It is questionable, however, whether u.s. Memories or any other 
privately financed enterprise could have succeeded without federal 
government assistance. For example, Institute of Electric and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) officials argue that it is time for the 
U.S. government to act by providing an "hospitable antitrust 
environment" and equalizing capital costs and risks for U.s. 
companies competing in global markets (Rowen, 1989). 
u.s. microelectronic firms are also challenging continuing 
Japanese growth in the U.S. by forming joint production ventures. 
These include a joint venture by IBM and Texas Instruments to 
construct microelectronic manufacturing facilities, a joint venture 
between the Digital Equipment Corporation and the Intel Corporation 
to produce logic devices and a joint venture between the LSI Logic 
Corporation and the National Semiconductor Corporation to manufac-
ture microelectronic arrays (SHC, 1988). 
The driving force behind these activities is Japanese 
competition of two types; competition in world markets and 
competition by way of establishing production facilities in the u.s. 
With regard to the former, u.s. microelectronic firms have 
chosen to meet the Japanese head-on with lower cost u.s. microelec-
tronic products and marketing practices. (There exists, however, a 
significant divergence of opinion between the u.s. industry and U.S. 
government as to whether or not the u.s. government should abandon 
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their free-trade philosophy and directly assist U.S. firms in 
foreign markets.) 
With regard to the Japanese competition in the u.s. , via 
establishing production facilities in the u.s., there is no unified 
opinion among U.S. industry or u.s. government officials as to the 
required response. There exist among some u.s. government officials 
and industry leaders so-called "chrysanthemum club" members who 
consider Japan as partners in the struggle against the Soviet Union. 
The "chrysanthemum club" members welcome Japanese production 
facilities in the u.s. and seek general accommodation with the 
Japanese in trade disputes (Fallows 1 1989) . The other group of U.S. 
officials, industry executives and members of academia, referred to 
as "revisionists" consider Japan as an "enemy 1 " a nation that 
operates not in concert with established international relations 
(van Walferen, 1989; Prestowitz, 1988; Fallows, 1989). 
The opinions that divide these two groups reach beyond 
immediate trade issues and address the fundamental question of 
whether or not u.s. microelectronic firms (as well as u.s. 
enterprises in other sectors of economy) can and.should cooperate 
with Japan. 
The tradi tiona! U.S. machine too 1 firms remain in a poor 
financial position and face increasing competition from Japanese and 
German tool-makers. In the past decade the number of traditional 
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u.s. machine-tool firms has shrunk from some 90 to less than 30 in 
1989 (SHC, 1988). 
In the field of advanced materials the u.s., as of autumn 1989, 
has a virtual world wide monopoly in technology and manufacture of 
advanced material products, except for advanced ceramics where the 
Japanese firms dominate. 
The advanced material industry in the U.S. is, however, in a 
unique position in several respects. To begin with, it represents 
an advanced technology sector that has only in the last few years 
emerged from the research, development and engineering phase and 
entered the phase of (limited) production. A very large proportion 
of the advanced materials that are manufactured are purchased by the 
u.s. federal government for defence-related applications. Com-
mercia! or private sector uses of advanced materials are limited, 
although available projections suggest an annual market for 
commercial application of over $88 million by 1995. The u.s. DOD 
has funded most of the research, development and related activities 
for advanced materials in the past. However, improved relations 
with the Soviet Union are expected to reduce DOD budgets which in 
turn may significantly reduce advanced material research and 
development activities (NRC, 1984; Rowen, 1989). 
In spite of the significant market potential of advanced 
materials, the u.s. government (except for the u.s. DOD) has 
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expressed no interest of funding additional research and 
development. 
Japan, which already has an extensive research and development 
programme in advanced ceramics, has for some time been attempting to 
obtain advanced materials technology from the U.S. Because of the 
defence-related uses of this technology, Japan was not successful in 
its effort until 1989 when the u.s. government agreed to share some 
of the advanced materials technology with Japan in a joint programme 
to design and build a new generation of fighter aircraft, the FSX 
(SHC, 1988; Rowen, 1989). 
The Japanese government has assured the U.S. that the use of 
the advanced materials technology by Japanese firms will be 
"controlled and restricted," although these Japanese assurances are 
somewhat vague (Prestowitz, 1988). 
13.2.5 Japan 
The geography of Japan makes it very poor with regard to 
national resources and Japan has been forced to rely almost 
exclusively on raw material imports (Shimo, 1982). This in turn has 
required Japan to depend on exports to pay for the required imports. 
The Japanese industrial base, essentially destroyed during World War 
II, was reconstructed and equipped with advanced machinery and 
equipment during the 1945 to 1955 period. 
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The Japanese political system, with the Emperor as a titular 
head has been very stable with one party, the Liberal Democrats, in 
control since the end of World War II. The homogeneity of the 
population has maintained a common national goal and ever since the 
Meji restoration period, that began in 1861, the population has 
followed the policies set forth by the Japanese government. The 
government for its part has successfully practised consensus 
building policies (Johnson, 1982). Japanese policies to foster 
advanced technology industries in Japan have been accepted by the 
population with a sense of obligation and duty (VanWalferen, 1989). 
As a result of these factors and the government's policies, 
Japanese economic growth and superior performance in the inter-
national markets has been unprecedented in the post-World War II 
period. Chapter 3 presents statistical information to support this 
statement and Chapter 12 presents information on the past and 
present Japanese science and technology achievements. 
As stated by Narin and Frame (1989): 
"When future generations of historians look 
back on the second half of the 20th century, 
one of the most significant historical develop-
ments they are likely to identify will be the 
phenomenal growth of Japanese economic 
strength. In the relatively short period of 
four decades, Japan has grown from modest 
economic means to become the second most power-
ful economic entity in the world. Historians 
will note that this growth was based not on the 
acquisition of territory or natural resources, 
but on the wise acquisition and employment of 
technology. 
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However there are notable changes in Japan in that MITI, the 
Japanese agency that has been the principal author of the Japanese 
government's science, technology and industry policies, has lost 
much of its power to author, enact and enforce such policies 
(Sanger, 1989). For the most part, this has been the direct result 
of Japan's economic growth. Japanese industry no longer requires 
government policies that would enhance its prospects nor do Japanese 
firms need MITI's financial assistance. For example, Hitachi Ltd. 
alone spent about $2.2 billion on research and development in 1988, 
or about so percent more than the entire MITI budget. 
This does not mean however that the Japanese have or will 
become less competitive. As stated by Sanger (1989): 
"MITI' s loosening grip will not make Japan a 
less formidable competitor. In the long run it 
may even pose bigger problems for the United 
States. The absence of central government 
control has already triggered spending wars 
here -- on R&D, more production capacity and 
more automation -- that seem bound to put 
American companies at a greater disadvantage." 
Indeed Japanese advanced technology sectors have increased their 
research and development expenditures as well as the construction of 
new manufacturing facilities in Japan, the u.s. and in the European 
nations, and they have done so without prodding by MITI. Recent 
Japanese marketing activities indicate the strong emphasis being 
placed by Japanese firms on opening markets for their micro-
electronic products in China and the soviet Union. Whereas, only a 
few years ago the Japanese were reluctant to sell their micro-
electronic products to the Soviet Bloc, the attempts by the u.s. to 
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increase its trade with Soviet Union will provide Japanese firms 
with the justification to enter these new markets (Rowen, 1989). 
In the machine tool industry Japanese firms have increased 
their sales in most countries and have significantly replaced German 
machine tool products in the U.S., in European nations and even in 
Germany. 
In advanced materials technology the Japanese have a distinct 
advantage in advanced ceramics, but lag in technologies for other 
types of advanced materials. However, Japanese industrial firms 
have access to considerable funding from their own operations as 
well as from the Bank of Japan; sources of funding that cannot be 
matched by U.S. firms without deliberate U.S. government policies to 
provide financial assistance. 
13.3 ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHIC DIFFUSION OF 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
Classical economic theory stipulates that a country with the 
appropriate specific natural and man-made endowments has comparative 
advantage over other nations for sectors of the economy that require 
these specific endowments. such a country is the obvious origin for 
such products (Deardorff, 1980). 
Analyses undertaken in Chapter 2 suggest that in terms of 
scientific and technical endowment and activities there are only 
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marginal variations among the five countries covered in this thesis. 
There exist among the five nations differences in what economists 
refer to as "national character," that is, unique characteristics of 
the natural, institutional and man-made environment (Dunning, 1981}. 
When the contributions of national character are taken into account, 
classical economic theory may provide a reasonable argument for the 
geographic origin of the three advanced technologies analyzed in this 
thesis. In the case of microelectronics, the very large electronics 
industry populated by large numbers of electrical engineers in the 
u.s. provided an excellent base for research and development 
activities in electronics that eventually led in 1961 to the 
development of transistors and other microelectronic products (Noyce 
and Hoff, 1981}. 
The metal working industry in the U.K. in the 1850's and 
advanced manufacturing technologies of 
provided the basis for the British 
(Kindlesberger, 1964; Pavitt, 1980). 
various metal products 
machine tool industry 
The developments in the 
fabricated metals sectors in Germany that followed early advances in 
the U.K. provided the basis for the German machine tool industry 
(Fawcett, 1976; Kennedy, 1982). 
The technological advancements in the organic chemical 
industry, based on crude oil, in the u.s. during the 1940's and 
1950's, established the U.S. as one of the world leaders in the 
manufacture of polyester resins and other plastics. This tech-
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nological base, combined with very large research and development 
funding by the u.s. DOD for the development of space vehicles and 
aircraft, resulted in the development of advanced materials based on 
organic chemicals (Kuhn and Porter, 1980). In Japan, where the 
ceramic industry has, for several centuries, lead the world in 
technological achievements, advanced ceramics technology was 
developed in the mid-1960s (American Ceramic Society Bulletin, 
1982) . 
Classical economic theory, however, not only postulates 
conditions for the most likely national origins of new (advanced) 
technology, it also stipulates that economic forces of comparative 
advantage will ensure that such a country will continue to remain a 
major world supplier of new (advanced) technology products (Landau, 
1988). Classical economic theory stipulates further that any and 
all intervention by a government on behalf of a nation's industry 
sectors is futile. Government intervention in free markets (both 
domestic and international) will, ultimately, lead to a decline in 
a nation's domestic production as well as to a decline in exports 
(Lancaster, 1957). 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 contradicts these 
stipulations. Japan is a prime example of this. As discussed in 
Chapter 12, the Japanese government's policies that have intervened 
in domestic and international markets on behalf of Japanese industry 
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sectors are extensive and have been systematically enacted by 
Japanese governments throughout the post-World War II period. 
Freeman (1989) summarizes this as follows: 
"In the immediate post-war period, after an intense 
debate, Japan specifically rejected a long-term 
development strategy based on the traditional theory of 
comparative advantage. This was apparently at that time 
being advocated by economists in the Bank of Japan and 
elsewhere who subscribed to the free-trade doctrine of the 
classical school. 
In place of traditional economic theory, the Japanese govern-
ment relied on policies that emphasized technological growth in 
selected industries that promised long term growth and markets. 
Freeman (1987) explains the government's role in this as 
follows: 
"From that time onwards MITI saw as one of its key 
functions the promotion of the most advanced technologies 
with the widest world market potential in the long term. 
In this respect MITI differed from almost all other 
analogous ministries in Western Europe or North America, 
which mostly did not see themselves as responsible for 
long-term technology policies until much later (that is, 
in the 1970s or 1980s) and were guided by very different 
conceptions of comparative advantage. 
As early as 1952 the Enterprises Rationalisation Promotion 
Law provided direct government subsidies for 'the experi-
mental installation and trial operation of new machines 
and equipment, plus rapid amortisation and exemption from 
local taxes of all investments in research and develop-
ment; second, it authorised certain industries (to be 
designated by the cabinet) to depreciate the costs of in-
stalling modern equipment by 50 per cent during the first 
year; and third, it committed the central and local gov-
ernments to building posts, highways, railroads, electric 
power grids, gas mains and industrial parks at public 
expense and make them available to approved industries'." 
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During this period, the Japanese economy has experienced 
unprecedented growth, and Japanese products have replaced those of 
the U.s. , Germany and other industrial nations in world markets 
(Mansfield, 1988). In the case of microelectronic devices, u.s. 
microelectronic products monopolized world markets from 1961 to the 
early 1970s. In 1970, the total worldwide output of microelectronic 
-
products was estimated at $3.1 billion. Approximately 87 percent 
were manufactured in the U.s. Japan's share of microelectronic 
products was less than 7 percent. By 1978, Japan's share of world 
microelectronic products had increased to 27 percent. The u.s. in 
1978 had 39 percent of the world market, and the European nations, 
26 percent. The remaining 8 percent of the world's microelectronic 
devices were manufactured by the NICs (Pugel, 1982). 
In 1988, the total worldwide production of microelectronic 
products was estimated at $4 7. 4 billion. Japan's share of this 
production was 37 percent or $17.3 billion; the U.S.', 31 percent, 
or $14.9 billion and Europe's, 17 percent, or $8.1 billion. The 
remaining 15 percent or $6 billion of microelectronic products were 
manufactured in South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Brazil and other 
NICs ( SHC, 1988) . Japan was able to overcome the f~rmidable lead of 
the U.S. in the manufacture of microelectronic products in less than 
twenty years. Furthermore, Europe's share of microelectronic device 
manufacture decreased from 26 percent· in 1978 to 17 percent in 1988 
due to Japanese microelectronic export penetration of the French, 
German and U.K. domestic markets (SHC, 1988). As discussed in 
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Chapters 8, 9 and 10 these three European nations have only a 
marginal impact on the world's microelectronic product markets in 
1989. 
Japanese firms have been able to achieve similar successes in 
the machine tool sector. In 1970, the total worldwide output of 
machine tools was valued at $8.3 billion. Germany was the largest 
manufacturer with an output estimated at $1.5 billion, followed by 
the U.S. with an output of $1.2 billion, Japan with an output of 
$0.8 billion and by the U.K. and France with machine tool outputs 
valued at about $0.4 billion each. By 1988, the total worldwide 
machine tool output was estimated at $38.4 billion, and Japan had 
become the largest manufacturer of machine tools with total sales of 
about $7.0 billion, representing 16.7 percent of total world 
production. Germany in 1988 was the second largest manufacturer of 
machine tools with output valued at about $6. 5 billion, representing 
13.5 percent of total world output, a decline from 17.4 percent in 
1977. The U.s.' machine tool output has declined significantly 
during the last decade. In 1977, the u.s. produced machine tools 
valued at about $5 billion, and was the largest machine tool 
manufacturer in the world with a 16.1 percent share of world 
production. In 1988 the value of machine tool manufacture in the 
u.s. was estimated at $2.7 billion, representing 6.8 percent of the 
total world-wide output of machine tools. In the case of France and 
the U.K., the value of machine tool manufacture in each of these two 
711 
nations has remained relatively stable during the last two decades, 
with annual values of approximately $0.8 billion each. 
As discussed in the subsequent sections, the growth of the 
Japanese machine tool industry may be attributed to specific 
Japanese industry sector policies or "guidance" by the Japanese 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) designed for 
specific (or "targeted"), Japanese industry sectors. It is 
important to note here that these Japanese policies have been 
successful even when directed against a nation such as Germany which 
experienced significant increases in the sector of industry i.e., 
machine tools, against which the Japanese products competed. 
Advanced materials represent technological developments that 
are less than a decade old. Most of the research and development 
effort and certainly all of the production activities of advanced 
materials (except for advanced ceramics) have taken place in the 
U.s. A very large proportion of the market demand for the $19 
billion sales of advanced materials in 1988 has been from the u.s. 
DOD for defence-related goods. 
As discussed in Chapters 8-12, interest in advanced materials 
in other nations, except Japan, has been very limited. Conversely, 
Japan has exhibited considerable interest in obtaining u.s. advanced 
materials technology but has been able to do so only to a limited 
extent because much of this technology has been restricted due to 
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U.s. defence considerations (National Materials Advisory Board, 
1985). The empirical evidence suggests that the origins of the 
three advanced technologies analysed in this thesis are very much in 
concert with classical economic theory. Conversely, the diffusion 
of the advanced technology industries from the "originator" nation 
to other countries and the rapid growth of these advanced technology 
industries in the other countries contradicts the basic premise of 
classical economics and corresponds to the new economic theory 
(Krugman, 1979; Krugman, 1981). 
The empirical evidence that contradicts classical economic 
theory has, of course, been observed and noted. As a result of this 
empirical evidence, conclusions have been reached by economists that 
appropriate government policies focused on specific industry sectors 
and technologies may overcome another nation's comparative advantage 
in both domestic as well as international markets. A "new" economic 
theory based to a significant extent on the appropriate public 
policies that require government intervention in free markets has 
been suggested (Krugman, 1983; Spencer and Brandor, 1983). The 
following section summarizes the salient features of this "new" 
economic theory. 
13. 4 1'RE "NEW'' ECONOMIC THEORY 
It should be stated at the outset that the new economic theory 
is not represented by a single all-inclusive formulation. Rather, 
it comprises a number of studies that are consistent in assumptions 
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and conclusions but address several components of a nation's 
economic growth and development, with a particular focus on 
government policies directed at increasing exports by the nation as 
a means of improving economic welfare in the country (Krugman, 
1984). The principal elements of the new economic theory may be 
summarized as follows: 
a) A nation selects specific industry sectors and corre-
sponding products for development and growth (Krugman, 1983). 
b) Products of the selected industry sectors are developed to 
embody the most advanced technologies. This objective is accom-
plished either by acquiring technologies from abroad or developing 
these within a nation via government assisted research and develop-
ment activities (Bhagwati, 1983). 
c) A home market is assured for these products by excluding 
imports, encouraging domestic consumption (including government 
purchasers) and controlling prices (Helpmay, 1981). 
d) Economies of scale in production are assured for the 
manufacturers of these products by limiting domestic competition and 
providing funding for capital expenditures (Hufbauer, 1970; Krugman, 
1983). 
e) Technology advancements, both embodied in the product(s) 
and used in manufacturing processes are incorporated by manufac-
turers as a result of government policies and support (Gruber, 
Mahter and Vernon, 1967). 
f) Long-run, low average production costs are achieved using 
various government policies (Krugman, 1983). 
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g) Exports to selected destinations of the low average cost 
products are initiated, providing to the importer, immediate 
·delivery, long-term financing assistance, ample inventory and prompt 
engineering assistance services (Johnson, 1957; Aquino, 1983). 
h) Exports with government support are extended to world-wide 
markets (Krugman, 1983). 
i) Earnings from export markets are used for the expansion of 
domestic manufacturing facilities in order to reduce further the 
average long run costs of manufacture (Casson, 1982). 
j ) Export markets are extended further with lower export 
prices resulting from the reduction in manufacturing costs; and 
k) Manufacturing facilities are established in other nations 
in proximity to markets. 
It should be emphasized that government policies executed in a . 
form of directives, regulations, recommendations, or in the case of 
the Japanese government, "guidances," are an integral part of each 
of the eleven principal elements of the new economic theory. These 
policies have been used by Japan and to a lesser extent by France, 
initially in a format that allowed very limited deviation by the 
firms involved. As the growth of the selected sectors occurred the 
firms were allowed considerable freedom of action. For example, in 
the 1960s, the Japanese government (or MITI), using the existing 
Japanese regulations of foreign exchange control, was able to 
dictate the specific foreign destination for Japanese exports. 
During the 1980s, the Japanese government has continued to encourage 
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exports via a series of financial assistance inducements but has not 
designated specific nations as trading partners for Japanese firms 
(Sakikabara, et al., 1982). 
Among the five countries included in the analyses, Japan has 
utilized all of the eleven elements of the new economic theory, and 
has utilized them very successfully. 
The French government has attempted to utilize government 
policies in concert with some of the elements of new economic theory 
to direct French industry, but with very limited success. The 
governments of the U.K. and the U.S. have not used policies as 
prescribed by the new economic theory or have used such policies to 
a very limited extent. In the case of Germany, the government has 
allowed markets to function essentially without any government 
intervention (Bulmer, 1983; deCarmoy, 1978). 
In summary, as shown in Chapter 4, the classical economic theory 
assumed that the relative abundance of natural resources would 
provide a basis for the comparative advantage of a nation in 
specific economic endeavours. The basis for a country's comparative 
advantage was expanded to include labour force, size of markets, a 
nations wealth and related variables. The new economic theory added 
government policies as one of the determinants of comparative 
advantage. 
716 
A study of government policies in the five nations analyzed in 
this thesis, suggests that even far-reaching policies by a govern-
ment may not lead to a nation's comparative superiority in an 
industry sector unless an appropriate social environment exists in 
a country. The poor performance by French industry is an example of 
this. Conversely, appropriate government policies may result in a 
significant comparative advantage of industry sectors in a country 
that has few natural resources. Japan, of course, is an example of 
this. Clearly for government policies to be effective, these must 
be formulated and enacted in concert with variables that make up the 
"national character" of a country. The attribute that makes 
government policies a powerful instrument in achieving comparative 
advantage for a nation is the ease by which policies may be adjusted 
or modified in response to the domestic as well as international 
economic and geopolitical forces. Proper adjustment of government 
policies, however, requires a well established and well functioning 
system of government on the one hand and a cohesive and responsive 
population on the other. 
13.5 SUMMARY OP CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has considered two economic theories of interna-
tional trade -- the classical and the "new" economic theories. 
Classical economic theory asserts that the achievement of compara-
tive advantage for a certain product will be determined by a com-
bination of factors: a) geographic factors such as location and 
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natural resources, b) availability of capital; and c) availability 
of labour. 
Underpinning classical economic theory is the assertion that a 
nation's optimum economic performance will be assured if free 
markets are permitted to function without interference. Conse-
quently, government intervention on behalf of a nation's industry 
sectors will will prove detrimental to these industry sectors. over 
recent decades, developments in the field of international traqe 
have led economists to question the validity of certain of the 
prescripts of classical economic theory; as a result, a "new" 
economic theory has emerged. The new economic theory of interna-
tional trade maintains that far from being detrimental to a nation's 
economy, government interaction, in the form of policies, directives 
and regulations is of vital importance for the advancement of a 
nation's industry sectors. 
The primary objective of this thesis has been to investi-
gate the impact of government policies on the three advanced 
technology sectors in each of the five countries, and from this, to 
ascertain which of the two economic theories represents the more 
valid explanation of current international trade patterns. Based on 
the statistical and analytical evidence presented throughout this 
thesis, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
a) In the area of advanced technology industry sectors, by 
far the most important development to have taken place over the last 
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few decades has been the spectacular performance of the Japanese. 
Moreover, successive Japanese governments have enacted a continuous 
and comprehensive stream of policies designed to advance specific 
industry sectors. The beneficial effects of such policies have been 
well documented throughout this thesis. As a consequence, one of 
the central prescriptions of classical economic theory -- that 
government intervention in the free markets will have a detrimental 
effect on a nation's economic well being -- must be rejected. In 
its place, it can be concluded that for the Japanese at least, 
government intervention has constituted a vital and central compo-
nent in the phenomenal success of this country in advanced technol-
ogy sectors over recent decades. This Japanese success stands in 
marked contrast to the performance of advanced technology sectors in 
the U.s. and the u. K. Moreover,· in both of these countries has been 
essentially no government intervention in support of advanced tech-
nology sectors. This being the case, it is logical to conclude that 
the central prescription of "new" economic theory -- that government 
intervention is of cardinal importance -- has been validated by the 
performance of the Japanese compared with those of the U.S. and the 
U.K. 
b) Despite the above conclusions, it is important to note 
that government policies themselves cannot guarantee economic 
success. Policies must be ~plemented in a receptive social 
environment and public concensus must be achieved for the policies. 
Policies enacted in Japan achieved considerable acceptance by the 
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population because of Japan's homogenious population, displaying 
common social, religious and political beliefs. 
In addition the Japanese policymakers strived to reach public 
concensus as to the need for policies enacted and the goals of such 
policies. Japan developed elaborate communications networks to 
achieve such concensus. The periodic publication of the white 
papers, "visions," economic plans and other information material by 
the Japanese government educated and informed Japan's population as 
to the need for policies. 
In marked contrast French government policies were enacted 
without any attempt to educate and inform France's population as to 
the need for such policies. Further, unlike in Japan, the French 
population is fragmented among different political and social 
interest groups with conflicting goals and social values. The 
political and social fragmentation of France, intensified by several 
major changes in France's political philosophies and leadership 
since the end of World War II, created a certain hostility to the 
French government's policies. 
Many of the French policies were enacted on behalf of the large 
French industrial enterprises controlled by the French government. 
The smaller and medium sized French industrial entities, not 
controlled by the government, were essentially neglected and 
developed opposition to these policies. 
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The German government did not interfere with free market 
functions in domestic or international markets on behalf of German 
industry. The cohesiveness of Germany society in general and the 
close cooperation between the German labour unions and the 
management of industrial entities, and between the industrial 
sectors and the German academic community significantly assisted 
Germany in achieving growth and technological advancement in 
domestic and international markets. The German performance in 
advanced technology sectors over recent decades has been modest when 
compared to that of Japan, but significantly more impressive than 
that of France. It can be concluded then for optimum economic 
advancement, appropriate government policies must be enacted within 
a socially and politically receptive environment. 
c) A central element of classical economic theory was the 
importance of geographic factors in determining a nation's compara-
tive advantage for a specific product. For many advanced technology 
industries, particularly microelectronics and machine tools, the 
simple fact is that geographic factors are of marginal relevance. 
This is manifest in a number of ways. Firstly and most obviously, 
a raw materials base and climatic factors are of little consequence 
in the production of microelectronics and machine tools. For these 
industries, geographic factors cannot determine comparative advant-
age. Thus Japan, possessing few, or no natural resources, was able 
to establish and maintain comparative advantages in both these 
sectors, primarily through the use of government policies. 
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On first examination the princ_ipal locus of industrial 
activities related to advanced polymers and advanced ceramics 
appears to be determined by the availability of resources (clay and 
oil) and therefore determined by geographic· factors -- one of the 
principal industry location determinants of the classical economic 
theory. Thus, it could be argued that clay resources in Japan were 
the primary determinant of Japan's dominance of the advanced 
ceramics industry, while crude oil in the U.S. dictated the U.S. 
preeminance in the field of advanced polymers. However, it is 
important to note that the U.S. also possesses large resources of 
clay and that the U.S. tried and failed to develop its advanced 
ceramics industry during the later 1970's. This failure was a 
direct consequence of the U.S. government's unwillingness to 
intervene on behalf of this industry sector. Similarly, while 
advanced polymer industry may have originated in the U.S. due to 
crude oil resources, the continued world domination of this industry 
is due almost exclusively to the heavy investments made by the U.S. 
DOD. 
Finally the importance of geographic boundaries has diminished 
considerably in the international trade of advanced technology 
products as a result of the ease with which technology (in the form 
of both know-how and finished products) can diffuse over geographic 
boundaries. Thus while most of the major breakthroughs that have 
occurred in the microelectronics and machine tools sector have been 
-made outside Japan, Japan has been able to acquire the relevant 
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chnology with ease through licensing agreements or outright purchases. The 
ergence of multinational corporations has further eroded the significance 
geographic boundaries, allowing companies to expand beyond the confines of 
e country and to manufacture, market and sell products in numerous foreign 
cations simultaneously. 
Taken together, these elements of the "new" economic theory present a 
allenge to current interpretations in economic geography. Furthermore, 
ey influence proundly a nation's economic base, an increasingly vital. 
ctor in the changing global geopolitical scene (Taylor, 1989). 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 13 
1 There exist several accepted categorizations of industrial 
nations with regard to technology policies. A well prepared 
statement of this can be found in a chapter prepared by Henry Ergas, 
a trade counsellor at the OECO, in the Guile and Brooke (1987) 
report on a recent symposium or technology and social priorities 
organized by u.s. National Academy of Engineering. 
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CHAPTER 14: 
PROSPECTS 
Analyses presented in this thesis suggest the emergence of 
Japan as a power in international economics and the relative decline 
of the u.s. The completed analyses also suggests only modest 
growth in advanced technology sectors in the principal European 
industrial nations. 
It is not likely that these developments will continue at as 
rapid a pace. On the contrary, the on-going geopolitical forces 
will, most likely, modify or even change these developments and 
relationships. The potential for a number of possible changes 
exists, and for some of these changes the basis has already been 
established by the historical developments. To begin with, the 
emerging prospects for a reduction in NATO-Soviet Bloc tensions may 
reduce the need for military power in certain industrial nations. 
The possibility of a nation possessing geopolitical power without a 
military power base, has been, of course, proven by Japan. However, 
the reduction of a nation's industrial activities directly related 
to defence considerations may result in a reduction of research and 
development activities in many of the advanced technology areas. A 
nation such as the u.s., for example, may be required to adopt 
unprecedented policies to encourage research and development 
activities in advanced technology sectors that were in the past 
driven by defence considerations and defence funding. 
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The removal of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and the 
decreasing influence of Communism in the Soviet Union itself may 
open significant new markets for the non-Communist nations. It is 
very likely that these new markets will be the subject of 
competition between the U.S., Japanese and West-European nations. 
The creation of the single European market in 1992 will also 
result in increased competition between the U.S. , Japan and EC 
member nations. The relative absence of native advanced technology 
industries in the EC countries may initially preclude large sales of 
advanced technology products in the Common Market by native firms, 
but it is reasonable to expect that the EC nations will rectify this 
by arranging for appropriate linkages with Japan or the U.S. It is 
possible that a three-tier concentration of advanced technologies 
consisting of Japan, the U.S. and Common Market countries will 
evolve in a relatively short time period. 
A market for advanced technology products significantly larger 
than that of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or the Common Market 
may be made available in China. It is reasonable to assume that 
Japan, because of its proximity and the already existing marketing 
effort there, may attempt to dominate this potential market. 
However some of the NICs should also be considered as competition to 
Japan if China's large potential market is ' opened to foreign 
nations. 
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Finally, it is also possible that the much talked about 
"Pacific Rim" country (Japan and NIC) collaboration will take place 
and will compete against the u.s. and Common Market countries in 
China, Eastern Europe, the Soviet . Union and other areas of the 
world. 
It should be pointed out that Japan is destined to play a major 
role as a world power in any of these changes. Japan's rapid 
economic growth combined with achievements in advanced technology 
sectors places Japan alongside the U.S. and the EC as a world power. 
Japan's potential influence over coming years is also assured by the 
successful Japanese efforts to penetrate the domestic economics of 
the EC nations, the u.s. and to establish an economic presence in 
NICs and less developed countries. Japanese firms have also been 
very successful in establishing close working relationships with the 
native firms in many industrialized nations. Japan is therefore 
well prepared to battle for dominance in the potential, future, 
markets of the USSR and China. 
Any one or several of the above speculative developments may 
take place, and it is not prudent to assign probabilities to these 
possible developments at this time. It is likely however that any 
such developments will take place only if accompanied by appropriate 
policies by the governments involved to deliberately foster such 
developments. 
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APPENDIX B: 
GLOSSARY 
The time interval between the instant that data is 
called from or delivered to a storage device 
(memory) and the instant the requested retrieval 
or storage is complete. 
A prescribed set of well-defined rules for the 
solution of a problem. Algorithms are implemented 
on a computer by a stored sequence of instructions. 
Indicates continuous, non-digital representation of 
phenomena. An analog voltage, for example, may take 
any value. 
Artificial Intelligence. The capability of a 
computer to perform functions that are normally 
attributed to human intelligence, such as learning, 
adapting, recognizing, classification, reasoning, 
self-correction and improvement. 
A robot designed, programmed, or dedicated to 
putting together parts into subassemblies or com-
plete products. 
System(s) used to automatically move and store parts 
and raw materials throughout the manufacturing pro-
cess and to integrate the flow of work pieces and 
tools with the manufacturing process. In FMS's, the 
automated material handling system operates under 
computer control. 
A high density rack storage system with rail running 
vehicles serving the rack structure for automatic 
loading and unloading. Vehicles interface with 
AVGS, ear-on-track, towline or other conveyor sys-
tems for automatic storage and retrieval of loads. 
In FMS's, automated storage systems operate under 
computer control. 
As mandated by the Export Administration Amendments 
Act of 1985, a requirement that individual validated 
license applications for most exports to COCM na-
tions must be approved automatically by Export 
Administration 15 working days after filing unless 
the applicant is notified that more time (not to 
exceed 15 additional working days) is required. At 
the end of the 15- (or 30-) working-day period, the 
~T 
Automation 
Batch 
Manufacture 
Batch 
Processing 
Binary 
Bipolar 
Bit 
Byte 
CPU 
Chip 
Competi-
tiveness ~ 
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export is deemed to be licensed, even if no document 
or communication to that effect has been sent or 
received. 
Automatically Programmed Tools. One of the princi-
pal software languages used in computer-aided manu-
facturing to program numerically controlled machine 
tools. 
The theory, art, or technique of making a process 
automatic, self-moving, or self-controlling. 
The production of parts in discrete runs or batches, 
interspersed with other production operations or 
runs of other parts. 
The technique of processing an entire group (batch) 
of similar or related jobs or input items on a sys-
tem at one time without operator interaction. 
Contrast with interactive graphics system. 
A system of numbers using 2 as a base in contrast 
to the decimal system which uses 10 as a base. The 
binary system requiers only two symbols ••. o and 1. 
Refers to transistors formed with two (N- and P-
type) semiconductor types. 
A binary digit. A bit is the smallest unit of sto-
rage in a digital computer and is used to represent 
one of the two digits in the binary number system. 
A set of contiguous binary bits, usually eight, 
which are operated on as a unit. A Byte can also 
be a sub-set of a computer word. 
Central Processor Unit. That part of a computer 
that fetches, decodes, and executes program 
instructions and maintains status of results. 
A small piece of a semiconductor material such as 
silicon on which an integrated circuit has been 
fabricated. 
The relative ability of firms located in a 
particular country to develop, produce, and market 
goods or services of a particular type in competi-
tion with firms in other countries. As used in 
this report, costs of production are the most 
CMOS 
CAD/CAM 
CAM 
CIM 
. 
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important single factor in determining competi-
tiveness. 
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor. A logic 
family made by combining N-channel and P-channel 
MOS transistors. 
Computer-Aided Design. Describes the more 
demanding and elaborate preparation of complex 
schematics and blueprints, typically those of 
industry. In these applications an operator con-
structs a highly detailed drawing on-line using a 
variety of interaction device and programming tech-
niques. Facilities are required for replicating 
basic figures; achieving exact size and placement of 
components; making lines of specified length, width, 
or angle to previously defined lines; satisfying 
varying geometric and topological constraints among 
components of the drawing; etc. 
Computer-Aided Design/Computer-Aided Manufacturing. 
Refers to the integration of computers into the 
entire design-to-fabrication cycle of a product or 
plant. 
Computer-Aided Manufacturing. The use of computer 
and digital technology to generate manufacturing-
oriented data. Data drawn from a CAD/CAM database 
can assist in or control a portion or· all of a 
manufacturing process, including numerically con-
trolled machines, computer-assisted parts program-
ming, computer-assisted process planning, robotics 
and programmable logic controls. CAM can involve 
production programming, manufacturing engineering, 
industrial engineering, facilities engineering and 
reliability engineering (quality control). CAM 
techniques can be used to produce process plans for 
fabricating a complete assembly; to program robots; 
and to coordinate plant operation. 
Computer-Integrated Manufacturing. The concept 
of a totally automated factory in which all manu-
facturing processes are integrated and controlled 
by a CAD/CAM system. CIM enables production 
planners and schedulers, shop-floor foremen, and 
accountants to use the same database as product 
designers and engineers. 
CNC 
Controller 
Country 
Groups 
Dedicated 
Manufac-
turing 
System 
Development 
System 
Die 
Diffusion 
Digital 
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Computer Numerical Control. A technique in which a 
machine tool control uses a minicomputer to store 
NC instructions generated earlier by CAD/CAM for 
controlling the maching. 
An information processing device whose inputs are 
both the desired and the measured position velocity 
or other pertinent variables in a process and whose 
outputs are drive signals to a controlling motor or 
actuator. The controller has a threefold function: 
first, to initiate and terminate motions of the 
manipulator in a desired sequence and at desired 
points; second, to store position and sequence data 
in memory; and third, to interface with the "outside 
world". 
Seven groups of foreign countries, established by 
the u.s. Commerce Department for export control 
purposes. Canada is not included in any country 
group and is referred to by name in the Export 
Administration Regulations. · 
A series of specially designed machine tools for 
automatically machining one part or several very 
similar parts in large quantitites. An example 
would be a transfer line for machining automobile 
engine blocks. 
Microcomputer system complete with peripherals, 
memory and software, used to write, compile, run 
and debug application programs for one or more 
target microprocessors. 
A single square or rectangular piece of semi-
conductor material into which a specific electrical 
circuit has been fabricated. Plural is dice. Also 
called a chip. 
A method of doping or modifying the characteristics 
of semiconductor material by "baking" wafers of the 
base semiconductor material in furnaces with con-
trolled atmospheres or impurity materials. 
Refers to electronic circuits or devices, the inputs 
and outputs of which are nominally discrete voltage 
levels. Analog or linear circuits, in contrast, 
have inputs and outputs that vary continuously over 
a range of voltages. Virtually all computers pro-
cess information in digital form. 
DNC 
Discrete 
Dumping 
Dynamic RAM 
EAR OM 
EAPROM 
Embargo 
End Use 
EPROM 
Flexible 
Automation 
FMC 
FMS 
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Can stand for either Direct Numerical Control in 
. . , wh~ch a s1ngle computer operates a number of hard-
ware or software controlled NC machines on a shared 
real time basis, or Distributed Numerical Control m 
which a complete part program is downloaded to a CNC 
system from a central computer. There is an operator 
at each of the NC machine tools and the machines are 
handled in a normal autonomous mode. 
A semiconductor device containing only one active 
device, such as a transistor or a diode. 
The sale of exported goods at less than the price 
charged by the manufacturer in his home market, or 
in some cases at less than cost. Dumping is re-
stricted under the GATT as an "unfair" trade 
practice. 
A type of semiconductor memory in which the presence 
or absence of a capacitive charge represents the 
state of a binary storage element. The charge must 
be periodically refreshed. 
Electrically Alterable ROM. A read-only memory 
whose contents may be altered on rare occasions 
through electrical stimuli. 
Electrically-Erasable PROM. 
A legal prohibition on commerce. 
The purpose or application for which controlled 
commodities or technical data will be used by a 
consignee. 
Erasable PROM. Similar to ROM, but enables the user 
to erase stored information and replace it with new 
information, when necessary. Most EPROMs are erased 
through exposure to ultra-violet light. 
Refers to the multi-task capability of robots; 
multi-purpose, adaptable, reprogrammable. 
Flexible Machining Center. Usually a multi-task 
capability of robots; multi-purpose, adaptable, 
reprogrammable. 
Flexible Manufacturing system. Four or more NC 
machine tools having automatic tool changing and 
part handling capabilities at, and between, the 
machines and all under computer control. An FMS 
can operate on a number of different parts simul-
GATT 
HMOS 
Hybrid 
Circuit 
Input/Output 
Integrated 
Circuit (IC) 
Intelligent 
Robot 
IGS 
ICG 
Interface 
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taneously without human interference for an extended 
time period, such as one or several shifts. An 
example would be a line of eight horizontal 
machining centres. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. An inter-
national organization, based in Geneva, that pro-
vides a forum for trade negotiations. Member 
countries are committed to reducing the barriers to 
world trade, and expanding its volume. 
High performance MOS. 
Any combination of two or more of the following in 
one package: 
* Active substrate integrated circuit. 
* Passive substrate integrated circuit. 
* Discrete component. 
Relating to the equipment or method used for trans-
mitting (I/O) information into and out of a 
computer. 
A semiconductor die containing multiple elements 
that act together to form the complete device 
circuit. 
A robot that can make sophisticated decisions and 
behavioral choices through its sensing and recog-
nizing capabilities. 
Interactive Graphics System or Interactive Computer 
Graphics. A CAD/CAM system in which the work-
stations are used interactively for computer-aided 
design andjor drafting, as well as for CAM, all 
under full operator control, and possibly also for 
text-processing, generation of charts and graphs, 
or computer-aided engineering. The designer 
(operator) can intervene to enter data and direct 
the course of any program, receiving immediate 
visual feedback via the CRT. Bilateral communica-
tions are provided between the system and the 
user(s). Often used synonymously with CAD. 
(1) A hardware andjor software link which enables 
two systems, or a system and its peripherals, to 
operate as a single; integrateed system. (2) The 
input devices and visual feedback capabilities 
which allow bilateral communication between the 
user and the system. 
ITC 
Keystone 
Equipment 
LED 
LSI 
Linear IC 
Machining 
Centre 
Manipulator 
Mask 
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International Trade Commission. An independent 
agency of the u.s. Government which investigates 
and rules on trade-related matters, primarily 
concerned with imports. 
Sophisticated devices essential to the success-
ful operation/completion of manufacturing pro-
cesses. (Some examples include process control 
equipment and specialized machine tools). 
Light Emitting Diode. A semiconductor device that 
emits light whenever current passes through it. 
Large Scale Integration. LSI devices contain 100 
or more gate equivalents or other circuitry of 
similar complexity. 
An analog integrated circuit, as opposed to a 
digital integrated circuit. 
A machine capable of performing a variety' of metal 
removal operations on a part, usually under numeri-
cal control. 
The mechanical linkages or joints of a robot or 
machine tool which move in prescribed directions in 
order to move parts, tools or materials. 
A patterned screen, usually of glass,· used to expose 
selected areas of a semiconductor (that has been 
covered with a photoresist) to a light source that 
causes polymerization. 
Metal Oxide Semiconductor. Devices using FETs in 
which current flow through a channel of N- or P-
type semiconductor material is controlled by the 
electric field around a gate structure. MOSFETs are 
unipolar devices characterized by extremely high 
input resistance. 
Medium Scale Integration. ICs containing ten or 
more gate equivalents but less than 100. 
A microprocessor complete with stored program memory 
(ROM), random access memory (RAM), and input/output 
(I/O) logic. If all functions are on the same chip, 
this is sometimes called a microcontroller. Micro-
computers are capable of performing useful work 
without additional supporting logic. 
Micro-
electronics 
Micron 
Micro-
processor 
Minicomputer 
Module 
Monolithic 
Device 
Multilateral 
Network 
Non-Servo 
Robot 
NC 
• 
740 
Microscopically small components or circuits made by 
means of photolithography techniques. 
Synonymous with micrometer: one millionth of a 
meter. 
Computer central processing unit on a single chip. 
A class of computer in which the basic element of 
the central processing unit is constructed of a 
number of discrete components and integrated cir-
cuits rather than being comprised of a single 
integrated circuit, as is the microprocessor. 
A separate and distinct unit of hardware or soft-
ware whih is part of a system. 
A device whose circuitry is completely contained on 
a single die or chip. 
As used in this report, referring to agreements or 
negotiations among three or more nations to reach 
common accord on national security export controls 
and procedures. 
An arrangement of two or more interconnected 
computer systems to facilitate the exchange of 
information in order to perform a specific func-
tion. For example, a CAD/CAM system might be 
connected to a mainframe computer to off-load 
heavy analytic tasks. Also refers to a piping net-
work in computer-aided plant design. "Local 
networking" is the communications network internal 
to a robot. "Global networking" is the ability to 
provide communications connections outside of the 
robot's internal system. 
A robot that can be programmed by its motions only 
to the end points of each of its axes of motion. 
See robot, servo-robot. 
Numerical Control. A technique of operating 
machine tools or similar equipment in which motion 
is developed in response to numerically coded com-
mands. These commands may be generated by a CAD/ 
CAM system on punched tapes or other communications 
media. Also, the processes involved in generating 
the data or tapes necessary to guide a machine tool 
in the manufacture of a part. 
Offshore 
Manufacture 
OECD 
Peripherals 
Process 
Processor 
Process 
Planning 
Programmable 
Controller 
PLA 
PROM 
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The production of parts and components, and/or their 
assembly, in plants located in foreign countries 
. , 
followed by sh~pment back to the home market or to 
third country markets. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment. An international organization composed of 
industrial countries. Its aims are to encourage 
economic growth and employment and to promote the 
development of industrializing countries. 
Computer hardware other than th~ processing unit 
itself. Typical peripherals are terminals, card 
readers, and auxiliary storage units. 
A systematic sequence of operations to produce a 
specific result. 
The portion of a computer system that executes 
the program. 
Specifying the sequence of production steps from 
start to finish, and describing the.state of the 
workpeice at each workstation. Recently CAM capa-
bilities have been applied to the task of preparing 
process plans for the fabrication or assembly of 
parts. 
A programmable controller is a solid-state control 
system that can be programmed to execute instruc-
tions that control machines and process operation by 
implementing specific functions such as logic con-
trol, sequencing, timing, counting, and arithmetic 
operations. A programmable controller consists of 
five basic elements: (1) central processing unit; 
(2) memory; (3) input;output interface; (4) power 
supply; and (5) programming device. 
Programmable Logic Array. A general purpose logic 
circuit containing an array of logic gates which can 
be connected (programmed) to perform various 
functions. 
Programmable Read Only Memory. A read-only memory 
which can be programmed after manufacture by 
external equipment. Typically, PROMs utilize 
fusible links which may be burned open to produce a 
logic bit in a specific location. 
RAM 
ROM 
Real Time 
Reexport 
Reverse 
Engineering 
Robot 
Robot 
Motions 
Robotics 
Semi-
condutor 
Sensor 
• 
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Random Acess Memory, which stores digital informa-
tion temporarily and can be changed by the use. It 
constitutes the basic storage element in a computer. 
Also called a read/write memory. 
Read Only Memory, which permanently stores informa-
tion used repeatedly - such as microcode or 
characters for electronic display. Unlike RAM, ROM 
cannot be altered. 
Refers to tasks or functions executed so rapidly 
by a CAD/CAM system that the feedback at various 
stages in the process can be used to guide the user 
completing the task. 
The exportation of commodities or technical data 
from one foreign destination to another at any time 
after initial export from the country of origin. 
Reproduction of a unique product based solely on 
examination and analysis of a sample of the product. 
A reprogrammable, multifunctional manipulator 
designed to move material, parts, tools, or 
specialized devices, through variable programmed 
motions for the performance of a variety of tasks. 
Four types of work motions: (1) Anthropometric 
Motion - Motion of a robot as in a.shoulder, elbow 
and a wrist, developing a modified spherical work 
envelope. (2) Cylindrical Motion - the motion of a 
robot's arm when mounted on cylindrical axis. (3) 
Polar Motion - the motions of a robot by two axes of 
rotation which create a modified spherical work 
envelope. (4) Rectilinear Motion - motions of a 
robot in three dimensions along straight lines. 
The use of computer-controlled manipulators or arms 
to automate a variety of manufacturing processes 
such as welding, material handling, painting, and 
assembly. 
A material with properties of both a conductor and 
an insulator. Common semiconductors include silicon 
and germanium . 
A transducer or other device whose input is a 
physical phenomenon and whose output is a quantita-
tive measure of that physical phenomenon. 
Servo-
Controlled 
Robot 
Servo-
mechanism 
Servo-Robot 
Software 
Start-up 
Static RAM 
Technical 
Data 
Technological 
Commodity 
Technology 
Transfer 
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A robot driven by servomechanisms, i.e., motors 
whose driving signal is a function of the difference 
between commanded position and/or rate and measured 
actual position and/or rate. Such a robot is 
capable of stopping at or moving through a practi-
cally unlimited number of points in executing a 
programmed trajectory. 
A control system for the robot in which the 
computer issues commands, the air motor drives the 
arm, and a sensor measures the motion and signals 
the amount of the motion back to the computer. 
This process is continued until the arm is reposi-
tioned to the point requested. 
A robot whose manipulator can be commanded to move 
anywhere within its limits of grasp (any points 
along its axis of motion) . See non-servo robot. 
Computer program. Can also refer to other carriers 
of information such as books, film, phonograph 
records. 
The time between the installation and the final 
operation of the system as desired. 
A type of RAM which does not require periodic 
refresh cycles, as does dynamic RAM. 
Information of any kind that can be used or adapted 
for use in the design, production, manufacture, 
utilization, or reconstruction of articles or ma-
terials. The data may take a tangible form, such 
as a model, prototype, blueprint, or an operating 
manual (the tangible form may be stored on re-
cording media); or they may take an intangible form 
such as technical know-how. Software is considered 
technical data. 
Mass-produced items that are marketed, distributed, 
and/or warehoused in large quantitites for use by 
distributors and customers around the world. Most 
items that can be purchased from retail outlets on 
a cash-and-carry basis are also technological com-
modities. Examples of commodities currently sub-
ject to national security export controls are some 
personal computers and related peripheral devices, 
floppy discs, and microchips. 
In the context of this report, the acquisition by 
one country from another of products, technology, 
or know-how that directly or indirectly enables a 
Third 
Countries 
Tool 
Transistor 
Transshipment 
Turnkey 
Vertical 
Integration 
VHSIC 
VLSI 
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qualitative or quantitative upgrading of deployed 
military systems or the development of effective 
countermeasures to military systems deployed by 
others. 
Free World nations that are not members of COCOM. 
A term used loosely to define something mounted 
on the end of a robot arm, e.g., a hand, a gripper, 
or an arc welding torch. 
The basic solid-state device used to amplify or 
switch electrical current. 
The transfer, by a series of separately documented 
shipments, of controlled products through one or 
more countries en route to a final destination that 
may be a proscribed country. Initially, the final 
destination - and in later transactions, the country 
of origin - are concealed to avoid export or re-
export prohibitions. 
A CAD/CAM or robotic system for which the supplier/ 
vendor assumes total responsibility for building, 
installing, and testing both hardware and software, 
and the training of user personnel. Also loosely, 
a system which comes equipped with al~ the hardware 
and software required to do a specific application 
or applications. Usually implies a commitment by 
the vendor to make the system work, and to provide 
preventative remedial maintenance of both hardware 
and software. Sometimes ushed interchangeably with 
stand alone, although stand alone applies more to a 
system's architecture than to terms of purchase. 
A method of manufacturing a product, such as a CAD/ 
CAM system, whereby all major modules and components 
are fabricated in-house under uniform company 
quality control and fully supported by the system 
vendor. 
Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit. Name given to 
a U.S. Department of Defense R&D program aimed at 
military needs for VLSI circuits. The designation 
refers to the high speed required for applica-
tions such as signal processing. 
Very Large Scale Integration. VLSI devices are ICs 
that contain 1,000 or more gate equivalents. 
Wafer 
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A thin disk of semiconducting material (usually 
silicon) on which many separate chips can be fabri-
cated and then cut into individual ICs. Also called 
a slice. 
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